研討日期

2005年416日上午10:00 ~ 13:00

研討地點

台大社會科學院第二教室

討論文獻

題目

作者

文獻出處

Permits, standards, and Technology Innovation

Juan-Pablo Montero

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

報告人

彭正浩

參加人員

黃鴻、胡均立、李揚、楊雅博、邱俊榮、吳芝文、許淑女英、詹懷瑾、王胤杰、張民忠、王佳琪、涂光億、吳政澤、李玫郁、李家銘、彭正浩、林晏如、蔡明芳

討論提要

This paper compare environmental R&D incentives offered by 4 policy instruments -- emission standards, performance standards, tradeable permits and auction permits -- in the presence of oligopoly permits and output markets.

In general, market-based instrument such as tradeable permits and taxed provide more incentives than command-and-control instruments such as emission and performance standards.(Jung1996, Milliman 1989 and Parry(1998))

Because R&D incentives depend on direct and strategic effects under oligopoly, standards can offer greater incentives than permits. These findings are different from previous studies which considered either a single firm or completely abstract from the output market.

 

結論

The result indicate that environmental R&D rankings differ form those found by earlier studies.

Under imperfect competition output and permit market:

1. Performance standards can provide more, less or the same R&D incentives than emission standards.

2.Emission standards provide more R&D incentives than tradeable permit.

3.R&D incentive between performance standards and tradeable permits are ambiguous.

4. Auctioned permits provide more R&D incentives than tradeable permit.

5.R&D incentive between standards and auctioned permits are ambiguous.

Under perfect competition output market and imperfect permit market :

1. Standards and tradeable permit provide equal R&D incentives, but fewer incentives than auctioned permits if output is fixed..

2.Emission standards and permits provide equal R&D incentives and more incentives than performance standards, if firms play Cournot in output market.

Under imperfect competition output market and perfect permit market :

1. Incentives to invest in R&D are the same under tradeable and auctioned permits.

2. Emission standards provide more R&D incentives than permits.

Under perfect competition output and permit market, emission standards and permits provide equal R&D incentives that exceed those under performance standards.

延伸研究

1. Find the welfare ranking of four instruments and optimal amount of R&D investment under perfectly competitive output market, if outputs are all exported.

2. How to setup and measure emission standards and performance standards for different firms under oligopoly output market?

3. Consider 'free entry' problem, endogenous number of firms in output market to see if there is any different findings. 

備註