

「自由派的帝國主義」： 英國對埃政策，1893-94

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摘要

自由主義的信念本與帝國主義不合，但在事關國家利益的外交與帝國政策上，自由黨人終究不能堅持理想而採行可能喪權辱國的溫和作法。十九世紀後期英國自由黨的政治理念與保守黨大相逕庭，但此種差異主要表現在內政方面；在外交政策上，自由黨則不得不走向保守主義式的路線。本文即藉著討論羅斯柏理(Lord Rosebery)擔任外交部長時期英國對埃政策的發展，說明自由黨由反帝國主義形象轉為帝國權益擁護者的變化脈絡及其意義。文分五節：導言分析 1892 年自由黨大選勝利後羅斯柏理就任外交部長時的政治氣氛，以及同年埃及新任總督艾伯斯(Abbas Hilmi II)即位時英埃關係的微妙變化；第二節論述 1893 年初「艾伯斯政潮」(Abbas' Coup)的發展與英國對埃控制力的強化；第三節探討艾伯斯政潮之後自由黨政府對埃政策路線「向右」的調整；第四節檢討 1894 年初蘇丹「邊境事件」(Frontier Incident)的發展與英國領埃威權的鞏固；結論解釋 1893 年至 1894 年間英國對埃政策所表現的「自由派帝國主義」(‘Liberal Imperialism’)精神及其影響。綜合言之，經過這二、三年間的變化，英國統埃的機制大改，英國逐步將埃及納為「保護地」，而自由黨的帝國政策則明顯趨向於「保守主義化」。

關鍵詞：自由派的帝國主義、埃及、格蘭斯敦、羅斯柏理、克魯摩、艾伯斯、艾伯斯政潮、邊境事件

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Imperial Liberalism or Liberal Imperialism: British Policy in Egypt, 1893-94

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Abstract

Essentially, liberalism contradicts imperialism; but in Realpolitik liberals rarely stand against imperial enterprise. Such is the case of the British Liberal Party during the late nineteenth century. Focused on Lord Rosebery's policy towards Egypt under Gladstone's last ministry, this thesis argues that, as far as foreign policy was concerned, the Liberals in the early 1890s discarded their 'outdated' beliefs in rationalism and pacifism, and assumed an attitude not different from that of their political opponents – the Conservatives. This change of attitude was highly justifiable and popular as the Liberal decision-makers raised questions about national interests under conditions of increasing competition from the other Powers. This article treats of the political atmosphere in 1892, when Lord Rosebery and Abbas Hilmi II took office as the British Foreign Secretary and the new khedive respectively, and the so-called Abbas' Coup in 1893 and the Frontier Incident in 1894, to show how 'Liberal Imperialism' developed and the British occupation of Egypt became 'permanent', in spite of strong Liberal idealists' opposition. The author points out that in dealing with the Egyptian question the Liberal Party was losing touch with liberalism and getting more and more 'conservative', and that while achieving more popularity with the British public in this way, the Liberal Party grievously alienated its fundamentalist supporters, which detracted from its merit and worth as an independent political group.

Keywords: liberal imperialism, Egypt, Gladstone, Rosebery, Cromer, Abbas, Abbas' Coup, Frontier Incident

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The year 1892 opened with an event that was to prove a turning point in Egyptian history. It was, in the eyes of the Radicals, an opportunity for the British Government to make a fresh start in the direction of establishing a national government in Egypt on constitutional lines, which Lord Dufferin, the British commissioner to Egypt (1882-83),¹ had promised and which might have enabled England to evacuate the country in agreement with the Sultan and the European Powers. But, contrary to the wish of the anti-annexationists, it turned to be an opportunity of taking the reins of government at Cairo more completely into the hands of the British rulers.

In 1892 the Liberal Party came into power in Britain and Abbas Hilmi II succeeded as Khedive (1892-1914) in Egypt. The hope was lavishly entertained at the time of a great change in the Anglo-Egyptian relationship. The so-called Abbas Coup of 1893 and the Frontier Incident of 1894 constituted what Lord Cromer (Evelyn Baring, the British Agent and Consul-General, 1883-1907) described as the second turning-point in the diplomatic history of the connection between Britain and Egypt since the occupation commenced in 1882.² During the two years after 1892, a

1 Dufferin was the Viceroy of India (1884-88), ambassador to Italy (1888-91), and ambassador to France (1891-96)

2 Lord Cromer, *Abbas II* (London: Macmillan, 1915), 64. According to Cromer, the real ruler of Egypt during his residence, the first turning-point occurred in 1887, when the Turkish Sultan refused to ratify the Wolff Convention and thus relieved the British of the responsibilities for their continued occupation of Egypt, together with all the difficulties and

good deal of trouble for the British arose from time to time with the young Khedive, but eventually the battle for British supremacy was won and the British position was therefore strictly regularized, though not necessarily justified. Meanwhile, the Gladstonian idea of a more liberal control of the Empire – ‘imperial liberalism’ – gave way to the Roseberian doctrine of ‘liberal imperialism.’

I. Britain and Egypt in 1892: A New Approach to Power?

Towards the end of the Salisbury ministry, W. E. Gladstone, the Liberal leader, had made some remarks on the question of continuity in foreign policy, which were naturally taken as throwing doubt upon the point he raised. The campaigns during the general election of 1892 centered on domestic issues and Irish home rule, with only Gladstone and his faithful follower John Morley occasionally remarking on the burdensome occupation of Egypt. These were really minor comments in the context of the general argumentation, but they were received excitedly by the press in France and Egypt as messages promising that the Liberal Party, if elected, was to evacuate Egypt. Cromer was much annoyed about the situation.³

After the victory of the Liberal Party in the election, Lord Rosebery (Archibald Philip Primrose, 1847-1929) was hesitant to join the Gladstone Government because of an acute difference of opinion between he – generally supposed to be the new Foreign Secretary – and the Prime Minister on foreign policy. Thinking of controlling foreign policy, Rosebery was concerned less with Eastern Europe than with Egypt: the Liberals were likely to accept his views on the Bulgarian question, but they were inclined to fight over Egypt.⁴ He informed the Prime Minister that he would accept

embarrassment that would have arisen from a premature evacuation of the country. In his classical book on the history of Egypt entitled *Modern Egypt*, Cromer strategically left out Abbas' Coup, with which he dealt in another volume named *Abbas II*.

3 Lord Cromer, *Abbas II*, 12-13; and R. L. Tignor, *Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt, 1882-1914* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 162.

4 Gordon Martel, *Imperial Diplomacy: Rosebery and the Failure of Foreign Policy* (London:

office only on condition that he should not be interfered with especially on the question of Egypt, insisting that Gladstone's pledge of evacuating Egypt should be disregarded so long as he was responsible for foreign affairs. Gladstone acquiesced in the condition, considering that a strong Liberal government could not be formed without Rosebery, who was widely expected to compensate for the premier's idealist liberalism on foreign affairs and to keep Great Britain great and imperial. Rosebery then chose for his under-secretary Sir Edward Grey, a young Liberal of like mind. Aloof and independent, the Foreign Office under Rosebery was a self-contained and powerful department, where the policy towards Egypt was decided on and conducted without much interference by the cabinet.⁵

The change of government came at a rather 'unfortunate' moment in so far as Egyptian affairs were concerned, for, as Cromer said, it was dangerous for an Eastern nation to base any political calculations on its own estimate of the state of party politics in England.⁶ Knowing that a section of the Liberal Party was in favour of the speedy evacuation of Egypt, many half-informed politicians at Cairo urged that the moment was singularly favourable for venturing upon casting off the British yoke.

In January 1892 Abbas succeeded his father Tewfik Pasha (r.1879-92) as Khedive. There were rumours before the accession of Abbas that he would not follow his father's example and relinquish his powers to the British. Less than a year the 18-year old ruler, of Turkish family, had managed to gather about him the nucleus of a new nationalist party. The Khedive had been greatly aided in this by the newly-published book of Sir Alfred Milner (1854-1925), *England in Egypt*, which conspicuously served Cromer's views and much angered the Egyptian people. The book, which was largely read in an Arabic translation at Cairo, candidly revealed the nature of the British policy in the 'veiled protectorate' and thoughtfully argued for the annexation of the country,⁷ causing painful alarm among the native elite.

McGill-Queen's University Press, 1986), 31.

5 For further discussion see E. T. Raymond, *The Man of Promise: Lord Rosebery* (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1923), 121.

6 Lord Cromer, *Abbas II*, 12.

7 Alfred Milner, *England in Egypt* (London: Edward Arnold, 1892), 29. Milner was the Under-Secretary for Finance in Egypt before publishing his book, which was finished in haste. 'I could not bring myself to abandon it, for it seemed to me, with all its shortcomings, to have some value and interest, especially at the present time.' (p. v) Milner's book gave

It was made clear by Rosebery that under the new government, no less than under the old, the British work in Egypt would carry on. To him, it was the question of continuity in foreign policy, connected with the honour and legitimate rights of the nation. Owing to the pre-occupation of the Liberal Government with the affairs of Ireland and other home politics, the Egyptian question was allowed to stand over in 1892. Rosebery at the Foreign Office was left to act, and he was to show that the Conservatives did not 'monopolize whatever talent the country possessed for dealing with foreign affairs.'⁸ In Egypt, on the other hand, there were elements of a stronger opposition to the English regime than the case under Tewfik. Abbas was to claim the rights that were legalistically his, by exposing the system of Anglo-Egyptian 'co-operation' in the past decade arbitrary and unjust. The confrontation between the English and Egyptian authorities revealed the same will of Rosebery and Abbas to assume responsibilities conferred by the positions they respectively occupied. Their conflict was one between the sense of 'power' and the sense of 'right.' And the result testified to the fact that 'might is right.'

