研討日期

2003年8月8日上午10:00 ~ 13:00

研討地點

台大社會科學院第二教室

討論文獻

題目

作者

文獻出處

Ownership and Non-performing Loans:  Evidence from Taiwan’s Banks

Jin-Li Hu

Yang Li

Yung-Ho Chiu

初稿

報告人

胡均立

參加人員

楊雅博、胡均立、吳世傑、邱俊榮、王光正、陳宏易、林燕淑、黃璀娟

討論提要

We first derive a theoretical model to predict that the relation between non-performing loan ratios and government shareholdings can be downward-sloping, upward-sloping, U-shaped, and inversely U-shaped.  An increase in the government’s shareholding does facilitate political lobbying.  On the other hand, the private shareholding will induce more non-performing loans to be manipulated by corrupt private owners.  We adopt a panel data set with 40 Taiwanese commercial banks during 1996-1999 for empirical analysis.  The rate of non-performing loans decreases as the government shareholding in a bank goes higher (up to 63.51 percent), while the rate thereafter increases.  Banks’ sizes are negatively related to the rate of non-performing loans.  Rates of non-performing loans are shown to steadily increase from 1996 to 1999.  Banks established after deregulation, on average, have a lower rate of non-performing loans than those established before deregulation.

延伸研究

1.          內部經理人目標之加權。

2.          內部經理人與股東之衝突。

3.          社會規範模型之納入。

備註