研討日期

2004116日上午10:00 ~ 12:00

研討地點

台大社會科學院第2教室

討論文獻

題目

作者

文獻出處

Hold-up and sequential specific investments

Valdimir Smirnov, Andrew Wait

Rand Journal of Economics

報告人

彭正浩

參加人員

梁文榮、邱俊榮、胡均立、吳世傑、楊雅博、陳更生、吳芝文、許淑煐、王胤杰、梁文榮、吳政澤、詹懷瑾、彭正浩、康廷嶽

討論提要

This paper explores the hold-up problem when parties can make investment simultaneously or sequentially. Sequencing of investments can allow some projects to proceed that would not be feasible with a simultaneous regime. However, a cost of sequencing is that it can disadvantage some parties, reducing their incentive to invest. The mere possibility of sequential investment can prevent trade from occurring; this can be interpreted as a new form of hold-up (follow-up). If both parties prefer to invest second, as the number of potential investment periods is increased, the subgame-perfect equilibrium can switch between a prison's dilemma and a coordination game.

結論

1.  The sequential-investment regime allows trade to occur that would not be feasible when only the simultaneous-investment regime is available.

2. The option of sequencing investment can reduce welfare. Sometimes, sequential investment may discourage by one party, preventing trade from occurring and reducing the welfare of both players.

3.     Sequential investment also lengthens the time from the start of the project until returns are realized, reducing the ex-ante values of total surplus when parties discount future returns.

4. The strategy may switch between prison's dilemma and coordination game as time horizon changes.

延伸研究

Dr. Hu recommends McAfee's "Black mail and Foreign Direct Investment" as a benchmark of extend study and research.

備註