II. Abbas' Coup and the Strengthening of British Control of Egypt

In the first few months of his reign, Abbas did not seem to resist British control. Cromer reported to Salisbury, the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, in February 1892: 'I see that the young Khedive is going to be very Egyptian, by which I mean, not so much anti-European – and certainly not anti-English – as anti-Turkish.'⁹ But as the British Agent returned to Egypt from England in the autumn, the situation became very different from that four months before, when he had taken his leave. He received many complaints from his English officials of Abbas' interference with their

the clear impression that, if Cromer had his way, the British would remain in Egypt indefinitely. For more discussion see, Peter Mansfield, *The British in Egypt* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1971), 154; and John Marlowe, *Cromer in Egypt* (London: Elek, 1970), 176.

8 Lord Cromer, *Abbas II*, 32.

9 Public Record Office (PRO), FO633/6, Cromer to Salisbury, 21 Feb. 1892.

programmes. At first, Cromer ignored the threat. He told the London authorities in November: '[The Khedive] had been foolish about a number of small things, but he is so young and inexperienced that he ought not to be judged too harshly. I lectured him in plain but very unfriendly terms, and I do not anticipate that for the time being I shall have much difficulty with him.'¹⁰ After this, Cromer was soon to find he was wrong.

At the end of 1892, when the Egyptian premier, Mustapha Fehmi Pasha was seriously ill, there was a discussion between Abbas and the British Agent on ministerial arrangements that would become necessary in the event of the death of the present Prime Minister. Cromer named Riaz Pasha, an Anglophile, to be the candidate. Believing that the Khedive would not venture to make any objectionable appointment, Cromer did not then think it necessary to interfere directly.¹¹ As soon as the new year came in, alarming rumours began to circulate in Cairo as to the intentions of the young Khedive and as to his dissatisfaction alike with his ministers and with his English advisers. In his communication with Cromer on the subject of premiership, Abbas had referred to Tigrane Pasha as a test of Cromer's insistence on English influence. Cromer expressed his disapproval of Tigrane's appointment, but the Khedive did not promise definitely to give up the idea. Cromer then wrote to Rosebery: 'If I were to receive a telegram from you stating that Her Majesty's Government would regard it unfavourably, the probability I think is that he (Abbas)

10 PRO, FO633/6, Cromer to Salisbury, 12 Nov. 1892. In *Abbas II*, Cromer explained his inactiveness in regard of the Khedive's challenges to be 'an attitude of studied moderation.' He said: 'To the despair of many of the British officials, I yielded on several minor points... I was well aware that this conciliatory spirit would be mistaken for weakness, that it would fail to conciliate, and that it would, on the contrary, afford encouragement to the commission of some flagrant act of hostility, which would ultimately necessitate strong action being taken. Nevertheless, the adoption of this attitude had, from my point of view, the great advantage that public opinion would be prepared for a conflict, and that when the conflict eventually came, I should be in a far better position to deal with it by reason of the patience displayed in the preliminary skirmishes... In this particularly case, I had not long to wait before a conflict was forced upon me.' Lord Cromer, *Abbas II*, 18. If this was not a pretext for his failure to avoid Abbas' Coup, then it was Cromer's confession of his intrigue of inviting the crisis.

11 *British Parliamentary Papers, 1893-94*, vol. 111, Cromer to Rosebery, 29 Dec. 1892, p. 1107. Rosebery communicated his concurrence to this position. *Ibid.*, Rosebery to Cromer, 29 Dec. 1892.

would not make it.¹² Rosebery thought it advisable to have a Mohammedan Prime Minister, and if possible, to avoid Tigrane Pasha, who, as Rosebery understood, was not in touch with the Egyptian people, either by race, religion, language or habits of mind. 'But I would not push opposition too far if the Khedive is set on Tigrane,' Rosebery instructed Cromer.¹³ The Khedive's attitude was due to a wish to show his strength of character and independence by nominating a Prime Minister who was disapproved by the British and nearly all classes in Egypt.¹⁴

On 2 January, the Khedive received again Cromer in an audience, and requested him to try and diminish the objections felt in London towards the appointment of Tigrane. Cromer advised Abbas not to appoint Tigrane, but he did not refuse to allow the Khedive to nominate Tigrane, because of the instructions of Rosebery. At the time Cromer believed that Abbas would certainly appoint Tigrane, and that the advice tendered by the British officials rather strengthened the Khedive in his determination to do so.¹⁵ Cromer agreed with Rosebery that it was not politic to take effective measures until the Khedive's contumacy had assumed considerable proportions and until he had given more overt proofs of deliberate unfriendliness to England. And Cromer thought it undesirable to use threats to prevent Abbas from challenging the English power, unless the English Government did intend to give effect to them. The threat that Britain should make her own terms with Turkey or with France was in his opinion very unwise, because it would scarcely be believed and would be extremely difficult to carry into execution. Cromer suggested that if a crisis occurred a change of Khedive should be the best and least disturbing remedy to apply, and that the use of this threat would probably bring Abbas to reason.¹⁶

12 PRO, FO78/4517B/2, Cromer to Rosebery, 1 Jan. 1893; also cf. FO407/119/1, same to same, 1 Jan. 1893.

13 PRO, FO78/4517A/1, Rosebery to Cromer, 1 Jan. 1893.

14 PRO, FO78/4513, Cromer to Rosebery, 9 Jan. 1893. Whether Abbas was acting under influence from outside was an important information for the Liberals, who supported national self-determination in principle, to react to. Cromer wrote to Rosebery: 'From all I hear, I entertain little doubt that the Khedive's *coup d'état* was preconcerted with the Representatives of France and Russia.' FO141/299, Cromer to Rosebery, 16 Jan. 1893.

15 PRO, FO78/4517B/4, Cromer to Rosebery, 2 Jan. 1893.

16 PRO, FO78/4513, Cromer to Rosebery, 9 Jan. 1893. The most serious difficulty involved was that an arbitrary change of the Egyptian Government made by England would raise some very awkward diplomatic questions.

The conflict between Cromer and Abbas burst out on 11 January, when Cromer closed their meeting with an extravagant reassertion of English powers in the light of Granville's despatch of early 1884. He told the Khedive that, although he never interfered in any matters of detail, it had always been fully understood that so long as the English occupation lasted, the greatest deference should be paid to any English advice on important questions. Yet Cromer found that he had failed to prevail over his rival.¹⁷

Much to the surprise of all, Mustapha Fehmi Pasha was recovering from the sharp attack of illness, which seemed to dissipate all the worries about a change of premiership. However, Mustapha Fehmi, who was understood to possess the confidence of the British, was suddenly dismissed by Abbas on 15 January 1893. At the same time the Ministers of Finance and of Justice were also relieved of their portfolios. In the place of these officials, Fakhri Pasha, a strong opponent of English influence,¹⁸ was appointed Prime Minister, and the Departments of Finance and of Justice were committed to two other native politicians (Boutros Pasha and Mazloum Pasha), who, like the premier, were understood to be unfriendly to European culture. Moreover, the Khedive intimated that for the future he would claim the right to appoint whatever ministers he pleased. His action was at once interpreted as a blow to the authority of the British, and the Egyptian press and the nationalist party loudly applauded the bold and independent attitude of the prince. Cromer protested against the new appointments, and refused to recognize the Khedive's nominees.

Cromer immediately reported the matter home, while the Khedive promised that no official notice should be issued until the British Government was informed of it. Cromer earnestly referred Rosebery to the despatch written by Lord Granville, the late Foreign Secretary, on 4 January 1884, which emphasized the necessity of the Khedive's following the advice of the British authorities on important questions so long as the British occupation continued.¹⁹ Offering an apology as well as a counsel,

17 PRO, FO78/4513, Cromer to Rosebery, 12 Jan. 1893.

18 Fakhri Pasha, a Turk, was dismissed from his post of Minister of Justice, on Cromer's advice, two years ago for obstinate opposition to the reforms demanded by the English officials.

19 *British and Foreign State Papers*, 1883-1884, vol. LXXXV, Lord Granville to Sir Evelyn Baring (later Lord Cromer), 4 Jan. 1884, p. 703. See also PRO, FO407/121/25, Appendix

Cromer said: 'A struggle with the Khedive is, as I have for some while foresee, inevitable, and it is not advisable to delay it. I think that this opportunity for bring matters to a head should be taken.' And he was more exacting than informative in reporting that Abbas had adopted his present attitude in the 'erroneous' belief that the Liberal Government would not support the British Agent in Egypt as fully the Salisbury ministry had.²⁰ To enhance his cause, Cromer added that British prestige had been seriously weakened by Abbas' rebellious act and would further be weakened by Britain's tolerance. In the end he requested that authority should be given to him – in the form of a telegram that he could show to Abbas – to take any step to prevent a change of ministry.

