研討日期

20051126日上午10:00 ~ 下午1:00

研討地點

台大經濟系館第二教室

討論文獻

題目

作者

文獻出處

Unionization, vertical markets, and the outsourcing of multinationals

Laixun

Zhao

Journal of International Economics 55 (2001)

PP 187-202.

報告人

彭正浩

參加人員

王胤杰、黃鴻、王光正、彭正浩、梁文榮 、林燕淑、胡均立、吳芝文、吳世傑、許淑瑛、曾靜枝、李玫郁、李家銘 、林晏如、高國峰、張民忠、陳盈秀、陳疆平、蔡明芳、涂光億

討論提要

This paper offers an explanation for multinationals that are both horizontally and vertically related. Specifically, when labor is unionized, the conventional incentives for merger may disappear in industries of successive (or bilateral) monopoly, due to ‘double marginalization’, which limits the amount of surplus that can be bargained between labor and the firms. We show that vertical integration raises both union employment and the negotiated wage, but may reduce total industry profits. As such, the integrated firm has incentives to outsource — to go multinational, regardless of whether the foreign country is unionized or not.

結論

This paper demonstrates that the negotiated wage decreases and firm profits increase with outsourcing. Thus, unionization in vertically related markets can make firms become multinational conglomerates that are both vertically and horizontally related.

延伸研究

Applying the concept in this paper to  derive the relationship between the bargaining power of domestic  union and  its outsourcing ratio.

備註