研討日期

2005年10月22日上午10:00 ~ 13:00

研討地點

台大經濟系館第二教室

討論文獻

題目

作者

文獻出處

Cooperative lobbying and endogenous trade policy

Toke S.Aidt

Public Choice 93, 1997

報告人

許淑媖

參加人員

張民忠; '楊雅博'; '黃鴻'; '曾靜枝'; '彭正浩'; '陳疆平;陳宏易'; '梁文榮'; '林燕淑'; '林晏如'; '李玫郁'; '吳芝文'; '冰瑤';王光正';許淑媖

討論提要

The literature on the political economy of trade has pointed out that a strong protectionist pressure arises from the interaction at the political market between self-interested politicians, voters and special groups leading to trade protection. Then why liberal trade polices are chosen in many countries?

結論

1. Since competitive lobbying leads o excessive rent-seeking expenditures, the lobbies have an incentive to cooperate. The outcome of cooperative lobbying is characterized in terms of lobbying and bargaining power of the two groups

2. Result 1, if the power of competing interest groups is balanced, then cooperation leads to free trade

3. Result2, if it is unbalanced, cooperation may increase protection

延伸研究

1. consider the factors that determine the lobbying power

2. think that consumer and producer playing as two conflicting parties compete/cooperative for government policy.

3. domestic firm and foreign firm serve as another type of competitive parties

備註