On 16 January a cabinet council was held in London, resulting in a moderate reply to Cromer. At first, Rosebery proposed to answer Cromer as he suggested in his telegram. 'Indeed I think we have no other course,' Rosebery told Gladstone.²¹ He emphasized that Abbas aimed a blow at the whole basis of British occupation and of their original interference, referring – more than what Cromer had done – to Granville's circular of 3 January 1883, which announced to Europe and Turkey that Britain should establish in Egypt law, order and good government on a stable basis.²² The Prime Minister and the Radicals, on the other hand, had sympathy for the Khedive, whose bid for independence was, they believed, spontaneous and based on

no. 1. Granville told Cromer: 'It should be made clear to the Egyptian Ministers and Governors of provinces that the responsibility which for the time rests on England obliges Her Majesty's Government to insist on the adoption of the policy which they recommend, and that it will be necessary that those Ministers and Governors who do not follow this course should cease to hold their offices. Her Majesty's Government feel confident that, in the event of a change of Ministry being necessary, Egyptians will be found...who will be ready to execute the orders which the Khedive, acting on the advice of Her Majesty's Government, may give them. In any representations which you may make with a view of carrying out the views above expressed, you may rely on the full support of Her Majesty's Government.' Also cf. Granville to Victoria, 4 Jan. 1884, in G. E. Buckle ed., *The Letters of Queen Victoria*, 2nd Series, vol. III (London: John Murray, 1928), 468-9.

20 PRO, FO78/4517B/19, Cromer to Rosebery, 15 Jan. 1893. Also cf. FO141/299, same to same, 15 Jan. 1893.

21 British Library (BL), Add. MSS. 44290, Rosebery to Gladstone, 16 Jan. 1893.

22 PRO, FO78/4512, Draft of Despatch from Rosebery to Cromer, 16 Jan. 1893. The Granville's despatch commenced with a statement that 'the position in which Her Majesty's Government are placed towards His Highness [the Khedive] imposes upon them the duty of giving advice, with the object of securing that the order of things to be established shall be of a satisfactory character, and possess the elements of stability and progress.'

a national will.²³ Commenting on Cromer's statement that Abbas' *coup d'état* was prearranged with the French and Russians, Sir William Harcourt, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, said that this amounted to the annexation of Egypt, a claim to the right of exclusive possession.²⁴ The cabinet were of opinion, without doubt, that no sanction should be given to Abbas' proceeding, but a question arose as to the degree of energy with which disapproval should be expressed, and also as to the meaning of Cromer in certain large words which he had used to prevent the Khedive from executing his plan.²⁵ However, a compromise was quickly arrived at between the Foreign Secretary and the other cabinet members.²⁶ The British Government cautiously expressed its wish to be consulted in such important matters; and Cromer was only authorized to communicate the message to the Khedive that, since no change appeared to be at present either necessary or peremptory, the British Government could not, therefore, sanction the proposed nomination of Fakhri Pasha. At the same time, Cromer was instructed not to take any further steps without again referring to London; but he was invited by Rosebery to suggest measures of pressure and steps to take in event of Abbas' disobedience.²⁷

In reply, Cromer suggested that if the Khedive refused to give way, English troops should occupy the Ministries of Finance, Justice, the Interior and also the Telegraph Office, and denied admission to the three ministers. And he urged that Abbas should be made to give way 'at whatever cost' if English influence was to be

23 Gladstone to Rosebery, 16 Jan. 1893, in H. C. G. Matthew ed., *The Gladstone Diaries*, vol. XIII (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1990), 181. Gladstone described Abbas' acts as 'an attempt...made with boldness apart from French aid.' In contrast to Gladstone's belief, Cromer emphatically argued that Abbas relied on support and sympathy from France and Russia. PRO, FO78/4517B/22, Cromer to Rosebery, 17 Jan. 1893.

24 A. G. Gardiner, *The Life of Sir William Harcourt* (London: Constable, 1923), 226.

25 PRO, Cab41/22/25, Gladstone to Victoria, 16 Jan. 1893.

26 In the crisis of January 1893 Rosebery was not initially at one with Cromer against the cabinet. When the London press reported, erroneously, that the Egyptian ministers to whom Cromer objected had already taken possession of their offices, Rosebery advised Cromer to accept the fact; and he generally agreed with the other Liberals in rejecting Cromer's violent suggestion. T. B. Miller, 'The Egyptian Question and British Foreign Policy, 1892-94', *The Journal of Modern History*, vol. 32, no. 1 (1960), 4.

27 PRO, FO78/4517A/13, Rosebery to Cromer, 16 Jan. 1893; and FO407/119/11, same to same, 16 Jan. 1893.

maintained.²⁸ Cromer then delivered an ultimatum to Abbas on 17 January and showed him a copy of Rosebery's telegram of the day before. Cromer announced that, if the Khedive agreed to reinstate Mustapha Fehmi as Prime Minister, no objection would be offered to the proposed changes as regards the Departments of Finance and Justice; otherwise, he must reserve the liberty of action of the British Government in regard of all these ministers. Cromer allowed Abbas a day to consider the conditions. Yet the Khedive said nothing from which Cromer could gather probable nature of his reply. On the same day Cromer urged Rosebery to offer him authority instantly for preparing for a military occupation of the said governmental offices. He justified his venturesome act by reporting home: 'Considerable excitement is felt here, it being fully understood by every one that English influence will be entirely destroyed if the Khedive is victorious,'²⁹

The London cabinet carefully considered Cromer's telegram, and all found that the measures proposed by the British Agent were too violent, and might be held to constitute an infraction of international law and led to the intervention of the Powers.³⁰ Rosebery only instructed Cromer to inform the Khedive, in case of his refusing to take English advice, that he must be prepared to take the grave consequences of his act. And to Cromer's great disappointment, Rosebery asked him to make 'some more practical proposal,' as there was still time to concert measures 'of a less violent character.'³¹ Meanwhile, the Foreign Secretary reported the existing situation to the Queen. Victoria was much surprised and complained that the

28 PRO, FO407/119/16, Cromer to Rosebery, 16 Jan. 1893; FO78/4517B/20, same to same, 16 Jan. 1893. Also cf. FO141/299, same to same, 16 Jan. 1893. The Egyptian administrative machine was divided into seven departments, over each of which a minister presided. These were Foreign Affairs, Finance, Justice, War, Public Works, Education, and the Interior.

29 PRO, FO407/119/21, Cromer to Rosebery, 17 Jan. 1893. Also cf. FO78/4517B/25, same to same, 17 Jan. 1893; and FO141/299, same to same, 17 Jan. 1893.

30 PRO, Cab41/22/26, Gladstone to Victoria, 17 Jan. 1893. 'This is to take possession of the country,' Gladstone wrote in his diary. Gladstone diary, 17 Jan. 1893, in H. C. G. Matthew, *op. cit.*, 182.

31 Rosebery to Victoria, 17 Jan. 1893, in G. E. Buckle, *The Letters of Queen Victoria*, 3rd S., vol. II (London: John Murray, 1931), 205; and PRO, FO78/4517A/15, Rosebery to Cromer, 17 Jan. 1893. Rosebery said that the aggressive measures proposed by Cromer reminded him of Napoleon's *coup d'état* of December 1851. Lord Crewe, *Lord Rosebery* (London: John Murray, 1931), 338.

cabinet's decision had not been submitted to her before informing the British Agent. 'We cannot allow England to be lowered in the eyes of the world,' she wrote to Rosebery, effectively pressing for the vigorous action suggested by Cromer.³²

Devoid of the support of the home government and seeing no signs of Abbas' surrender, Cromer was disposed to give the Khedive another chance of yielding before resorting again to threats or to positive action. But, suddenly, on the afternoon of the 17th, Tigrane called on Cromer on behalf of the Khedive, and after a good deal of discussion an agreement was reached. Mustapha Fehmi was not to resume office, and Fakhri was to be dismissed, while Riaz was to be appointed Prime Minister; the Khedive's nominations for the Ministries of Finance and Justice were accepted, but Abbas' Anglophobe private secretary, M. Rouiller, was asked to leave the country. And, owing to Cromer's insistence, Abbas was to make to the British Agent a formal declaration, the contents of which would be formed according to Cromer's dictation. The Khedive was demanded to say that he 'was most anxious to cultivate the most friendly relations with England, and that he would always most willingly adopt the advice of Her Majesty's Government on all questions of importance in the future.'³³ On the next morning Cromer visited Abbas, and matters were settled in conformity with the arrangement made on the previous day. In the official announcement of the formation of a ministry under Riaz, however, no mention was made either of the dismissal of Mustapha or the brief premiership of Fakhri. Such was the end of the 'Minister Crisis'.

