

1626年西班牙入侵台灣的 「正當化」

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摘要

在所謂「恢復失地」(Reconquista)時期(711-1492),伊比利半島上的基督教王國和回教王國爭戰有八百年之久,因此產生了一個習於戰鬥的社會,隨後轉而征服美洲。當傳教士報導了西班牙征服者和殖民者對於印第安人的第一批暴行,西班牙王室開始考慮應否繼續支持殖民的活動,特別是有否法律根據足以將其正當化。當時的學者很快體認到,征服美洲截然不同於先前的「恢復失地」。回教徒被認為是反基督教的,更是入侵者。相反的,美洲印第安人只能算為是異教徒,卻是他們自己王國的真正統治者。於是在六世紀的西班牙大學,如Salamanca,興起了一場相關問題的複雜辯論。

這場辯論最主要的成果是,精心地建構出一種不同於羅馬法的近代國際關係學說。學者之中,以多明我會士Francisco de Vitoria所提出的理論最具影響力。他強調說,征服美洲印第安人且使他們改變信仰,只有當土著在自由的情況下,接受西班牙的統治,並皈依基督教,才算是合法。

本文藉由台灣的個案研究,試圖分析當菲律賓的西班牙人計畫征服新領土時,當時有關殖民的理論扮演什麼角色。首先我們將審視六世紀末征服福爾摩沙島的計畫,然後集中探討1626年實際的佔領行動。有一些研究宣稱碩學之士Vitoria為此歷史過程提供主要的歷史基礎,但我們認為,Vitoria理論和實際軍事考量的結合才是當時殖民「正當化」的概念模式。

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關鍵詞：Francisco de Vitoria、國際法、台灣史、西班牙人在台灣

The “Justification” of the Spanish Intrusion in Taiwan in 1626

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Abstract

The Christian kingdoms of the Iberian Peninsula were fighting the Muslim kingdoms in that region for eight centuries during the period known as the *Reconquista* (711-1492). This created a society accustomed to fighting, whose energies were then directed to the conquest of America. Once the first atrocities of the conquistadores and colonizers against the Indians were reported by some missionaries, the Spanish Crown started to consider if this historical process could be continued or not, and if there were any legal bases that might justify it. Very soon the scholars of that time realized that the reason for the *Reconquista* (the recovery of their land from the Moors) was different from that of the Conquest of America. Muslims were considered as antichristian and intruders. On the contrary, the Amerindians could only be considered as pagans and the real rulers of their kingdoms. A complex debate arose in Spanish universities such as Salamanca on this question in the 16th century.

The main fruit of all this discussion was the elaboration of a modern doctrine for international relations, different from that of Roman Law. The scholar whose theories were most influential was the Dominican Francisco de Vitoria. For him the conquest and conversion of the Amerindians could only be legitimate if the natives freely accepted the sovereignty of Spain and adhered to the Christian faith.

The present paper seeks to analyze, through the case study of Taiwan, to what extent the Spaniards in the Philippines were bound by the theories of that time when they were planning the conquest of a new territory. First we will review the projects of

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conquest of *Isla Hermosa* at the end of the 16th century, and later we will focus our study on some of the reasons used to justify the actual occupation, that took place in 1626. Some claimed to be based on the theories of Master Vitoria, but, in our opinion, a combination of both Vitoria theories and practical military approaches were behind the whole rationale.

Keywords: Francisco de Vitoria, International Law, Taiwan History, Spaniards in Taiwan

The “Justification” of the Spanish Intrusion in Taiwan in 1626

José Eugenio Borao

In the year 1626, Spain had over a century of experience in colonial administration, and the main discussions on the “right of conquest” and the “just war” were almost over. They had produced a core of legislation that limited the authority of the Spanish governors. Even in faraway places like the Philippines, Legazpi, the first *adelantado* had to wait three years in Cebú for the order to proceed with the conquest of the archipelago, which finally came with his appointment as Governor General.

Because the main expansion in the Philippine area was from 1571 to 1600, and the one outside (Ternate, Jolo, Isla Hermosa, etc.) took place at the beginning of the 17th century, the establishment of the fort of Quelang (now Jilong) was arguably the last expansion of the Spanish Empire before its decline. This fort was intended as another point in the defense system of the archipelago, more than a starting point for another area of colonial expansion. We do not know the reason why they did not expand from there. Maybe it was the lack of strength or maybe the understanding that such expansion was not justified because that move was not considered in “the reasons of the conquest” (to expel the Dutch and to preach the Gospel). In any case, in Spain there was a shift in the political mood from the optimism of the Renaissance period that produced the conquest of America, and even the Philippines, to the pessimism of Baroque times. At this time Spanish politics were more interested in conserving rather than expanding the Empire. This was why the naval fleet of 1626 was raised, not amidst the euphoria of conquest, but in secrecy, triggering debates about whether this was an appropriate step or not.

Traditionally, the historiography on the Spanish colonial presence in the

Philippines has coalesced around two extremes, the ones praising it, and the ones extolling it as a whole. In this last group excels one of the main divulgators of Philippine history, Teodoro Agoncillo, who said: “Spain, by virtue of discovery and actual occupation, claimed the Philippines and made it a crown colony and therefore the Spanish king’s property... As a crown colony, the Philippines came under the control of the Council of Indies. Even so, the Spanish monarch appointed all the high officials of the colony and issued royal orders and decrees for its proper administration... [These laws] were collected and published under the title *Recopilación de las Leyes de los Reynos de las Indias* (1681). This compilation testifies to the humane character, at least theoretically, of the Spanish colonial system, which had no equal in the history of European colonialism up to the end of the nineteenth-century. The implementation of that system was, however, another matter... The Spanish Governor...used his power not necessary with wisdom but with malice aforethought in order to thwart the king’s good intentions regarding the natives. This explains why the Law of the Indies, though humane, was generally dead letters in the Philippines”¹.

The problem with making general statements is that they often fail to capture the complexity of what was happening on the ground. Here, I will draw on a case study of Spanish expansion from the Philippines to show how the apparent marginality of the geographical area of Isla Hermosa (now Taiwan), deserved in the Spaniards of that time the same intellectual effort and moral reflection that—for example—the entrance of Legazpi in Manila.

1 Teodoro Agoncillo, *A short history of the Philippines*, National Book Store, Manila, 1975, pp. 37-42.

1. The Interest of Establishing a Spanish Fort in Taiwan

(1) The General Memorial of 1586

The interest of the authorities in Manila in conquering Isla Hermosa, or at least some strategic points of the island, turns up for the first time in a small reference inside the big memorial that the Governor General and the city of Manila sent to King Philip II in 1586. In 1582 the Archbishop of Manila had had the initiative of convoking a Synod in the cathedral, with all the civil and ecclesiastical authorities, to analyze all the spiritual and moral problems related to the social and political organization of the colony. The work of this assembly ended in 1586 with that report to be sent to Philip II. The Jesuit Alonso Sánchez was commissioned for this task. Also the new Governor General organized on 20 April 1586 a similar council (and even coinciding some of the attendants) at his palace addressing similar problems, but focusing mainly on the political and strategic aspects. The memorial was signed the 26 July 1586, and Alonso Sánchez was also commissioned to deliver the memorial to the king.² Sánchez departed soon after.

