研討日期

2005年7月9日上午10:00 ~ 13:00

研討地點

台大社會科學院第二教室

討論文獻

題目

Strategic trade and delegatoin games

報告人

彭正浩

參加人員

胡均立、王光正、邱俊榮、楊雅博、吳芝文、許淑女英、彭正浩王胤杰、張民忠、王佳琪、涂光億、李家銘、林晏如、蔡明芳、高國峰

討論提要

One of the chief shortcomings of strategic trade theory has been that its predictions are highly sensitive to assumptions about the nature of product-market competition. Applying recent results in duopoly theory, this paper considers three-stage games in which governments choose subsidies, firms' owners choose incentive schemes for their managers and, then the managers compete in the product-market.

結論

 This paper shows that if firms' owner  have sufficient control over the managers' behavior, then the optimal strategic trade policy does not depend on the mode of product-market competition. In the linear model, this paper shows that owners' ability to set a simple, relative performance incentive schemes is sufficient for the invariance result to hold. In more complicated environments, more complicated incentive schemes may be required, but basic result is robust.

備註

The deficiency of this paper is to eliminate the principle-agent problem which is concerned in traditional game theory by setting relative performance  incentive scheme. Since no matter what kind of mode of competition faced by the owners, they can create the same incentive scheme to their managers. Therefore, authors can yield the results in this paper, i.e. the same quantities of output and price.