The outcome, clearly a decisive victory to the British, was in Cromer's eyes only a 'compromise,' for he had intended to take a much stronger line of action. Cromer complained to Rosebery after the crisis that, in view of the reluctance of the British Government to act vigorously in support of any representations he might make at Cairo, he thought it essential to settle the matter quickly. And it was with great reluctance that Cromer did not insist on the retention of Mustapha, who had always been loyal to the British Government.³⁴ Rosebery also desired to restore Mustapha to a previous position if possible. He planned to give some other post to the

32 Victoria to Rosebery, 18 Jan. 1893, in G. E. Buckle, *op. cit.*, 205.

33 Lord Cromer, *Abbas II*, 27.

34 PRO, FO78/4517B/28, Cromer to Rosebery, 18 Jan. 1893.

old politician when he convalesced, to refute the supposition that the Khedive could get rid of pro-English officials on account of health.³⁵ Gladstone, however, deemed the result to be 'satisfactory,' since the Khedive was defeated in the main and essential point of the appointment of his new Prime Minister. He did not agree to insist to the uttermost on the reinstatement of Mustapha, which would be very humiliating to the Khedive, by reason of the poor health of the old premier.³⁶

As soon as the Abbas' Coup ended, Cromer suggested increasing the British garrison in Egypt at once.³⁷ Before receiving Cromer's letter, the idea had occurred to Rosebery that the mere threat of the increase of the British force would bring the Khedive to his senses. To Cromer's proposal Rosebery completely agreed, although he expected to meet with strong resistance from his colleagues. 'But if I am to remain responsible for affairs something of the kind must be done,' Rosebery said.³⁸

The idea of increasing the garrison in Egypt was very repugnant to Gladstone, who told his War Secretary, Campbell-Bannerman, that the sending of troops to Alexandria at this time would recall the memory of the bombardment in 1882 and suggest some intention of occupying the country permanently.³⁹ In fact, during the previous few weeks, the Prime Minister had discussed unofficially with the French Ambassador (W. H. Waddington) behind Rosebery's back about the possibility of evacuating Egypt. Cromer's suggestion seemed to him to aim at putting down the treaty rights of the Khedive by force. According to the Prime Minister's secretary, Gladstone was 'tremendously taken back' by Rosebery's letter (20 January) on the subject of the army of occupation in Egypt. He was quoted as saying: 'I would as soon put a torch to Westminster Abbey as send additional troops to Egypt. It can't be. Such proposals make me so fearful about the future. I can see nothing for it but for

35 PRO, FO633/7/120, Rosebery to Cromer, 19 Jan. 1893.

36 PRO, Cab41/22/27, Gladstone to Victoria, 18 Jan. 1893; and Cab37/33/17, F. Bertie's memorandum, 30 Jan. 1893.

37 PRO, FO407/119/32, Cromer to Rosebery, 19 Jan. 1893. Numerically, the Egyptian and English garrisons of Cairo were equal. Cromer recommended the increase of cavalry without withdrawing the infantry battalion, and he further recommended the addition of another battalion, thus raising the strength of the British garrison to three battalions.

38 PRO, FO633/7/120, Rosebery to Cromer, 19 Jan. 1893.

39 Gladstone to Henry Campbell-Bannerman, 23 Jan. 1893, in H. C. G. Matthew, *op. cit.*, 190-91.

Rosebery to resign.⁴⁰ Gladstone's anguish was evidenced by the fact that he was well aware that his government simply could not get on without Rosebery, and that it was no use taking a step that might result in his resignation. He cooled down ere long, and tried to reach a compromise before the cabinet meeting. He wrote to Rosebery on the day that there were two ways of dealing with the Egyptian question – force or European law, and that the cabinet wholly leant to the latter.⁴¹ The Foreign Secretary replied immediately that the Government had only two options before them – to retreat from Egypt or to send an army there.⁴² A conclusion was arrived at that very day that the British Government, without making any announcement, should be prepared if necessity should arise to increase the garrison in Egypt.⁴³ Thus, Rosebery practically had the promise of having his own way on the matter.

But Cromer expressed his deep regret at the cabinet's decision and continued to champion his cause.⁴⁴ He reported that the Egyptian press, inspired by the palace, deliberately distorted the story of the ministerial crisis and omitted particularly the promise given by the Khedive to follow the advice of Britain for the future.⁴⁵

40 E. W. Hamilton diary, 20 Jan. 1893, in D. w. R. Bahlman ed., *The Diary of Sir Edward Walter Hamilton, 1885-1906* (Hull, England: The University of Hull Press, 1993), 187. Sir William Harcourt, Rosebery's only serious rival, had laboured hard to keep the cabinet together over Egypt. See David Brooks ed., *The Destruction of Lord Rosebery* (London: The Historian's Press, 1986), 4.

41 BL, Add. MSS. 44290, Gladstone to Rosebery, 20 Jan. 1893.

42 BL, Add. MSS. 44290, Rosebery to Gladstone, 20 Jan. 1893. Rosebery added that the French Government had just refused their consent to the increase of the Egyptian army, so they could not complain. (The proposal of the Egyptian Government to increase their army by 2,000 had not received the sanction of the Powers: all the Powers assented except Russia, who gave no answer, and France, who withheld her assent.) He told Gladstone the other day that, though it might be desirable to evacuate Egypt, Britain could not be jockeyed or intrigued out of it. Ibid., same to same, 19 Jan. 1893.

43 The cabinet agreed upon words as follows: 'That they would be prepared, if necessity shall arise, to increase the British Garrison in Egypt, but that they did not think the time propitious for the announcement, and that Lord Cromer was to request authority from home before making it.' PRO, Cab41/22/28, Gladstone to Victoria, 20 Jan. 1893. Also cf. FO78/4517A/18, Rosebery to Cromer, 20 Jan. 1893.

44 PRO, FO633/7/390, Cromer to Rosebery, 21 Jan. 1893; and Victoria journal, 21 Jan. 1893, in G. E. Buckle, *op. cit.*, 209. Cromer said to Rosebery the same thing as what the latter had said to Gladstone the day before – 'You will have to choose between going forwards or backwards – that is to say, either asserting yourself more strongly, or retiring from the country.'

45 Cromer had communicated the Abbas' assurances officially to Tigrane, with the request that they should be made known to Riaz. According to W. S. Blunt, a former diplomat and

Cromer's telegrams contained some expressions calculated to breed irritation and suspicion in the cabinet. However, determined to enforce his Egyptian programme, Rosebery threatened the cabinet with resignation until Cromer's demand was met fully. He told the British Agent: 'If you do not receive the powers you ask on Monday morning, the Foreign Office will have passed into other hands.'⁴⁶ At the same time, the Queen strongly urged the Government to adopt Cromer's advice.⁴⁷ The Radicals – especially Gladstone, John Morley and William Harcourt – recognized, reluctantly, the force of the argument based on the importance of maintaining public order in Egypt, but they, as Cromer realized it, were absolutely disgusted at the notion of sending out troops merely to 'overawe the Khedive.'⁴⁸ In Cromer's view, it was unwise to announce that the preservation of public order was the sole motive for reinforcing the garrison, for 'no political effect could be created by a statement of this nature.'⁴⁹ He suggested merely making the announcement without adding any comments whatever, so as to make it terrifying enough to the Egyptians.

In consideration of the future of the Home Rule bill for Ireland, the Radicals finally gave way on 23 January.⁵⁰ Cromer was then requested to make the announcement of reinforcement to the Egyptian Government without, however, assigning any reason for the measure – exactly as he had wished.⁵¹ The number of

political writer, the Khedive told the deputation that waited on him that all he had promised was 'to consult the British Resident.' W. S. Blunt, *My Diaries* (London: Martin Secker, 1919), Part I, 90.

46 PRO, FO633/7/391, Rosebery to Cromer, 21 Jan. 1893. Cromer replied that if the Foreign Secretary should resign, he would follow suit. 'The result will almost certainly be that many of the high English officials here will resign or be dismissed – in fact, the whole machine will collapse.' Ibid., Cromer to Rosebery, 22 Jan. 1893.

47 She said: 'The moment that necessity arises is the moment *too late* for action... If troops are *sent* to Cairo the necessity will *not* arise and any danger of war will be *averted*.' Victoria to Gladstone, 21 Jan. 1893, in Philip Guedalla ed., *The Queen and Mr. Gladstone* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1933), 460.

48 BL, Add. MSS. 44906, *Egypt* by Lord Cromer, p. 257.

49 PRO, FO407/119/40D, Cromer to Rosebery, 22 Jan. 1893.

50 A. L. al-Sayyid, *Egypt and Cromer: A Study in Anglo-Egyptian Relations* (London: John Murray, 1968), 112; and Keith Robbins, *Sir Edward Grey* (London: Cassell, 1971), 43.