Chapter 8 of the memorial presented by the Governor had the title “On the expeditions and necessary pacifications”, and contained a vague and general reference about the territories inside and outside the Philippines that it could be advisable “to pacify”, making a list of eleven places, where Isla Hermosa was included.³ Three years later, Philip II approved the document, including routinely the *item* Isla Hermosa, as well as all the other ones, in his instructions addressed to the new Governor General of the Philippines, Gómez Pérez Dasmariñas (1590-

2 Besides these two memorials other people wrote to the king before the departure of Fr. Sánchez, like different officers, the members of the City Council, the judges of the Audiencia, etc., each one expressing particular views about the Philippines. See Blair & Robertson, *The Philippine Islands*, vol. VI.

3 José Eugenio Borao, *Spaniards in Taiwan*, SMC, Taipei, vol. I: 2001, vol. II. 2002, p. 16. Since now on this book will be quoted as *SIT*.

1593)⁴. The document's validity is important because 37 years later, those planning the military expedition recalled this approval of the king during the process of "justification" of the conquest.

(2) The Three Proposals of Luis Pérez Dasmariñas

The possibility of sending a military expedition to Isla Hermosa emerged for the first time ten years later, in 1596, during the shogunate of Hideyoshi and the period of his invasion of Korea (1592-1597), which produced fears that reverberated throughout Taiwan and the Philippines. Manila was even more fearful when it received the news of the shipwreck of galleon *San Felipe* in Japan, in 1596, and the seizing of its cargo by Japanese authorities. In July 1596, Luis Pérez Dasmariñas—a young man with the resolution of the first conquistadors and soon after as acting Governor General (1593-1596) after the death of his father, the above-mentioned Governor General—reported to the king⁵ on the advantages of going to Isla Hermosa for two "reasons of convenience": (1) to get information, "because the proximity to China and Japan will offer us more chances of knowing what happened in those kingdoms and their intentions about the Philippines"; and (2) as a kind of "preventive war", getting the lead to the Japanese, and thus avoiding a big threat to the province of Cagayan⁶. This fear reappeared half a year later when Hideyoshi sent 140,000 soldiers to Korea in January 1597.

Pérez Dasmariñas addressed a new and more systematized report to the recently appointed Governor, Francisco de Tello (1596-1602), giving him nine reasons for the advisability of occupying Isla Hermosa as soon as possible. The first six reasons

4 *SIT*, pp. 16-17

5 *SIT*, pp. 21-23

6 Dasmariñas was aware of a possible problem, which was of Japan becoming too suspicious of the Spaniards moving to Taiwan. In that case, Dasmariñas argued, the Spaniards will have to give convincing explanations, but if they fail, the Japanese could attack with big strength and advantage. Thus, the only possibility of contain them was to make a very strong fort. On the contrary, "if they accept the Spanish presence—Dasmariñas added with optimism—, it would be a great occasion to deal with those people". In any case, the best option for him was for the Japanese to ignore the island, and consequently the Philippines will not be threatened by anyone, only by the Chinese if they continue growing. *SIT*, pp. 18-20)

were to avoid a big harm for the Philippines, as (1) it would spell the end of trade with China, because the Japanese would take over communications; or (2) because Chinese *sangleys* would be afraid of coming for trade, if they knew that the Japanese were around; or (3) if they dared to set sail, the Japanese would be in Cagayan waiting to commandeer their sampans bound for Manila; (4) on the contrary a fort in Isla Hermosa would provide greater security to the Chinese during their trips to Manila; and even (5) if the cost of maintaining a fort in Isla Hermosa were significant, it would be smaller than to fortify Ilocos and Cagayan, were the Japanese to establish a presence on that island; (6) if the threat did become serious, the people in the fort could more easily send warning to Manila about Japanese maneuvers. The last three reasons were more miscellaneous in nature: (7) the opportunity of that moment, because the newly arrived soldiers in the Philippines and the ones expected for April will acclimatize better to the tropic if they go first to the north during the rainy season; (8) also for the reputation of the Spanish army; and (9) to secure this passage from the danger of the natives, who have killed and robbed the people and ships disgraced in their coast, as it happened recently with the Dominican Juan Cobo and captain Llanos, when coming back from Japan.

It is interesting to point out that the reasons of Dasmariñas were only of strategic and military nature. Only at the end was the death of Juan Cobo at the hands of the natives mentioned as a possible justification for the conquest, but not because of the protection of preachers—as stated by master Vitoria in his “principles”⁷—but because of the security of the passage. It seems that his report convinced the Governor Tello, but Tello failed to persuade the Council of War who opposed the report’s findings because of the scarcity of forces, overstretched in Cambodia and Mindanao. They resolved to fortify Cagayan in the meantime and to request Nueva España for more help, as Tello did in a letter dated May 1597⁸. The final answer to the proposals of Dasmariñas was in the same military terms of opportunity, without entering into moral considerations. One month later, direct news coming from a

7 These principles of Francisco de Vitoria (1483-1546), master in the University of Salamanca, are a rationale trying to assess under which conditions the natives of an “uncivilized” territory can pass under the rule of the Spaniards and under which conditions they cannot. See later note 44.

8 *SIT*, pp. 24-25

Dominican who survived the *San Felipe* shipwreck reported the growing Japanese menace. Tello responded by appointing Juan de Zamudio as general with responsibility to coast the waters in preparation for a possible Japanese attack and to oversee the fortification of Cagayan⁹.

Luis Pérez Dasmariñas was really convinced of the need to establish a fort in Isla Hermosa. He soon wrote another even more extensive report¹⁰ to Governor Tello (the second one to him) on the urgency to get a foothold in Isla Hermosa. His analysis grew in depth and the last incidental point of his previous report was brought forward to the introduction, stating that the Spanish presence there would be a good occasion to win the friendship of the natives. He now thought that: (1) the arrival of a Spanish army would not make the Japanese and the Chinese suspicious, on the contrary they would show respect for the Spaniards; and (2) now is the best moment to do it because Japan is busy with the conquest of Korea. He did not add new strategic reasons, but referred to his previous reports in which said reasons had been laid out. He encouraged the Governor to go, telling him that 300 soldiers will be enough, not only to prevent Japan but also to force the natives to friendship if they doubted our goodwill. In order to achieve good relations, he suggested the Spaniards must bring all necessary supplies with them in order to avoid robbing the natives. Nevertheless, for Dasmariñas dealing with the natives was not the main concern; building the fort was. Later, there would be enough time for their “pacification, conquest or other suitable measure that may be done”. He continued to repeat the same ideas several times but in different ways, as in: (1) encouraging the arrival of learned people in order to: a) help the needs of the soldiers; b) to deal with the natives according to a righteous conscience and justice were war to break out, and offering them pardon for their prior offenses (Cobo and Llanos); and (2) such a deal will be of mutual benefit because we would guarantee the natives’ protection in return for their assistance. Finally he recommended that some *sangleys* might join the naval expedition, not only for the help that they could offer in dealing with Chinese authorities, but also to avoid Chinese suspicion towards their new neighbors; and finally to gather existing information on the island to draw a comprehensive map.

