研討日期 |
2003年12月6日上午10:00 ~
12:00 |
||
研討地點 |
台大社會科學院第二教室 |
||
討論文獻 |
題目 |
作者 |
文獻出處 |
Strategic Environmental Policies
When Waste Products are Tradable |
James
Cassing and Thomas Kuhn |
Review
of International Economics, 11(3), 495-511, 2003 |
|
報告人 |
蔡宗秀 |
||
參加人員 |
黃鴻、郭虹瑩、陳更生、許淑英、梁文榮、陳秀華、蔡爵丞、郭子綾、蔡宗秀 |
||
討論提要 |
1. The purpose of
this paper: by assuming the international hazardous waste market is an
oligopoly market structure, this paper studies the strategic behavior of
waste-exported and waste-imported countries’ decisions on environmental taxes. 2. Model: the
authors built an m+1 countries model.
Waste is assumed exported by n identical firms in home country
(developing country). There are
m waste-importing countries. The
price of the waste is a function of the volume of total exported-waste, the
home country environmental tax, and all foreign countries’ environmental
taxes. 3. Three
scenarios: based on the model set-up, this paper derives the governments’
strategic behavior based on (1) pure environmental policy—the governments do
not take into account the terms of trade in their environmental tax
decisions; (2) Nash Equilibrium—the two governments play Nash game in
deciding each country’s environmental tax; (3) Stackelberg leadership—the
home country decides its environmental tax first. Results:
(1) pure environmental policy— optimal environmental tax should equal to each
country’s environmental marginal damage. (2) Nash equilibrium—the home
country’s optimal
environmental tax is less than its marginal damage while the foreign
countries environmental taxes are higher than their marginal damage. (3)
Stackelberg leadership—the home country optimal environmental tax is even
less than the tax rate on Nash equilibrium. |
||
延伸研究 |
The
contribution of this paper is on its model; it is the first that formally
models the international waste market.
Based on his model, I am going to expand the model so that the reality
and the theoretical discussion can be matched closely. These include: (1) assuming the home
country also disposal the waste; waste disposal is also a competitive market;
(2) foreign country recycles the waste and produces an recycled product; its
social welfare includes recycled product market’s consumer surplus, producer
surplus and waste importing tariff. |
||
備註 |
This paper makes a huge mistake. The sign of dE/dt is positive—the appendix of the paper
points it out correctly--however, the content of the paper treats it as
negative. This affects the
analysis of the whole paper. We
wonder the main results of this paper are actually opposite.
|