51 In the announcement the Government published in the newspaper in England of 24 January, however, it was said that the decision had been arrived at 'in view of recent occurrences which threatened to disturb public security in that country.'

the British force in Egypt, which now stood at about 3,000 men, was nearly doubled after the reinforcements of two battalions from Malta and Gibraltar arrived at Alexander early in February.⁵²

III. Britain's Egyptian Policy Reconsidered and Reoriented: 1893 and beyond

The Abbas Coup exposed the fact that the system under which the British ruled Egypt was very artificial; it showed that if ever the question was raised in a distinct form of what was to be done if the Khedive defied, great difficulties would ensue. It had not hitherto been necessary to define very closely the principles of the British occupation: so long as Tewfik was alive the British Agent succeeded in avoiding any issue of this sort being raised. But that was not the case since the accession of Abbas, who intended to force on 'prematurely' a general discussion of the Egyptian question. The lesson Cromer wanted to teach Abbas after the Ministerial Crisis was not exactly that the British Agent should be consulted before every ministerial change was made, but that the British control over the internal Government of Egypt allowed no questioning. That the candidates for important offices in the Egyptian Government must be agreeable to the British was actually secondary in importance. In fact, Tewfik had dismissed Nubar and Riaz, both great favourites of Cromer, without having consulted the British Agent.⁵³ As *The Times* observed, 'If we have not

52 According to the speech of the War Secretary, Campbell-Bannerman, on 18 April 1893 in the House of Commons, the figure was 5,637. *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates (Hansard)*, 4th Series, vol. 11, 'The British Garrison in Egypt', Henry Campbell-Bannerman, 18 April 1893, p. 556. The reinforcements stopped at Alexander, and were not expected to be brought to Cairo unless circumstances should require. The decision had a generally tranquillizing effect in Cairo, but much excitement still prevailed in the provinces. An infantry battalion which happened at this moment to be passing through the Suez Canal on its way from India to England, was ordered to land in Egypt and march into Cairo. The rapidity with which the English troops appeared after the announcement of the increase of garrison produced a very striking effect.

53 Although Tewfik had often changed his ministers, he had in most cases, however, been wise enough to take the British representative into his counsel. When Mustapha was told by Abbas' emissary to leave his office, he asked if the Khedive had consulted Lord Cromer on the subject, and begged him, before taking any final step, to do so. Abbas was exasperated by this answer, and wrote with his own hand an order dismissing the Prime Minister on the

hitherto declined to accept the nomination of a Prime Minister, the reason is simply that a Prime Minister has never before nominated in such circumstances and conditions as to make his nomination a real danger to important interest.⁵⁴ When the French Ambassador to London protested that Britain's course of action indicated that she claimed the right to nominate the Egyptian Prime Minister herself, Rosebery replied that that was not the way in which he should put the matter, but she did claim the right to give *authoritative* advice as to the choice of ministers. 'Indeed, so long as the British flag was there, and British forces were in co-operation, it would not be possible for us to allow the whole Administration, beginning at the top, to be reversed at the mere whim of the Khedive,' he asserted.⁵⁵ As a matter of fact, Rosebery had been prepared to support Cromer's proposals in case Abbas refused to give in, though he thought the military occupation of the Egyptian public offices 'should be reserved as a fifth act, and not as a second.'⁵⁶

Immediately after the end of Abbas' Coup, Cromer warned Rosebery of another thing of the same sort in the near future, and he urged the British Government to consider how to coerce the Khedive in case of necessity. 'I can suggest nothing less violent than the measures which I have already proposed,' he told Rosebery, asking for a clarification, formal or informal, of British policy in Egypt.⁵⁷ Rosebery agreed that the British must be prepared for a possible renewal of these incidents. The general relief in England at the arrangement made between Cromer and the Khedive

spot. See PRO, Cab37/33/10, Mr. A. Hardinge to Rosebery, 22 Jan. 1893. *The Times* commented: 'Abbas Pasha is a young man, and still has a few things to learn; among the lessons which it will be necessary to press upon his attention are those which may be drawn from the lives of his father and grandfather.' *The Times*, 17 Jan. 1893, 'The Egyptian Ministry', p. 9. The English press tended to impute the outbreak of the ministerial crisis to the headstrong and self-confident character of the young Khedive ruling a court where the conflict of international interests required temperate control. *The Pall Mall Gazette*, 18 Jan. 1893, 'Crisis in Egypt', p. 5.

54 *The Times*, 19 Jan. 1893, 'The End of the Egyptian Crisis', p. 9.

55 PRO, FO141/296, Rosebery to Lord Dufferin, 17 Jan. 1893. 'When [Waddington] spoke of the high-handed nature of Lord Cromer's proceeding, I was at a loss to understand his meaning,' Rosebery said to the British Ambassador to France the next day. FO141/296, Rosebery to Dufferin, 18 Jan. 1893. Also cf. FO343/3, Rosebery to Malet, 18 Jan. 1893.

56 PRO, FO633/7/120, Rosebery to Cromer, 19 Jan. 1893. Rosebery told Cromer after the ministerial crisis: 'I regret your Lordship's inference that Her Majesty's Government are not likely to give you vigorous support.' FO407/119/29, Rosebery to Cromer, 18 Jan. 1893.

57 PRO, FO78/4517B/28, Cromer to Rosebery, 18 Jan. 1893.

also quickly gave place to a feeling of apprehension as to the further development of events. Then the opinion prevailed that Britain would take all the measures necessary to establish her authority on a firm basis and to secure the continuity of reforms. Before long, the Foreign Secretary communicated to Cromer a frank expression of his general views on the Egyptian question. This was what the Radicals hated to see – connecting the ministerial event with the whole Egyptian question. On the issue of reinforcement, Gladstone and his followers had tried to keep question of present necessities more distinct from that of future policy. The situation was recognized by them as a crisis not yet having assumed a permanent character. They held that if the split between the Egyptian and British Governments was prolonged and became chronic, the British position in Egypt would be fundamentally changed, and the European Powers must be called in to rearrange the situation.

As soon as he was informed of the Abbas Coup, Rosebery observed that the position with which Britain had to deal in Egypt differed materially from that which had existed in the previous period.⁵⁸ But, as the British Government decided to increase the garrison in Egypt, Rosebery declared that this measure did not indicate any alteration of policy or any modification of the assurances that Britain had given to Europe with respect to her occupation of Egypt.⁵⁹ The Government's statement did not convince the Opposition at all, naturally.⁶⁰ In practice, the case in mid-January had been so far advanced by the subsequent circumstances that the cabinet had now gone beyond the point to which the Liberals desired to move. They did not consider the demands by Cromer for pledges from the cabinet to be warranted either by precedent or by principle. But they could not but endorse them. The cabinet only consoled themselves by waiting to see that, after a certain moderate interval of time, Britain would return to the normal position, and, more positively, by issuing a note to the six Powers that the reinforcement implied no change in Britain's engagements as regards Egypt. Many of the Powers tended to look upon the increase of the garrison

58 PRO, FO78/4512, Rosebery to Cromer, 16 Jan. 1893.

59 PRO, FO78/4517A, Rosebery to Dufferin, 23 Jan. 1893.

60 The Conservative leader in the House of Commons, A. J. Balfour, pointed out that the British position is materially changed by the incident, which must inevitably profoundly modify the view of the difficulties of the British in Egypt. *Hansard*, 4th S., vol. 8, 'Address in Answer to Her Majesty's Most Gracious Speech', 31 Jan. 1893, A. J. Balfour, pp. 92-93.

as immaterial, because it was its presence, not its numbers, which was objectionable, and because, however large it might be, the British Government would not dare to use it to coerce the Khedive.⁶¹ Yet, as a token of Britain's intention of keeping Egypt or as a moral support to the British Agent, the reinforcement was abhorrent to the Radicals and the Porte. The increase of the British garrison made the Sultan exceedingly angry, particularly as he had lately been boasting to his *entourage* that a complete evacuation would shortly follow.⁶²

Cromer was ambitious as well as shrewd when he pointed out to Rosebery that the British could not disguise from themselves that their occupation had changed its character and might necessitate a different policy.⁶³ To this Rosebery half agreed, his view being that Britain must go on as before 'with ten-fold vigilance,' though.⁶⁴ He told the British Ambassador to Turkey, Sir Clare Ford, on 1 February: 'The policy of Her Majesty's Government had undergone no change, but they were determined to carry out that policy in the manner and by the means which they might consider most efficacious.'⁶⁵ Thus, the only difference between Rosebery and Cromer respecting Egypt seemed to be whether to declare openly the change in policy or not. In fact, in order to let the native public know what the policy of the British Government was and subdue the nationalist party, Cromer advised publication of Rosebery despatches,⁶⁶ which would show Cromerism and Roseberianism in agreement. (To the Liberals, there was danger of a new publication of Blue Books, as Cromer had been compiling things against the Khedive since his accession.) Theoretically,

61 France urged the Porte to address a circular to the Powers, inviting them to express their views as to the condition of affairs in Egypt, while Germany advised the Sultan to accept in silence recent events. The governments of Germany, Austria and Italy communicated to Turkey an identic note as follows: 'The rights of the Suzerain are sufficiently safeguarded by the form of the British communication, and the situation in Egypt remains practically unaltered, and therefore no further notice should be taken of the matter.' PRO, FO407/119/66, Sir Clare Ford to Rosebery, 30 Jan. 1893.

62 PRO, FO407/119/49, Sir Clare Ford to Rosebery, 26 Jan. 1893. Anyway, Turkey accepted the fact resignedly and quietly.

63 PRO, FO633/7122, Rosebery to Cromer, 27 Jan. 1893.

64 PRO, FO633/7121, Rosebery to Cromer, 27 Jan. 1893.

65 PRO, FO407/119/78, Rosebery to Clare Ford, 1 Feb. 1893.

66 PRO, FO633/7/400, Cromer to Sir P. Currie, 29 March 1893. The Policy of the British Government and its communications with the Powers in regard to Egypt since the events of 1882 were clearly set forth in correspondence which had been laid before Parliament.