9 *SIT*, p. 26

10 *SIT*, pp. 27-31

Summarizing, we have seen how the three proposals of Dasmariñas shifted from a military approach to a moral one, justifying the conquest along the principles of Vitoria. He did not learn these ideas in Spain—he was too young—but in the Philippines. Certainly, as he said in the beginning of his last report, he was using now an additional source, “the information that the [Dominican] commissioner priest Juan del E. produced after the death of Dominican Juan Cobo and Captain Llanos”. At least, we can see indirectly the growing interest of the Dominicans in the Formosan affair.

Tello again summoned the War Council on 22 June to discuss the new proposal of Dasmariñas. But the council once again turned them down, maybe under pressure from the bad news coming from the people of the ship that went to Mindanao (which experienced a mutiny on board of 40 Chinese) and also from the one that had sailed to Cambodia, and which reported the presence of 4 English ships in the Moluccas area. The council’s conclusion was to inform the king on these matters and await his orders¹¹. The one person who sided with the views of Dasmariñas was the cosmographer Hernando de los Ríos Coronel, who wrote directly to the king repeating the ideas of Dasmariñas—security of the Philippines, protection of the Chinese trade, and King’s army reputation¹²—and accompanied his letter with a detailed map of Isla Hermosa¹³ (the first complete Western map of the island).

The strong apprehension about the Japanese died down with the passing away of Hideyoshi and the problem abruptly was over. Things changed again, two years later, when some Dutch ships showed up in Philippine waters at the end of 1600. They were an emerging naval power and one of Spain’s rivals in Europe, and therefore were capable of tipping the balance of power in the area.

(3) The Proposal of Dominican Bartolomé Martínez in 1619

The clash between the Dutch and the Spaniards in Taiwan was yet to come. However, in 1619, the Dominican Bartolomé Martínez (who accidentally had passed

11 *SIT*, pp. 32-33

12 *SIT*, pp. 34-35

13 *SIT*, p. 39

through Taiwan on his journey to Macao) came up with a memorial regarding the advisability of establishing a port in Isla Hermosa. This was his rationale: (1) Pacan (probably *Beigang*, near present Tainan) could be strategically comparable to Macao because it offered all the advantages of that city (e.g. access to trade with China) and none of the problems from living in Chinese territory; among the advantages were the low prices of goods and avoidance of taxes imposed by the mandarins; (2) the Spaniards would spare themselves the trouble of dealing with intermediaries to the mandarins, and they would profit from fabled Manila's silver; likewise, they would not be hampered by legal or defense concerns; (3) Taiwan could serve as a stopover point for the galleons of Acapulco, as well as a good watch post, just in case the Dutch were to find their way into China; the possession of such a port would avoid having a fleet constantly to guard the area; once the enemy's presence was felt, boats could be sent from the island to warn China. Bartolomé Martínez suggested that the conquest be done as soon as possible; otherwise, either the Japanese would beat the Spaniards over it, or the Chinese would pare down their trade with Manila due to pressure from the Dutch or from Chinese pirates. Either way, the Chinese would not find an alternative to trade with the Spaniards. This was the synthesis of Martínez's long report.

The report was certainly read, disseminated, and analyzed because a copy of a follow-up document regarding the matter or perhaps an official report that was based on this memorial fell into the hands of the Dutch, two years later. The Dutch translated said document into their language two years later.¹⁴ Certainly, much of the data contained in this translation corresponds to the information found in the original Spanish document. (Moreover, one may speculate that the Dutch managed to speed up their expansion into China—particularly, the attack on Macao in 1622—because they knew about the existence of such a document).

(4) The Growing of the Dutch Threat (1624-1626)

As is well known, the Dutch were looking for a post in China to establish direct commercial links, but Chinese authorities were opposed. Then, they tried to conquer

14 *SIT*, pp. 48-51

Macao in 1622 but the Portuguese were lucky enough to expel them with a minimum of effort.¹⁵ The Dutch saw that their only chance for the time being was to establish themselves in Pescadores Islands, where they started fortifications the same year. Later on the Chinese, considering the islands under their jurisdiction, told them to leave the place and to go further to Taiwan, as they did in 1624. The fortifying of the Dutch in Formosa and the raids that they started around the Chinese waters created big uncertainty in Manila, making the Spaniards to think again about the possibility of going to Isla Hermosa. At this moment, political, commercial and religious interests converged into a determination for action.

Regarding commerce, the trade with China was necessary for the survival of the Philippines. The location of the Dutch in Penghu and in Taiwan had certainly created a decline in the Spanish-China trade. In this sense, the officers of the Royal Treasury of the Philippines wrote a letter to the king¹⁶; so did the Archbishop of Manila, Miguel García Serrano,¹⁷ asking him to remedy the situation.

On the other hand religious interest in going to Japan was also present. The Christians in Japan were persecuted, and the Catholic Church had already several martyrs, both foreigners and Japanese. The Japanese ports were closed to missionaries. These missionaries were Jesuits going from Macao, or Dominicans and Franciscans going from Manila. The Spanish Dominicans thought that Taiwan could be a good stopover to go in propitious times, not only to Japan but also to China, since the only way to enter China was Macao, under the control of the Portuguese. The Dominicans—led by the above-mentioned Bartolomé Martínez, now the Provincial in Manila—had special interest in participating and even promoting this endeavor for different reasons: (1) they had been established in Japan, and they even had some martyrs there; (2) they had a tradition in dealing with the Chinese of the *parian* of Manila; (3) they had tried unsuccessfully to enter in China through Macao; and, finally, because (4) the province of Nueva Segovia—the one comprising northern Luzon and even the Babuyan islands on the way to Taiwan—was assigned to them.

15 For details, see Paul A. Van Dyke, “The Anglo-Dutch Fleet of Defense (1620-1623). Prelude to the Dutch Occupation of Taiwan”, *Around and about Formosa*, SMC, 2003, pp. 61-81.

16 *SIT*, p. 57

17 *SIT*, p. 57

The same interest was perceived by the Augustinian Medina, who in his *History of the Augustinians in the Philippines* (1630), after saying that the Governor was determined to go to Isla Hermosa, declared: “The Dominicans encouraged this affair, because of the nearness of the island to China, and influenced by the gain of souls. As everything here depends on the Governor of these regions, no one dares to contradict him in whatever pleases him; for they fear his anger upon them”.¹⁸

According the *History* of Aduarte¹⁹ plans for the conquest started to take shape at the end of 1625 between Bartolomé Martínez, and the Governor of the Philippines, Fernando de Silva. In January of 1626 meetings were held among the Provincial, the Governor, the *Audiencia*, the Archbishop of Manila and military men. Finally, a small fleet of two galleys and 12 sampans left the port of Cavite on 8 February 1626, reaching the northern part of Taiwan on 10 May 1626, after some delay in Nueva Segovia, as we will see later in detail.

