研討日期

2003年1月11日上午10:00 ~ 下午1:00

研討地點

東吳大學城中校區國貿系教室

討論文獻

題目

作者

文獻出處

Coupons and Price Discrimination in Vertically-Correlated Markets

Jin-Li Hu

Yu-Hsiu Chiou

Hong Hwang

Working paper

報告人

吳芝文

參加人員

林燕淑、楊雅博、吳芝文、施冠宇、廖峻毅、黃祥斌、張筑雅、邱俊榮、陳宏易、陳玉晏、王光正、蔡明芳、柯美如

討論提要

This research analyzes the non-cooperative and cooperative strategies with respect to manufacturer and retailer coupons.  In a model with one manufacturer selling its product to one retailer, it is found that the retailer can achieve third-degree price discrimination equilibrium in retail markets by issuing coupons to demanders with higher elasticity.

結論

Although facing only one retailer, the manufacturer can also achieve the same third-degree price discrimination equilibrium by issuing coupons directly to demanders of higher elasticity.  However, when only one firm issues the coupon, both manufacturer and retailer coupons can help alleviate the channel profit loss due to double marginalization.  If the manufacturer and the retailer non-cooperatively issue coupons, then the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium outcomes are equivalent to those under the successive third-degree price discrimination.  Moreover, cooperative strategies between the manufacturer and the retailer can eliminate double marginalization, achieve the vertical integration effect, and lead to higher profits, consumer surpluses, and social surpluses than non-cooperative coupon strategies.

延伸研究

1、水平寡占市場的折價券競爭

2、垂直寡占市場的折價券競爭

3、作為第二級差別取價的折價券競爭

備註