Rosebery still preferred private guidance to public interference, and he also agreed with his colleagues that such intervention should be as tender to the susceptibilities of the Egyptians as possible. Anyway, in repelling an unprecedented challenge Britain was forced to explicitly affirm what had always been contained in the avowed principles of her action; and this constituted a new departure of British policy in Egypt. It was doubtful whether Rosebery had established the Egyptian administration on a new basis, but it was doubtless that Britain was to guide the new ministry with absolutely authoritative advice.

The system under which the British Resident had been working for the past ten years had been shaken, if not shattered. Being a very delicate machine, the possibility was slight of its reconstruction. And it was clear that after this Cromer had the least intention of restoring the old laws. He had been warning Rosebery since Abbas' Coup that there were limits to the English officials' endurance.⁶⁷ From then on he, with Rosebery's consent, began to remain aloof from the Khedive and use firm and strong language to Riaz Pasha.⁶⁸ The threat he freely resorted to against the Egyptian Government was that a joint Anglo-Turkish occupation was not an impossible combination. Indeed, British military occupation was in some respects far less serious an evil than the 'civil occupation' of the British officials.⁶⁹ On the other hand, Cromer continually actuated Rosebery to adopt a forward policy and appealed to the Queen for assistance, his role in Egypt now becoming 'more an architect and less a pilot.'⁷⁰ Before the opening of the 1893 sessions, Victoria asked her ministers to use 'firm and unequivocal language' in Parliament on the Egyptian question, and

67 He wrote to Rosebery: 'What is to be the end of all this? Are we to be supported, or are we not? And unless the whole machine is to collapse, I shall be obliged to support them. This is the situation which we are approaching, and, I fear, approaching rapidly.' Cromer to Rosebery, 17 March 1893, quoted in Lord Zetland, *Lord Cromer* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1932), 205.

68 Cromer refused to see the Khedive since the ministerial crisis until early February. 'I shall impress him more by silence than by any amount of persuasion,' the British Agent said. PRO, FO633/7/394, Cromer to Rosebery, 3 Feb. 1893.

69 W. S. Blunt, 'The Khedive and Lord Cromer', *The Nineteenth Century*, vol. 35, no. 204 (Feb. 1894), 182. For Cromer's refutation see PRO, FO407/119/157, Cromer to Rosebery, 7 April 1893; and FO407/119/170/170, same to same, 28 April 1893.

70 W. M. Welcher, Jr., *No Country for a Gentleman: British Rule in Egypt, 1883-1907* (New York: Greenwood, 1988), 13.

received satisfactory assurances from Gladstone.⁷¹ Yet, the Prime Minister did not regard the proceeding in Egypt as affecting in any manner the fundamental considerations which bore upon the subject of the occupation; and soon later, in April, he secretly drafted provisions for the withdrawal of the British force from the country.⁷² But he realized that the nature and the existing situation of the Egyptian question forbade the Government to enter into further explanations at the present juncture. Under such circumstances, the British position was subject to the interpretations of Cromer and Rosebery: Gladstone declined to offer any statement to the House of Commons at the end of 1893 by reason that the views of the Government on Egypt had been fully stated in Rosebery's despatch to Cromer of 16 February, which was presented to Parliament earlier in that year.⁷³

An Anglo-Turkish arrangement was consequent upon the breakdown of the existent system in Egypt. Rosebery comfortably agreed with Cromer's opinion that nothing was more calculated to create a sobering effect in Egypt than the idea that the British were likely to come to their own terms with the Sultan over the head of the Khedive. From February 1893 Rosebery tried to proceed with some arrangement with Turkey, in the sense of accentuating the Sultan's authority at the expense of the Khedive, but without fixing a date for Britain's withdrawal. It would flatter the Sultan, but avoid the evacuation clauses of the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1887. 'The situation is completely changed since the Drummond Wolff Convention...and...the Khedive's character creates a new position,' he told the

71 Victoria to Gladstone, 30 Jan. 1893, in G. E. Buckle, *op. cit.*, 217; and Gladstone to Victoria, 30 Jan. 1893, in Philip Guedalla, *op. cit.*, 463.

72 Gladstone diary, 20 April 1893, in H. C. G. Matthew, *op. cit.*, 228. Gladstone desired to evacuate Egypt within 2 years provided that (1) there should not be any sign of danger in the measure; (2) the Turkish commissioner should also be withdrawn; (3) no other Powers should take the place of Britain or maintain any force in Egypt; (4) provision should have been made at a conference of the Great Powers and Turkey for Britain's right of re-entry.

73 *Hansard*, 4th S., vol. 20, 'The British Occupation of Egypt', 29 Dec. 1893, Gladstone, p. 443. Rosebery's despatch, though dated 16 February 1893, was actually written and finished on 16 January. See footnotes above. Ironically, in the general debate on Egyptian affairs in early May, Gladstone's speech in the House of Commons was made in a different spirit from that of Rosebery's despatch. And he appealed to the House for forbearance in discussing the matter. *Ibid.*, vol. 11, 'Egyptian Affairs', 1 May 1893, Gladstone, pp. 1655-56.

Porte.⁷⁴ Rosebery was anxious to embark on such negotiations, for it would justify Cromer in frightening the Khedive with the rumours of them. But he did not wish to enter into negotiations with Turkey of too strict a kind, as he believed that these might throw Abbas at once into a fury. Rosebery told the Porte that the negotiation must be absolutely secret between Britain and Turkey – without the supervision of a third Power, although he knew this to be practically impossible. What was really on his mind was that the British should endeavour to keep the present system going without signs of friction until they could arrive at some understanding with the Porte.⁷⁵ Rosebery hoped that such an arrangement would keep Abbas in order, and, if not, depose him with ease. But in fact, despite the eagerness of the Porte to negotiate with Britain, Rosebery was obstinately pessimistic about arriving at a satisfactory settlement.⁷⁶ Before the ministerial crisis he had held that negotiations for the evacuation of Egypt would be ‘a pernicious waste of time and energy.’⁷⁷ His attempt in 1893 at arranging a parley with the Sultan was important as a strategy, not as an objective.

Rosebery’s attitude towards the rule of Egypt was revealed by his response to the suggestion propounded in the summer of 1893 that Cromer be made viceroy of India. Rosebery opposed taking the British Agent from Egypt not because he was an indispensable man or because he could not be replaced, but because his removal was the one aim of the Khedive’s scheme, which would make Abbas ruler of the country and ‘would make instant evacuation necessary at the point of the Khedive’s toe.’⁷⁸ At the end of the year, when it was proposed to withdraw 2,000 men from Egypt in order to reduce the cost of the army of occupation, Rosebery told the War Office that Britain must at all hazards keep to its engagements with the Egyptian Government. And Cromer, from a local point of view, held that the question of the occupation was

74 PRO, FO633/7/127, Rosebery to Cromer, 24 Feb. 1893.

75 PRO, FO633/7/125, Rosebery to Cromer, 14 Feb. 1893.

76 PRO, FO407/120/126B, Rosebery to Clare Ford, 30 Oct. 1893.

77 BL, Add. MSS. 44290, Rosebery to Gladstone, 7 Nov. 1892.

78 BL, Add. MSS. 44290, Rosebery to Gladstone, 10 Aug. 1893. Lord Salisbury was so disappointed with Cromer for his mismanagement of affairs at Cairo that he said Cromer was unfit to succeed Lord Lansdowne in India.

one to be treated not with the Khedive's authorities, but with the Sultan.⁷⁹ It was clear that the consolidation of British control over Egypt during this year was based not on the consideration of material need, but on the will to a permanent occupation.

IV. The British Position Reconfirmed: The Frontier Incident of 1894

Although Britain had successfully vindicated her position after the Abbas Coup, many English politicians thought it necessary for her to administer to the Khedive a still sharper lesson before long. Once or twice, in May, August and November 1893, the friction between the Egyptian Government and the British was so great as to threaten a ministerial crisis, which was only avoided by the efforts of the Khedive and by the good sense of Riaz himself.

When he returned to Egypt from England in October 1893, Cromer received several reports of conflicts between the Egyptian ministers and the English officials. 'I listened to all the complaints of the English officials, but I determined to choose my own battle-ground in the struggle which was obviously impending.'⁸⁰ He was waiting for a quarrel over some issue that would be comprehensible to the British public on the one hand, and would afford no justifiable grounds for the other Powers' intervention on the other.