2. The Debate on the Justification of the Conquest

(1) Political Justification of Governor Fernando de Silva (1624-1626)

The Governor General, Fernando de Silva, in a letter of 4 August 1625, explained to the king the importance of conquering Isla Hermosa for strategic reasons. First, he said that his predecessor Alonso Fajardo (1618-1624) had already been advised to do so (probably by Bartolomé Martínez’s report of 1619), but now he could no longer afford ignore the problem as in the previous year the Dutch had fortified there and captured a Spanish vessel with 30.000 pesos. Based on the common opinion of his predecessor and justified by the provocation of the Dutch, he was determined to gain a foothold in some part of Isla Hermosa to face the menace.²⁰ Once the occupation was complete (May 1626), he wrote again to the king, on 30 July, once more justifying his policy, by saying how in the previous months trade had

18 *SIT*, p. 115

19 *SIT*, p. 84-85

20 *SIT*, p. 58

been diverted to the Dutch port, which received 900 *piculs* of silk, which amounted to more than 20 times the 40 *piculs* that had reached Manila.²¹

(2) The Moral Justification of Dominican Domingo González (February 1626)

In 7 February 1626, the day after the departure of the fleet to the conquest of Isla Hermosa, the Dominican Domingo González concluded a document²² justifying this move. We do not know how both things became related, but—considering that this document seems to be not of a public but private nature—we can assume that the Dominicans felt the need to justify the action of occupying an alien island. González asked himself this question: “Does this republic of Manila or, better said, His Majesty the King, have the right and the authority to colonize Isla Hermosa?” To this, he answered “yes”, and his rationale was based in two “titles”, or reasons, taken from Vitoria:

Based on the “title” of “the right to preach”, his answer to that question was “yes” (1) *because* the Bull *Inter Coetera* of Pope Alexander VI, had “entrusted the King and Queen of Spain with the task of sending preachers to all these kingdom and provinces”; and (2) *because* our experience is that these barbarian provinces have not guaranteed the safety of our preachers, *consequently* whoever would send preachers must also provide them armed escort (not because the Gospel must be preached through violent means, but simply because their safety had to be assured; however, the soldiers should never use their weapons unless gravely provoked); and (3) *since* the safety of the soldiers who accompany the preachers cannot be assured unless they built a fort to defend themselves, *then* they can rightfully ask permission from the barbarians to do this, if possible. (But if it is difficult to do so or if it is too dangerous to wait for an answer, they can of course start building it. This is even clearer in our case, not only in view of the grave risk posed both by the barbarians but, more so, by the Dutch. Thus it is urgent that this be done); and (4) *since* the Pope and the learned men in Spain, like Vitoria, approved this understanding *then* King Philip II granted

21 *SIT*, p. 81

22 *SIT*, pp. 58-61

permission [in 1589] without further consultation; and (5) *since* from Isla Hermosa the Dutch are cutting off our trade with China (which is vital for us), *then* it is necessary to colonize Isla Hermosa for the survival of the Philippines.

Later, based on the “title” of *the right to trade*, as stated by the *Ius Gentium*²³ (or the Law of People) he said: (1) our men, even if they are not preachers of the faith, can go and deal with the neighboring kingdoms and so establish trade relations with Isla Hermosa. No one can stop them from doing so as long as they do not give the natives a good reason to reject them; (2) for this to happen, a port where merchants, goods, and buyers can be set up (to protect them from even the natives whose treachery we have long experience, as well as from the Dutch, who steal from and kill Spaniards if they are not well-protected) to begin dealing with the natives, as is stated by master Vitoria.

Finally, González asked himself if there was any difference in case that the natives might prevent the settlement of the Spaniards out of fear (regardless if it is justified or not). According to Vitoria, González said that the Spaniards, if they really go with good intentions, still they can settle down. Of course, they will try first to persuade the natives with ambassadors. But, nevertheless, if they fail and the war comes, it will be a *just war* on both sides, because the natives will be in an “error of judgment”. Later we will elaborate further on these ideas.

(3) The Initial Skepticism of the New Governor Niño de Tavora

The first person to be hesitant with the conquest was the new appointed Governor General Niño de Tavora, who arrived in Manila at the end of June of 1626, just one month and a half after setting up the Taiwan outpost. De Silva had to explain and justify to the incoming Governor the action that had just happened. This was done

23 Prior to elaborating this question, González—following Vitoria’s thought—summarized the main ideas of the *Ius Gentium* regarding this matter: (1) Ports must be common to all, but without harming the land where outsiders desire to settle, *consequently* the relation between kingdoms must be smooth sailing. (2) The Lord had it that all things not be found in one kingdom alone, thus encouraging communication, friendship and trade. And these tendencies are so intimately rooted in human nature that no matter how barbaric these people surrounding us may be, all of them value the warm welcome they extend to foreigners who, in turn, come to these parts without the intention to do harm.

not only out of courtesy, but because it was customary for the incoming Governor to make a formal assessment of his predecessor’s tenure, judging the lawfulness of his service, in the so-called *Judgment of Residence*. We do not have the details of the process of this particular trial, neither the results, but we know that Governor Tavora, after demanding information from different persons, delivered a hesitant opinion: “The reasons to justify this move have been many. I, up to this moment, have not understood them all and I think only time will reveal everything”.²⁴ Nevertheless, his doubts did not hinge on the justification of the move itself but on the way it had been done. His first doubt was safety, particularly how this new trade route would be protected from the Dutch. To which De Silva replied: “I can confidently say that the [route] can be navigated nine months a year among islands and currents without a port on the eastern strip. And when the northern monsoons come, it is impossible for an [enemy] ship [to await us] in that area, due to the strong winds”.²⁵ His second doubt was the fort’s location, because he was considering—as his behavior will show later—that a better move might have been to attack the Dutch directly in the west of the island, instead of setting up a fort in the north of Isla Hermosa.

Fernando de Silva, like so many other Governors before him, collected all sorts of letters of praise about his governorship before departure, which he might later use either to justify his actions in case of eventual accusations, or for personal promotion. Among these letters we can see the one of the Archbishop of Manila of 25 of July, praising his government and particularly the fact of “occupying the best port of Isla Hermosa, a task which was verily entrusted and ordered by His Majesty Philip II”²⁶. Another letter was written by the officers of the *Audiencia* justifying De Silva’s action of stopping “the rebels from Holland... who are damaging and stealing from the ships that are coming to these islands to trade”.²⁷

At that moment, Niño de Tavora had no other alternative but to accept the *fait accompli*. In order to justify himself, he made known to the king in a letter of 20

24 *SIT*, p. 76

25 *SIT*, p. 82

26 *SIT*, p. 79

27 *SIT*, p. 83

July²⁸ the policy that he would follow in this matter: (a) to keep the two galleys of Isla Hermosa in good shape in order to facilitate the passage of the Chinese junks to Manila; (b) to involve civil merchants in the trade between Manila and Isla Hermosa to avoid expenses to the crown; (c) to provide ministers to procure the conversion of the natives to Christianity. Also, he presented to the king a detailed map of the strategic location of Isla Hermosa, nestled between China and Philippines. Besides, he was proud to give a clear description of the Dutch fortress that he had obtained from the report of Salvador Díaz—a Macanese that just had escaped from the Dutch fortress, and safely arrived to Macao on 20 April 1626.²⁹

Soon after, Niño de Tavora got to know the hardships of the newly established in Formosa, of the “many [that] have died and suffered great misery and hardships—eating even dogs and rats, also grubs and strange herbs because they soon consumed the provisions that they had brought with them and others had not arrived from Manila”³⁰. This reaffirmed his conviction that a more important goal than to set up a fort was to expel the Dutch from their post, and so he prepared a strong fleet to go to Formosa in August 1626 (as we will see later). The armada failed to execute its objective because a storm struck and badly scattered the fleet that it hardly managed to reach Quelang. Niño de Tavora remained determined to expel the Dutch that he tried again one year later, in August 1627, with another bigger fleet, but the elements “conspired” against him (as also we will see later).

