研討日期

2005年10月1日上午10:00 ~ 13:00

研討地點

台大社會科學院第二教室

討論文獻

題目

作者

文獻出處

Durable Goods Monopoly, Learning-by-doing and “Sleeping Patents”

Edward Kutsoati

and

Jan Zabojnik

Working paper (2001)

報告人

周冰瑤

參加人員

黃鴻、林燕淑、梁文榮、胡均立王光正、邱俊榮、楊雅博、吳芝文、蔡宗秀、許淑女英、張民忠、李玫郁李家銘、涂光億、彭正浩、蔡明芳、林晏如、曾靜枝、周冰瑤、陳疆平

討論提要

    Consider a durable good monopolist that operates in two periods.

    We analyze a durable–good monopolist’s decision to adopt a new and more ecient tech­nology that is readily available at no cost and compare to the social optimum.

    After an initial period of learning by doing, the new technology can either lower the cost of production, or make the good more attractive to con­sumers.

結論

    There are two effects that influence the monopolist’s incentives to adopt an innovation in the presence of learning by doing, and these work in opposite directions.

    First, the adoption of the innovation makes the monopolist’s time inconsistency problem more severe, which tends to dis­courage innovation. Our first result is that this effect can lead to situations where the monopolist suppresses a better product or a dominant technology in a socially inefficient way.

    Second, owing to the presence of learning by doing, the gains from the innovation are realized mainly in the second period. Because the monopolist’s pricing leads to a higher second period residual demand than is socially optimal, the monopolist may view the innovation as more desirable than a social planner would. This sometimes makes the monopolist adopt an innovation that optimally should not be adopted, which is our second main result.

備註