研討日期

2004年4月3日上午10:00 ~ 13:00

研討地點

台大社會科學院第二教室

討論文獻

題目

作者

文獻出處

Commodity Taxation in a Differentiated Oligopoly

Helmuth Cremer,

Jacques-Francois Thisse

International Economic Review, 1994

報告人

郭子綾

參加人員

黃鴻、林燕淑、楊雅博、胡均立、吳世傑、吳芝文、郭虹瑩、許淑瑛、邱俊榮、蔡宗秀、楊雅博、吳世傑、王光正、黃璀娟、陳宏易、郭子綾、李揚、梁文榮、蔡爵丞、鄭義暉、陳秀華、陳更生、劉惠玲、朱維愷

討論提要

The authors introduce commodity taxation into a vertical differentiation model with endogenous product selection. They show that a uniform ad valorem tax lowers both qualities, distorts the allocation of consumers between firms and lowers the consumer prices of both variants. A small uniform tax is always welfare-improving over the no-tax equilibrium. A differentiation of tax rates may or may not be desirable on welfare grounds. If a welfare improvement is possible through a nonuniform tax, it is always the high-quality variant which must be taxed at a higher rate.

結論

This paper is very technically designed to explore the complex three-stage game problem. In the beginning, it figure out the first-best allocation, and then compare those equilibria in different cases to discuss the tax effects. However, the paper misses the case discussing of  price-cutting competition between the two firms.  

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