(4) The Opposing Opinion of Cevicos (1627)

The most serious technical objection came from Juan Cevicos, a man who had experienced the Japan-Manila route and Dutch naval activity. As early as 1609, when the galleon *San Francisco* was shipwrecked in Japan, he saw how well the Dutch fared in their first voyage to Japan. Upon returning to Manila in 1610, Cevicos was captured by the Dutch and later released after a Spanish offensive was launched. The result of all this was his decision to become a priest. He worked in the cathedral of

28 *SIT*, p. 77

29 *SIT*, p. 21-22

30 *SIT*, pp. 87-89

Manila until 1622, when he was sent to Madrid for some concerns of the Manila dioceses. From 1623 to 1630, he was based in this city, where he wrote two important discourses.

The discourse of 1627³¹, which might have been also addressed to the Court, is more important because it openly protested the establishment of a port in Isla Hermosa, a military move that had just made the news in Madrid. The thesis of Cevicos’ long discourse was not moral, but practical: “The only reason for the Spaniards to fortify in Isla Hermosa is to drive out the Dutch from their fort and from that island”. As we can see, his point of view coincided with the one that Governor Niño de Tavora was trying to implement at the same time. He developed his thesis around the following points: (1) Isla Hermosa was not a strategic base for trade with China because, until then, the Dutch pirates were enjoying equal success at the entry point of Manila and at the exit points of the Chinese ports; (2) the Dutch were more interested in setting up a trading post that would make it easier for them to engage in commerce with Japan; a trading post offered intrinsic benefits because through it the Dutch would be able to obtain the silver they needed to trade with China; they would be able to buy Chinese silk with the silver, and then, to force the prices down, saying that the silver came from Manila; (3) *consequently*, the Dutch would become more powerful each time and thus be a threat to Manila and Macao; additionally Isla Hermosa might be turned by them into a springboard to launch an attack against Macao; (4) *besides*, if Spain fortified in Isla Hermosa the situation would trigger new problems; for example, if the Spaniards tried to obstruct the trade between the Dutch and the Chinese, then both nations would become enemies of the Spaniards, “for each one is free to trade with whomsoever he wishes” and the situation would become worse as always happens when one tries to monopolize influential zones by force.

He also presented other reasons that criticized the report of Bartolomé Martínez, whom he might have met: (1) the island lacked natural resources; (2) if the Chinese ships were safer sailing to Manila, then the Dutch would wait for the boats at the exit of the ports of Taiwan; (3) Isla Hermosa was in no way a good stopover point for the

31 *SIT*, pp. 106-111

galleons of Acapulco; (4) if Isla Hermosa was going to be an entry point for missionaries in China (a clear reason of Martínez), this would only arouse suspicion among the Chinese, because they had not been informed about it, and the Dutch would act as they did in Japan, spreading calumnies of the sort that the missionaries paved the way for the conquistadors.

The other discourse that Cevicos wrote was the one of 1628 dealing with different problems, but in one section of it he expressed the little danger that the Dutch represented to the Manila-Japan route [if they were not established in Isla Hermosa], because—he said—they were expected to approach the Philippines from October to March, and lie in wait for the Chinese junks from April to May; they would go back to Batavia because in June was the start of the period of furious gales; on the other hand, the ships that were leaving Manila for Japan would leave at the end of June or throughout the month of July, the moment when the Dutch were not expected to be around.

(5) Strategically Speaking, Everybody Had a Point

We have seen basically two opinions: the one of the outgoing Governor Fernando de Silva and the Dominicans, and also siding with them we can include the one of Luis Pérez Dasmariñas expressed 30 year earlier, of establishing a permanent post in the north; on the other hand, we have the one of incoming Governor Niño the Tavora and Cevicos saying that the only advisable move was to face directly the Dutch and expel them. Which military and strategic opinion was the right one? It is difficult to say, because everyone can claim a point in the debate, even after 1642, the year the Spaniards were defeated in Jilong by the Dutch. For example, the Dominicans can claim that a part of their goals was achieved, because they managed to go to China in 1630 and to start their mission there, opening a new chapter in the history of Christianity in China. The point of view of the critics, like Cevicos, looks to be the right one since after the junta of 1637³²—summoned by Governor Hurtado de Corcuera—the fortresses were considered officially useless and the ones in Tamsui started demolition. For some clever minds like the mentioned Augustinian Juan

32 *SIT*, pp. 262-271

Medina, this was obvious already in 1630, when he wrote in his *History*: "I think time has proven how unwise this move of Isla Hermosa was; for none of those problems have been remedied, but have remained. The forces, which are becoming fewer in these Philippine islands, are divided, and there are other innumerable inconveniences."³³ For this reason the point of view of the Governor Fernando de Silva looks unsustainable. However, it still is difficult to judge, because even if there was a final failure in 1642, it is also true that the strong but in the end unsuccessful pressure that the Dutch applied against Manila (1642-1648) started only after the conquest of the Spanish fortress in Jilong. Then, the Dutch conquest of Quelang may have delayed the beginning and shortened this dangerous period of pressure, causing the failure of the blockade of Manila that ended after the Treaties of Westphalia (1648).

3. The Actual Setting and the Dealing with the Natives

(1) The Fleet of Conquest of May 1626 and the Declaration of Conquest

As we have seen, there were three different fleets of conquest: the one of May 1626 organized by Governor de Silva, and the ones of August 1626 and August 1627 prepared by Governor Niño de Tavora. Although the information for each one comes from different sources, we can reconstruct the three episodes with some detail. The first, under the command of Carreño de Valdés, was composed of 100 soldiers and a similar number of Pampangos. He brought an engineer to design the floor plan of the castle and to start its foundations. It was a small fleet because it was not supposed to meet the Dutch, and if the natives were to put up resistance it would not be a big one. The most important vessels comprised only of two galleys, each one armed with five cannons and each with a capacity of 30 infantrymen. The rest of the infantry and the other supplies were loaded into sampans and other smaller vessels. As we have mentioned, the fleet left Cavite on 8 February and spent the spring in Northern Luzon, where it quelled some native uprisings in Yrraya and in the Mandayas River. They left Luzon on 4 May, and three days later they reached

³³ *SIT*, p. 115

southern Taiwan and another three days more the north of the island.

