研討日期 |
2003年10月25日上午十點到下午一點 |
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研討地點 |
經研所會議室 |
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討論文獻 |
題目 |
作者 |
文獻出處 |
Multiproduct
multinationals and reciprocal FDI dumping |
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Journal of International Economics 54 (2001) 429-448 |
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報告人 |
蔡爵丞 |
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參加人員 |
黃鴻、林燕淑、邱俊榮、楊雅博、吳世傑、梁文榮、胡均立、蔡宗秀、鄭義暉、陳宏易、郭虹瑩、許淑女英、黃璀娟、吳芝文、郭子綾、蔡爵丞、陳秀華 |
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討論提要 |
The
world pattern of foreign direct investment is remarkably similar to the world
trade pattern, yet the mainstay theory of FDI has trade and FDI as
substitutes. This paper posits a model where multiproduct firms
simultaneously engage in intraindustry FDI and intraindustry trade in a
manner that naturally leads to parallelism in the trade and FDI patterns. The
model cannot explain all aspects of the trade and FDI correlation, and it is
clearly irrelevant to some industries. It is, however, base on a novel motive
for FDI. There are two approaches discussing
about the FDI and trade. The first one is advantages approach, that
multinationals must have some sort of advantage over local firms. The other
is proximity versus scale approach, that single product firms must choose to
either save on trade costs (by producing in proximity to their consumers) or
to exploit scale economies (by consolidating production at home). Obstacles to trade generates a natural incentive for multiproduct firms to engage simultaneously in IIFDI and IIT.This model is “cross hauling” of foreign investment that generates two way trade in differential final products. It is analogous to the reciprocal dumping model because imperfect competition is the heart of these two models. |
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結論 |
There are three cases discussing in this
paper. The followings are the results of these three cases respectively. In the full symmetry case, IIFDI arises when
varieties are sufficiently good substitutes (so the cannibalization effect is
powerful), trade costs are sufficiently high (so geographical separation
reduces cannibalization a lot), and the cost of multinationals is not too
great. In the firm wise symmetry, the incentive to go
multinational increases as a firm’s own varieties become better substitutes
for each other relative to their substitutability with the other firm’s
varieties. This incentive also rises with trade costs, but falls with the
cost of multinational. In the matching product lines, a firm’s
varieties are pair-wise good substitutes with their competitors’ goods. When
the costs of multinational is sufficiently small, the cannibalization effect
is thus always lower in the M-only outcome, and consequently M-outcome always
dominates N-outcome. When two-way FDI arises, the ratio of operating profit to fixed cost is higher for local factory than it is for the factory abroad. In this case, the FDI may be thought of as reciprocal FDI dumping. |
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延伸研究 |
The approach in question may apply to the studies in international trade and spatial competition. We are going to file a study involving endogenous location decision and competitive price discrimination to examine the effect of firms’ location choices on the ability of their price discrimination. In addition, the effects of competitive price discrimination, while considering endogenous location, on the equilibrium price, consumers’ surplus and social welfare are also interesting. |
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備註 |
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