General H. H. Kitchner, the Sirdar of the Egyptian army,⁸¹ had long been engaged in preparing for the advance to the Upper Nile. The details of the proceedings were carefully withheld from the Khedive, nominally the Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian army. Abbas was offended at Kitchner's secret programme and other British encroachments on his power, and it was a matter much discussed between him and his intimates. Some of them were young officers, who encouraged him to assert himself as a reply to Cromer's call a year before for English

79 PRO, FO633/7/407, Cromer to Rosebery, 19 Dec. 1893.

80 Lord Cromer, *Abbas II*, 50.

81 In 1892 Kitchner was made commander in chief of the Egyptian army and in 1896 began the reconquest of the Sudan.

reinforcements. Early in January 1894 the Khedive made a tour on the Upper Nile, determined to find out exactly the state of affairs in the Sudan. Kitchner, who was with Abbas, tried to obstruct his inspection. A series of conflicts between the two occurred, culminating in the 'Frontier Incident' on 19 January. At that day, during a review the Khedive criticized a black regiment which was officered by Englishmen for marching disgracefully. (Various statements were current in Egypt as to what the Khedive had actually said or done.)⁸² At this Kitchner took offence, and offered to resign instantly, but the Khedive declined his offer of resignation. The British authorities regarded this matter as serious, because the Egyptian army was absolutely the creation of English officers, and because Abbas' damaging observations were entirely at variance with the opinion both of General Walker, the Commander-in-Chief of the British Army of Occupation, and the Sultan's commissioner, El Ghezi Moukhtar Pasha, who had just visited the same place. The incident had followed closely upon Moukhtar's tour on the Upper Egypt, and was thus understood as the consequence of the very complimentary remarks made by that officer of high experience and reputation. Kitchner reported it to Cromer immediately, and made use of the incident later as a pretext to get the Khedive recalled from the frontier.⁸³ Cromer, though not in favour of a Sudan campaign because of financial reasons, was ready to support Kitchner's cause in his dispute with Abbas with a view to making it the occasion of a new trial with the Khedive and, possibly, a new change of ministers.⁸⁴

Cromer then telegraphed to Rosebery, suggesting that Maher Pasha, the Under-Secretary of the War Office, should be dismissed for inciting the Khedive to strike,

82 In reply to Cromer's demand for apology for the incident, the Khedive surrendered on condition that he reserved to himself the right of making his version of the fact public. A statement was circulated in February in Cairo which purported to be the Khedive's version of the recent Frontier Incident. It was communicated amongst others to the agent of Reuters and the correspondent of *The Times* in Egypt, but the authority of this document was denied by Tigrane Pasha. See PRO, FO78/4574, Cromer to Rosebery, 18 Feb. 1894, Inclosure: 'Statement of the Khedive on the Nile Incident'.

83 See PRO, FO141/304, Kitchner to Cromer, 19 Jan. 1894.

84 Cromer grossly exaggerated the threat to the Egyptian army from Abbas' action. As some English officials indicated, most of the army, including many English officers, were unaware of the dispute between the Khedive and the Sirdar until they read about it in the newspapers three days later. R. L. Tignor, *op. cit.*, 173.

and that the threat should be resorted to if necessary that the Egyptian army would be placed directly under the control of the British Government.⁸⁵ Rosebery told the governments of France and Russia that he must deal separately with the case, independently of the other Consuls-General. And he gave Cromer a positive reply in very firm words,⁸⁶ while at the same time he published all the instances of insult which had recently occurred in order to excite the public in England. He even instructed Cromer to 'frighten' the Khedive with his official telegram.⁸⁷ On receipt of Rosebery's letter Cromer sought an interview with Riaz, and demanded the removal of Maher (to be transferred to some civil appointment) and the issue of laudatory order of the day to the army, and especially to the British officers (in the form of a letter addressed by the Khedive to the Sirdar, to be published in general orders).⁸⁸ And Rosebery's publicity campaign soon proved serviceably effective, as all the English papers of the day were full of violent words against the Khedive. *The Times*, for example, called on the Government to teach Abbas that 'Egypt does not exist to be his plaything.'⁸⁹ This climate of public opinion held sway over the cabinet, who always kept silent on the matter, and greatly contributed to the very full support given to Cromer compared with the awkward hesitancy displayed over the Abbas Coup last January.

Obviously, Rosebery's position on the occasion was much stronger than that a year ago on the ministerial crisis, and he became very active in directing Cromer to handle the issue. He was prepared to assume full responsibility of the consequences of his decision, as he did not wait to take measures until after a cabinet council.

85 See PRO, FO78/4578, Cromer to Rosebery, 20 Jan. 1894. Also cf. FO633/7/410, same to same (private), 20 Jan. 1894.

86 PRO, FO78/4577/5, Rosebery to Cromer, 21 Jan. 1894. Also cf. FO633/7/410, same to same (private), 21 Jan. 1894.

87 'You should...frighten His Highness, and my telegram leaves you a free hand as to the means,' Rosebery told Cromer privately on 21 January. PRO, FO633/7/410, Rosebery to Cromer, 21 Jan. 1894.

88 According to W. S. Blunt, the conditions imposed by Cromer included a requirement that the English officers in the Khedive's army should have the right to be tried by court martial in England. Abbas was said to have accepted all these conditions. See W. S. Blunt, *My Diaries*, 127. The idea of addressing a circular letter explaining the incident to the Powers was abandoned, together with that of addressing such a letter to the British Agent.

89 *The Times*, 25 Jan. 1894, 'The Egyptian Army', p. 9.

Cromer was this time greatly content to literally repeat Rosebery's plain-spoken language and carry out his views. 'It is important that the Khedive should have a perfectly correct version of our views,' the British Agent happily echoed his master's words.⁹⁰ Indeed, Rosebery was now even more overbearing than Cromer with the Egyptian Government. He told Cromer a few days after he had instructed the latter to make capital out of his indignation at the incident: 'With reference to my public telegram, you may make a merit...of mediating to modify stern attitude of Her Majesty's Government.'⁹¹ And Cromer had to somewhat soften a few of the expressions when he embodied Rosebery's instructions in a semi-official letter to the Egyptian authorities, although he claimed that he reserved to himself the right to make an official communication at any future time on the subject.⁹² At the same time, he persuaded Rosebery to be conciliatory with the Maher solution and close the crisis summarily.⁹³ At last, by the end of January, the Khedive and the Egyptian Government had complied with what the English public thought to be very 'moderate' demands.⁹⁴

Soon after the Frontier Incident was over, Rosebery began to contemplate the removal of the Khedive. He then tried to impress upon the Porte that the insult of

90 PRO, FO633/7/412, Cromer to Rosebery, 23 Jan. 1894.

91 PRO, FO633/7/413, Rosebery to Cromer, 26 Jan. 1894.

92 PRO, FO78/4578, Cromer to Rosebery, 24 Jan. 1894; and FO407/126/50, Cromer to Tigrane Pasha, 24 Jan. 1894. Also cf. FO141/304, same to same, 24 Jan. 1894.

93 The Khedive promised to transfer Maher to another post as soon as the Egyptian Government could offer him one equivalent to that which he was at present occupying. And in the order of the day which praised the Egyptian army, the services both of the English and native officers were referred to in a laudatory manner. Rosebery had hoped to take advantage of the present position to insist on Maher's instant dismissal and the substitution of a satisfactory successor; but after Cromer obtained a promise that the new appointment for Maher's place would meet with the British Agent's approval, Rosebery agreed to consider the incident at an end. PRO, FO78/4578, Cromer to Rosebery, 27 Jan. 1894; and FO407/126/41, Rosebery to Cromer, 29 Jan. 1894. The Order of the Day was duly published, and Maher was appointed after a week or so Governor of Port Said. His successor at the War Office was Sir E. H. Zohrab Pahsa, who was of Armenian race and of the Christian religion, and a nominee of Kitchner's.

94 See the strong call made by *The Pall Mall Gazette* on 27 January 1894 ('The Heart of Pharaoh', p. 1) for displaying British authority and re-establishing her damaged prestige. 'Let the lesson of last January be remembered. It is the half-settlement of that crisis which has been at the bottom of all trouble since,' the leading London evening paper said. For the full text of the Khedive's Order of the Day, see *The Pall Mall Gazette*, 29 Jan. 1894, 'The Khedive and the English', p. 7.

Abbas' recent behaviour was levelled as much at the Sultan, through Moukhtar, as it was at the British Government through the English officers. And, in view of the alienation of the Egyptian troops from the British and of the inveterate feeling of Abbas towards British occupation, Rosebery began to consider a sure formula for dealing with new outbreaks of Egyptian revolt. Whether any measures should then be taken against the person of Abbas, and whether all outlying English officials should be recalled to the citadel at Cairo, was a further matter for his consideration. Unlike a year ago, when Cromer was anxiously appealing for the home government's clarification of its Egyptian policy, Rosebery in early 1894 took the initiative in expounding the British position and invited the Resident's views on it. Apparently, both Rosebery and Cromer wished to use this incident as a lever to make Abbas and his ministers yield on the general points at issue, and they were sanguine about the effect in this direction.