The official document recording the taking of Isla Hermosa was drafted on 16 May by the notary of war Pedro Sotelo de Ulloa³⁴. It was signed by the commander of the expedition, Carreño de Valdés; by the four Dominicans Bartolomé Martínez, Domingo de la Borda, Francisco de Santo Domingo and Jerónimo Morera; by the captains and sailors Juan Martínez de Liédana, Antonio de Vera, Benito Delgado, Juan de Chaves, Diego Novas, and the chief pilot Pedro Martín Garay. In the document, the notary gave details of the three actions of Carreño: (1) he tried to communicate with the natives through the missionaries and the captains, offering them good deals; (2) he waited for four days without receiving any affirmative answer of rendering obeisance to His Majesty; (3) consequently, he had taken ownership of the port, the “fort” and nearby towns, claiming to represent those living on the island, by orders of Governor Fernando de Silva, and in the name of the King of Spain and as part of his royal patrimony. We will later analyze this procedure.

(2) The First Dealings with the Natives

The *History* of Aduarte offers a description of the voyage, landing, and occupation of the island of Quelang (renamed San Salvador by the Spaniards, and today known as Hoping). According to Aduarte the Spaniards terrified the natives with their harquebuses, who escaped to the mountains. The Spaniards helped themselves to the rice and everything the natives had left behind and started living in their houses. The missionaries tried to appease them by promising restitution for what the soldiers had taken.³⁵

The Dominican Esquivel was clearer six years later, when describing what had happened in 1626. Talking about these natives, he said: “They are the pirates who were living in the islet where we have the city built, who suffered much harm at the beginning of the conquest. They were driven out of their land, their *tambobos* of rice and corn razed to the ground along with their houses of excellent timber, their

34 *SIT*, pp. 75-76

35 *SIT*, p. 73

furniture and other belongings.”³⁶

Besides this conflictive first encounter, the Spaniards—in order to achieve peaceful co-existence with the natives—had to solve the problem of the language barrier and win their trust. These tasks were entrusted basically to the missionaries, who: (1) used the mediation of a Japanese Christian, a long time resident of Santiago, and married to a native woman; (2) started to learn the native language; (3) tried to approach the natives with kindness and respect³⁷. Also, the missionaries baptized the two daughters of the Japanese with a big display of pomp, hoping to impress upon the natives the importance of religion.

We know little about daily life at the very beginning. Only the *History of Medina* testifies that the Spaniards went through very hard times in adjusting to the new land: “Then it befell that many of the troops died, for the island is very cold... Its inhabitants are fierce, and live without law or reason, but as their chiefs dictate. Ours have suffered significant hardships there. Sergeant-major Carreño was local governor of that fort and the troops and he did his utmost. The Chinese came and offered many things when the soldiers had money; but, when money failed, all was about to perish.”³⁸ Consequently, the Spaniards had few things to offer the natives with which to win them over. Indeed, the lack of supplies from Manila increased their hardship, and indirectly may have created more conflicts with the natives, as the Spaniards grew heavily dependent on them.

(3) The Armada of August 1626

The Dutch documents contain the description of another Spanish armada that went to Taiwan in August 1626.³⁹ The account, dated 10 September 1627, was written in Nagasaki by two Dutchmen who, in turn, claimed to have obtained information from two Spaniards in Cambodia. The information culled from the Dutch sources explains that the armada was composed of three galleons, six frigates, two galleys, and 11 or

36 *SIT*, p. 165

37 *SIT*, p. 86

38 *SIT*, p. 115

39 *SIT*, pp. 89-93

12 Chinese junks. The vessels carried 500 Spaniards and over a thousand Pampangos. The commander was a certain *Caraans* (possibly Juan de Alcarazo) who had orders from the Governor General to attack the Dutch fort in Zeelandia. The Spanish sources do not refer clearly to this armada. There is a reference only in 1627 written by Fr. Melchor Manzano, which says: “Last year, Governor Juan Niño de Tavora sent aid from the entire city in the form of men and ammunition”,⁴⁰ but it does not elaborate on its fate. According to the Dutch, a storm struck the fleet so badly that only one galleon, six frigates, one galley and four or five junks managed to reach Jilong in August 1626. One of the other two galleons disappeared, while the other reached the islands of Lequios, where most of the crew perished and therefore could not return to Manila. The other galley and the rest of the junks were either lost or scattered around the Philippines.

It seems that the remaining ships did not bring much relief, but rather new mouths to feed, thus worsening the situation. No wonder, the same Dutch source added: “In the month February [1627] about 250 Spaniards and a great number of men from Pampanga had perished and that the above mentioned *Caraans* as well as most of his men were seriously ill. The reason was the water, which contained a lot of sulfur and is very unhealthy. They say that no one can survive there, which was also confirmed by many Chinese who had navigated there. The helmsman of our junk had navigated to that place several times. He judged that nobody could remain there for one, two or three months without falling ill and getting bellies as round as a keg. They say straight out that it is lamentable that the first ones sent from Manila to look for a suitable bay used so little knowledge to clearly explain the situation.”⁴¹

Precisely the fact that the Dutch knew all these things in Cambodia shows the pressing need of the Spaniards, because they went so far looking for rice. One Spanish report confirms the same picture. It is a paragraph of an annual Jesuit letter mentioning that “at the beginning, the land tested them, for many died and suffered great misery and hardships—eating even dogs and rats, also grubs and strange herbs because they soon consumed the provisions that they had brought with them and

40 *SIT*, p. 113

41 *SIT*, p. 90

others had not arrived from Manila.”⁴² And, again, this problem might have put the natives in a dilemma, either escaping to the mountains or shouldering the need of the Spaniards.

(4) The Armada of August 1627

This new military fleet was even better equipped than the previous one and was possibly one of the more important armadas organized in the Philippines in those twilight years. It figured not only as a military operation but also as a carrier of a large amount of aid and supplies—including food, domestic items, and construction materials—to those who had gone to Taiwan the year before. The armada began to make preparations at the beginning of the summer of 1627. The armada was composed of three galleons carrying 125 artillery pieces and over 800 infantry men, Spaniards as well as Filipinos. Three small ships and two galleys accompanied the three galleons. To reduce the risks, the *Rosario*, the biggest and the fastest of the three ships, was loaded with a portion of the aid and went ahead, and in fact, was the only one that reached the Spanish fort because another big typhoon dispersed the armada. When the *Rosario* arrived in Jilong there was relief all round that the ship had docked at the right time, not only to offer provisions, but also to punish the treasonable offences of the inhabitants of Tamsui and to confiscate their provisions.⁴³

In hindsight, the failure to follow through the Spanish armadas with a third one—neither Nino de Tavora nor his successors were keen—possibly negated their longer term effectiveness. From then on, only an aid in spring and another in August were sent on a regular basis to the fort of Quelang. In other words, the commander of the first expedition Carreño de Valdés (1626-1629) was the only one that conducted almost exclusively the first dealings with the natives, and all these difficulties put him in an unfavorable position to meet the high demands of the principles of Vitoria.

42 *SIT*, p. 88

43 According to another Jesuit annual letter, the one of 1628, twenty Spaniards went to buy rice in Tamsui, and were welcomed and offered a good deal. Nevertheless, the days were passing by and after one month the rice was not yet sold. Then they were requested by the local chieftain to help him in fighting against his enemy at the other side of the river, but in the process the natives committed a treason killing half of the Spaniards. When they returned to Jilong the arrival of the *Rosario* happened. *SIT*, pp. 131-132.

