研討日期

2003年6月21日上午10:00 ~ 下午1:00

研討地點

台大經濟系201教室

討論文獻

題目

作者

文獻出處

Trade Liberalization and strategic Outsourcing

Yongmin Chen; Lota Ishikawa; Zhihao Yu

Journal of International Economics, forthcoming

報告人

王光正

參加人員

胡均立、邱俊榮、林燕淑、楊雅博、吳世傑、王光正、吳芝文、劉惠玲、施冠宇、廖峻毅、張筑雅、陳玉晏、蔡明芳、柯美如、黃祥斌

討論提要

We discuss the extending research of the paper, “Trade Liberalization and Strategic Outsourcing” this week. We set up a two countries exporting to the third country model to discuss the outsourcing problem. In this prototype model, there are two countries engaged in Cournot competition in the third country. Country A has an upstream firm produced intermediate goods and a downstream firm produced final goods and there is only one vertically-integrated firm in country B. Besides competing in the  final goods market with country A’s downstream firm, the vertically-integrated firm in country B can intervene in the intermediate goods market in country B, either selling intermediate goods or outsourcing it. The timing arrangement of the prototype model is as follows. In stage 1, both the Grov’t of country A and  country B decide the subsides of the their final exporting goods. In stage 2, the upstream firm of country A decide his intermediate outputs and the vertically-integrated firm of country B decide his strategic selling or outsourcing of intermediate goods. In stage 3, both of the downstream firm in Country A and the vertically-integrated firm compete in the final goods market in the third country. 

結論

Given the liner demand of the final goods, the subsidies of country B may be positive or negative. The reason of negative subsidies is that the Gov’t of country B will consider the relatives between the marginal revenue (MR) of intermediate goods market and the MR of final goods market for the vertically-integrated firm. It is different from Brander and Spencer (1985).

延伸研究

Use the general demand form to do the model.

備註