研討日期

2004年8月14日上午10:00 ~ 12:00

研討地點

台大社會科學院第25教室

討論文獻

題目

作者

文獻出處

Political manipulation of a public firm’s objective function

M. White

Journal of Economics Behavior and Organization

報告人

許淑英

參加人員

林燕淑、胡均立、邱俊榮、邱郁琇、楊雅博、胡均立、陳宏易、許淑瑛、梁文榮、王光正、王胤杰、蔡宜臻

討論提要

If the government, controlling the public firm which competes with a private firm, can assign the public firm any social welfare function, what function would it assign?

結論

The government can maximize its true objective by assigning the public firm a different objective function. This strategic behavior allows the government to fine-tune the public’s perception of its political agenda.

延伸研究

If the public firm acts as a Stackelberg leader instead of competing simultaneously with the private firm, what function will government assign?

備註