4. The *Ius Gentium* and the Conquest

To analyze whether the principles of Vitoria were honored in the conquest we must check these principles in detail⁴⁴ against the three steps of Spanish arrival in Taiwan: *a)* how were the trips justified beforehand?; *b)* how was the actual occupation carried out?; and *c)* how was it regarded later by the people involved in this endeavor and by the natives?

(1) The Justification before the Journey of Occupation

We will focus basically on the reasons of González, the one who thoroughly analyzed the problem before departure from a Vitorian perspective (*De Indis*, question 3, articles 1 and 2), and were issues he had discussed in the university of Salamanca in 1537 and published in 1539. The first reason to go to Isla Hermosa, he said, was based on the papal bull of 1493 that “entrust to the kings of Spain the task of sending preachers to all these kingdoms ruled by pagans ... a matter to which the Pope has authority”. Regarding this point, scholars even at that time argued about the real

44 Now, is the moment to make a short presentation of the principles (or “titles”) of Vitoria. He claimed that there were seven unjust “titles” (q. 2) for which the natives can pass under the rule of the Spaniards: (a. 1) The sovereignty of the Emperor over the whole world. (a. 2) The authority of the Pope granting the Indies to the Spaniards. (a. 3) The right coming from the discovery. (a. 4) The refusal of the Indians to receive the Christian Faith, after listening to the missionaries. (a. 5) The sins of the barbarians *contra natura*. (a. 6) The [apparent] voluntary choice made by the Indians [but, in fact, made out of fear]. (a. 7) A special gift from God, like the one of God to the Israelites. Vitoria’s seven just “titles” (q. 3), for which the native can pass under the rule of the Spaniards: (a. 1) The obstruction to the right of the Spaniards to move freely around the discovered lands (mutual partnership and communication). (a. 2) The right of the Spaniards to propagate the Christian religion in America. (a. 3) The protection to the natives who have been converted to Christianity and later persecuted by the pagan Indians. (a. 4) If the Indians have converted to Christianity the Pope can give them a Christian prince, removing their pagan prince. (a. 5) The tyranny of native princes giving inhuman laws. (a. 6) A real and free election made by the natives. (a. 7) The alliance of some natives with other natives to whom the Spaniards had previously declared a just war. (a. 8) A very low degree of civilization (but he doubted the validity of this title). See Vitoria, *De Indis* (“On the American Indians”), in Anthony Pagden & Jeremy Lawrence (ed). *Vitoria Political writings*, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought, Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 231-292.

meaning of the papal bull of 1493. Vitoria also discussed this matter (*De Indis*, q. 2, a. 2) saying that "the Pope is not the civil or temporal master of the whole world; ...and if he has temporal power is only insofar as it concerns spiritual matters, but not over the barbarians or unbelievers; ...consequently "the Spaniards when they first sailed to the land of the barbarians, carried with them no right at all to occupy their countries". On the other hand (*De Indis*, q.3, a. 2, prop. 2), Vitoria argued that "the Pope could nevertheless have entrusted this business to the Spaniards and forbidden it to all others". In this sense, González followed clearly the thought of Vitoria.

The second reason of González was based on the security that should be offered to the preachers and the soldiers. González added that, nevertheless, the Spaniards should ask permission from the natives to build a fort in Isla Hermosa. If the answer was delayed, they could go ahead. In this case, due to the proximity of the Dutch, to build a fort as soon as possible was even more reasonable. Here, González's proposition was also based on Vitoria, who stated, "My third proposition is that if the barbarians permit the Spaniards to preach the Gospel freely and without hindrance, then whether or not they accept the faith, it will not be lawful to attempt to impose anything on them by war, or otherwise conquer their land" (*De Indis*, q.3, a. 2, prop. 3). Regarding the second part, "the delaying of the answer", González' proposition also is based in Vitoria, who stated: "the Spaniards, after first reasoning with them to remove any cause of provocation, may preach and work for the conversion of that people even against their will, and may if necessary take up arms and declare war on them, insofar as this provides the safety and opportunity needed to preach the Gospel" (*De Indis*, q.3, a. 2, prop. 4). It seems that, according to González, the Dutch presence on its own was not sufficient reason to build the fort, but, if the fort had been built lawfully, it would afford the advantage of security.

The third reason submitted by González was the threat of the Dutch presence in Taiwan and their intentions to cut off the China-Manila trade, an action that could have easily destroyed the Philippines. This justification of self-defense does not come from Vitoria. Besides, when Vitoria wrote this *Relectiones* (1537-1539), the Dutch had not started their naval expansion.

When elaborating his fourth reason, González simplified the thought of Vitoria by saying that all the ports should be common for all people, and these people have

the right to be protected. This right ceased when the common good of the natives was at stake. Certainly, it matched with the ideas of Vitoria (*De Indis*, q.3, a. 1). Nevertheless, because this article 1 is very extensive, and is based on the *Ius Gentium*, let us make here a more detailed summary. Vitoria argued: “The Spaniards have the right to travel and dwell in those countries, so long as they do not harm to the barbarians; ...and they can trade among the barbarians, so long as they do not harm to their homeland; ... (prop. 3) and if there is anything among the barbarians which is held in common both by their own people and by strangers, it is not lawful for the barbarians to prohibit the Spaniards from sharing and enjoying it,... my seventh proposition goes further: once the Spaniards have demonstrated diligently both in word and deed that for their own part they have every intention of letting the barbarians carry on in peaceful and undisturbed enjoyment of their property, if the barbarians nevertheless persist in their wickedness and strive to destroy the Spaniards, they may then treat them no longer as innocent enemies, but as treacherous foes against whom all rights of war can be exercised”.

We can conclude that González knew the doctrine of Vitoria quite well, particularly articles 1 and 2 of the question 3 of *De Indis*, and also, we can presume that when the Dominicans went to Taiwan they had in mind those “binding” principles not only to conduct their preaching, but also to keep an eye on Spanish soldiers and authorities, and to admonish them if some wrong doing were committed.

(2) The Actual Occupation

Regarding the actual occupation, we have seen that the Spaniards arrived in Quelang on 10 May 1626, and the formalities of the conquest were finalized 6 days later,⁴⁵ on 16 May, through a ceremony symbolizing “the possession of the port of Quelang and the fort [to be constructed], representing all the things of that island”. It seems they were satisfied, because they said they had proceeded lawfully. According to this official document, first, several missionaries and captains negotiated with the natives offering them friendly dealings, “but the natives refused to render obeisance to the king”. So, they took possession “in the best form and manner that can be lawfully

45 *SIT*, pp. 75-76

allowed”. This way doing totally contradicted the statements of Vitoria, because we have mentioned that the Spaniards who had just arrived in Quelang Island frightened the natives with their weapons. Consequently the natives were not in a position to understand the offers of the Spaniards; they might have been very suspicious about their intentions. The soldiers took for granted the incommunicability with the natives and even they provoked it by intimidating them. Thus the *requerimiento* formula (i.e., the calling to the natives for negotiations) was in this case a farce because it was done after taking the houses and victuals of the natives.

