研討日期

2005年11月19日上午10:00 ~ 下午1:00

研討地點

台大社會科學院第二會議室

討論文獻

題目

作者

文獻出處

Tax competition and tax coordination in a median voter model

C Fuest and B Huber

Public Choice 107,97-113

報告人

許淑媖

參加人員

王胤杰、黃鴻、王光正、梁文榮、邱俊榮、胡均立、吳芝文、吳世傑、許淑瑛、曾靜枝、李玫郁、李家銘 、林晏如、高國峰、張民忠、陳盈秀、陳疆平、彭正浩、蔡明芳

討論提要

This paper analyzes the welfare effects of capital tax coordination in a simple model of fiscal competition where fiscal policy is subject to majority voting and households differ with respect to their labor and capital income.

結論

The coordinated capital tax increase may raise or reduce welfare, depending on the relative magnitude of economic distortions induced by a labor tax and political distortions resulting form the influence of the median voter on fiscal policy decisions.

延伸研究

Applying the concept in this paper to international trade theory is expected to enrich this theory to some extent.

備註