Besides, the claiming of the new land as a part of the royal patrimony of the king was totally unjustified under the principles of Vitoria because the natives had not come voluntarily under the obeisance of the Spanish crown. This behavior of the Spaniards can be understood only under the *Ius Gentium* in the Roman Law tradition that considered the submission of less civilized people as a way to offer them your “superior freedom”.

It is interesting to remember the comment of Governor General Niño de Tavora, after receiving the first explanations of the occupation. He said: “the reasons to justify this move have been many; I, up to this moment, have not understood them all and I think *only time will reveal everything*”. We do not exactly know if he was referring to moral or strategic reasons or to both; but the final part of his sentence highlights the idea that “things can be justified *a posteriori*, if in the final analysis they prove to have been beneficial”.

(3) A Retrospective Vision

When the Dominicans were signing the official report sanctioning the island's conquest, we can imagine with what mixed feelings Bartolomé Martínez had achieved his dream of setting foot near Japan and China without the limitations of the Portuguese of Macao, yet he was probably not satisfied with the way things had been conducted, guilt-ridden as he must have been. Esquivel told us six years later that the houses of the natives were razed and burnt, although it is not clear if this happened in the first week or in the following weeks or months. But, in fact, it didn't matter. At that moment Bartolomé Martínez was probably thinking that if nothing were done,

the words of Vitoria and the analysis of González would remain beautiful albeit empty words.

Considering the outcome, we must assume that the Dominicans convinced Carreño to pay for the damages, and to promise compensation to the natives. Esquivel tells us that the Quelang governor decided to compensate them with the important sum of 4,000 pesos, and that the promise was in the process of being fulfilled because—he assures us that—six years later, “400 or 600 pesos have been already paid.” Nevertheless, Esquivel doubted if they would receive more compensation because of the damages they caused later.⁴⁶ This desire to compensate the victims was not credited to the good offices of Esquivel or the Dominicans solely, but basically to the *auctoritas* of Vitoria, who also mentioned the idea of canceling compensation to the natives if they persisted with their belligerent behavior, for, in time, they ought to have realized what the real intentions of the Spaniards were.

It is not now the moment to analyze the relations between Spaniards and Basayos in the tiny area of Senar, Taparri, Quimaurri and Santiago, during the 16 years of Spanish presence in northern Taiwan. The Spaniards did not expand beyond these limits, maybe because they lacked the strength to do it, or because they were bound by the ideas of Vitoria. But we have an excellent document—the Dutch questionnaire to Teodoro, compiled in 1644 two years after the withdrawal of the Spaniards—that can help us to take a minimal approach to this retrospective evaluation. Teodoro was an 8-year-old native of Quelang when the Spaniards arrived there. He passed all his youth in contact with the Spaniards. Maybe the Dominican Teodoro Quirós baptized him, gave him his own name and taught him Spanish, a language which Teodoro mastered. In 1642, the Dutch considered that the chieftain of Quimaurri, Sisinjan, had committed treason and decided to hang him. Soon after, they chose the 25 year-old Teodoro as the new leader. Two years later, he was subjected to a long interrogation with many questions about the Spanish times. Teodoro explained in questions 6 and 8 that the Spaniards had been in war with those of Tamsui because the latter had ambushed the Spaniards and later these retaliated, and with Kipormowa, a town in the east coast who killed the Spaniards and Chinese

46 *SIT*, p. 165

who had a shipwreck in their coast. In questions 12 to 15 Teodoro was asked about taxes, Christianization, and the Spanish language, saying that they never paid taxes and that the Spaniards never asked for it. Only the priests asked the natives—already converted to Christianity—to pay for the maintenance of the candles of the church, because the nearby towns were Christian, and because of the contact with the Spaniards all of them had become familiar with Spanish, except for the distant town of Santiago, whose priest knew the local language.⁴⁷

Conclusion

This had been a part of the history lived by men for whom the map of East Asia grew too small only 20 years after landing in Manila in 1571. That map grew small because—unlike later generations that do not know where Java or the Moluccas are located—that immense area had an integrated place in the mental geography of those men. They did not care if they had to make a two-week trip to buy rice in Cambodia

⁴⁷ These are the full questions and answers (*SIT*, p. 477):

12. *How many villages around Jilong and Tamsui and the rest of Formosa were at peace with the Spaniards?*

12. The following eight villages: Kimauri and St Jago, each having 100 warriors without counting the children and the wives. Sometimes, they also went to war with the Spaniards. The other six villages did not harm the Spaniards but they would neither go to war with them nor wish to establish further peace arrangements. These villages are: Kinneporach, having 300 warriors not counting the wives and children; Kimmalauw having 100 *ditto*; Kibanorra having 350 *ditto*, Kekitis Sebbon having 700 *ditto*; Kitalabiau having 60 *ditto* and Keketorachan having 80 *ditto*.

13. *Did these villages pay the Spaniards any tribute in the form of money, rice, paddy, pelts or anything else?*

13. They did not pay tribute to the Spaniards and this was also never demanded by the latter. They only paid for the candles that were used in the churches. And he, the one who was interrogated, was responsible for the receipts and expenditures of the candles. The receipts were in money or paddy. The paddy would be in turn used to buy money.

14. *How many of the eight mentioned villages were Christian?*

14. Two, Kimauri and St Jago.

15. *Do the inhabitants of these two villages understand Spanish?*

15. All from Kimauri, adults as well as children, understand Spanish. However, the ones from St Jago only understand Spanish partially because their priest could speak the native language.

in order to survive, when they could not find it in a nearby valley; if their ship got stranded in an unknown coast, they would cut down trees and use the old one to produce a new smaller boat to return to their place of departure; if they were shipwrecked in one island, they would go back there to convert their inhabitants. If doors closed in one place, they knew that in another a gate would open. If they did not care about their own lives, how were they going to be concerned about the lives of others? Therefore, these people lived a permanent contradiction, carrying out impossible missions and at the same time abiding by the moral norms that they imposed on themselves. Sometimes they had to reduce the scope of their mission to stay within the bounds of morality, at others they had to lower their moral standards to reach their secular goals. Later on, there would be enough time to try and find a solution to the problems this may have created.

Bartolomé Martínez was really determined to come to Isla Hermosa. He had reasons enough and he was confident that he could achieve it. What was the difference between him and the actual inhabitants of the island, i.e. the most recent immigrants? Nothing probably, it was a matter of who got there first. If they were the legitimate lords now, why could the Spaniards not be the lords in the future? The main problem was how to overcome the contradictions that might appear along the way.

Fernando de Silva had fought—or may have fought—in Flanders against the Dutch. They were again nearby at the other end of the world. How was he not to rise to the challenge posed by those rebels against the same king, and heretics dissenting from the same religion? And the Dutch, how could they not take advantage of the chance to cut the umbilical cord that the Philippines had with China? What was wrong with fighting that nation which was preventing them from rising in the emerging world economy and which was still loyal to the authority of the Pope?

“God, gold, glory”. For some people service to the king justified many things. For others, the salvation of the infidels justified compelling them to enter a new era of Justice. Finally, others considered that the desire for gold did not need to be justified. In any case, all of them acted thinking that the injustices committed—if any—were regrettable but reparable; they also thought that “a good result”, even if not justified because of the wrong means used, was still “a good result”.

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