From that time, the British were fairly satisfied with the Khedive's behaviour. Cromer made a boast in March of his influence with the Egyptian Government by saying: 'If I said the word, a change [of the ministry] would certainly be made.'⁹⁵ After the British position had become invincible, Rosebery and Cromer assumed a seemingly liberal attitude towards fresh native hostilities. Cromer remained inactive in regard of the argument based on the conduct of the Ministers in the Frontier Incident, which was very strong, as he was assured that in any case any serious conflict with the British would be avoided. Such confident and optimistic mood had been wanting until just a month ago. When the Sultan, for fear of the loss of his authority, urged the British Government not to allow a visit by the Khedive to London, Lord Kimberley, the new Foreign Secretary chosen by Rosebery, remarked: 'It does not seem to me to be in our interest to back up the Sultan against the Khedive when the Khedive is not against us. His coming to England is a friendly gesture, and it cannot be our policy to discourage it.'⁹⁶ By now the British position in Egypt was

95 PRO, FO633/7/417, Cromer to Lord Kimberley, 4 March 1894. 'But I have no certitude as to whom the Khedive would wish to appoint,' Cromer added. Also cf. PRO, FO78/4574, Cromer to Rosebery, 4 March 1894.

96 Kimberley to Currie, 22 May 1894, quoted in T. B. Miller, *op. cit.*, 11.

strong enough to be independent of Turkish recognition,⁹⁷ and the Egyptian question was changing from an issue of Anglo-Turkish relations into that of Anglo-Egyptian relations. The projected journey fell through anyway, and Abbas went to Constantinople instead in June. Though he agitated there for Turkish assistance in getting the British out of his country, the British Government was not disturbed. In fact, people began to say in Cairo: 'The Khedive is under Lord Cromer; Lord Cromer is King!'

The spring of 1894 saw the Egyptian nationalist movement lose its force, with Cromer's installation as absolute despot ruling the country through a dummy premier. The relations between Abbas and Riaz deteriorated quickly since the Frontier Incident, because the latter had 'betrayed' the Khedive and insisted on yielding to the British demands. When Riaz resigned in April, the Khedive dutifully followed Cromer's advice for sending for Nubar Pasha and, after some little hesitation, accepted all the other proposals regarding the new administration. In 1895 Mustapha was reinstated as Prime Minister, and Abbas was plunged into the follies of youth after the repeated failure of his heroic challenge to the British power.⁹⁸

V. Conclusion: Egypt and the Rise of British 'Liberal Imperialism'

It was made clear by Rosebery before the election in 1892 that under the new Liberal government Lord Salisbury's foreign policy would be continued, and that the British work in Egypt would go on without interruption. 'If there is one thing in my life I should like to live after me,' he said in 1895, 'it is that, when I first went to the Foreign Office as Secretary for Foreign Affairs, I argued for and maintained the

⁹⁷ T. B. Miller, *op. cit.*, 15.

⁹⁸ The frame of Abbas' mind appeared to contemporary observers to have undergone a material change since his visit to Constantinople. H. F. Wood, *Egypt under the British* (London: Chapman & Hall, 1896), 208. Anyway, the Khedive never recovered his nerve after the defeat in 1894.

principle of continuity in foreign administration.’⁹⁹ Indeed, by 1894 Rosebery had succeeded in overturning almost all the pre-election statements of the Gladstonians.

The cornerstone of the system under which Egypt had been governed during the reign of Tewfik Pasha (1879-92) was a fairly ‘good’ understanding between the Khedive’s government and the British Consul-General. Although this system had worked well in practice, it was, Cromer acknowledged, ‘very artificial,’ and its power to resist any political shock was very ‘doubtful.’¹⁰⁰ Within a year of Abbas’ accession to the Khedivate he had already rebelled against the position of a mere puppet, and boldly challenged this artificial system.

To solve the crisis of January 1893, Gladstone had been disposed to consult the European Powers, particularly France, on the fundamental change in the situation of Egypt.¹⁰¹ Rosebery, on the other hand, was anxious to make it clear on this occasion that Britain did not recognize any separate right in France as occupying a privileged position with regard to Egypt, or as representing in any way the Great Powers. To Waddington, who had referred to a speech by Gladstone (delivered on 31 January in the House of Commons) as indicating willingness to resume negotiations respecting Egypt with the French Government or with the Porte, Rosebery remarked that the British Government recognized with regard to Egypt only the Sultan as suzerain and the Great Powers collectively.¹⁰² Gladstone hoped that a more liberal attitude towards the Egyptian question would pacify France and therefore maintain British splendid isolation – a liberal position – in foreign relations, while Rosebery, with the support of Germany, was ready to claim for Britain paramountcy in Egypt at the cost of French alienation. Rosebery preferred Turkey to France for negotiation over Egypt, not because he respected the suzerain, but because he disdained the French as a contestant. As a result, the events of 1893-94 in Egypt led to closer relations between

99 Lord Rosebery (editor anonymous), *The Foreign Policy of Lord Rosebery: Two Chapters in Recent Politics 1886 and 1892-5* (London: Arthur L. Humphrey, 1901), 74.

100 Lord Cromer, *Abbas II*, 8. Indeed, as Cromer said, the only matter for surprise was that it had lasted so long.

101 Gladstone’s note, 17 Jan. 1893, in H. C. G. Matthew, *op. cit.*, 182; and BL, Add. MSS. 44290, Gladstone to Rosebery, 4 Feb. 1893.

102 PRO, FO343/3, Rosebery to Malet, 1 Feb. 1893. Also cf. Rosebery to Gladstone, 22 May 1893, in H. C. G. Matthew, *op. cit.*, 240. ‘The mere readiness to negotiate separately with France was a concession for which we may ask a return,’ Rosebery said.

Britain and the Triple Alliance, making British foreign policy inevitably more imperial and less liberal.

From the viewpoint of W. S. Blunt (1840-1922), a liberal-minded political observer, the quarrel between Abbas and Cromer was very much a personal one.¹⁰³ And Cromer acknowledged after the end of the ministerial crisis that it was 'of a somewhat artificial character.'¹⁰⁴ To Rosebery, however, the political agitation of 1893-1894 had shown the danger of the outcry raised by the Radicals for the evacuation of Egypt. In his eyes, their views, like the notes and protests of the French Government, were lacking in the element of reality. He, for instance, thought it very insignificant to distinguish how far Abbas' decision was due to personal impulse alone, or to the suggestion and guidance of others; what he saw was that it was of a nature to change the relationship between Britain and Egypt. Rosebery tried, and to a great extent successfully, to justify and make permanent the British position in Egypt simply by the right of conquest. Even if the declaration of British supremacy had not been laid down in the Granville despatch of 4 January 1884, 'it was clear,' Rosebery argued, 'that the most ordinary common sense dictated this view of our position.'¹⁰⁵ Thanks to the agitation for patriotism by the press, the incidents in the period produced a unanimous expression of support for the policy pursued in Egypt. The Radicals were shrill but impotent. Gladstone's nervous embarrassment and tension was revealed in what he said following the proceedings of January 1893 in Parliament: 'We must not flinch from doing – whether it be agreeable to us or not – that which on a rational and temperate view of the circumstances is necessary for the purpose of so maintaining order. We did not proceed on any vague intimation or any unwarranted assumption of our own, but upon the assurances both of the civil and military authorities on the spot; and I rejoice to think that what has been done has received the general acquiescence of the great body of the community both at home and abroad.'¹⁰⁶ In regard of Egypt, Gladstone had had to defend what he did not

103 W. S. Blunt, *op. cit.*, 89.

104 PRO, FO78/4513, Cromer to Rosebery, 9 March 1893.

105 PRO, FO141/296, Draft of Despatch from Rosebery to Cromer, 16 Feb. 1893.

106 *Hansard*, 4th S., vol. 8, 'Address in Answer to Her Majesty's Most Gracious Speech', 31 Jan. 1893, Gladstone, p. 117.

approve of and bear the responsibilities that were Rosebery's or Cromer's.

Ironically, in 1882 the British Government under Gladstone intervened to restore to the Khedive his 'legitimate authority' of dismissing his ministers (esp. Arabi), but now the Liberal Government was indignant with the Khedive for using the same authority. To the Liberal idealists, the Liberal Party seemed to have gone in for a thorough debauch of jingoism after 1893.

Exhausted and helpless over the affairs in Egypt and Ireland, Gladstone decided to retire from the political life in February 1894. A difference of opinion between the Liberal leader and his Foreign Secretary accounted for this decision. 'Opinion perhaps is too weak a word, for with me it is a matter of faith,' Rosebery wrote to Gladstone,¹⁰⁷ exposing also in what way the Prime Minister felt. Rosebery believed that what they wanted to achieve in international politics was exactly the same – the peace of the world, but they were diametrically opposed to each other as regards the means. In March the Queen selected Rosebery as the successor to Gladstone. And Rosebery chose Kimberley, the former Indian Secretary and an imperial sympathizer, to run the Foreign Office. As soon as Rosebery succeeded Gladstone, the Egyptian question *in* Egypt became, as some Englishmen on the spot reported, considerably quiet.¹⁰⁸

Described as a 'Liberal Imperialist' in 1885, Rosebery gladly defended himself by defining the meaning of the term as 'a Liberal passionately attached to the [British] Empire and interested intensely in the best means of sustaining and promoting the interests of the Empire.'¹⁰⁹ And shortly after the end of his premiership in mid-1895, Rosebery explained 'Liberal Imperialism' as implying the maintenance of the Empire, the opening of new areas for British surplus population, the suppression of the slave trade, the development of missionary enterprise, and the development of British commerce.¹¹⁰ By this, Rosebery practically created a new ideology and then annulled it, as he meanwhile obliterated the difference between the foreign policy of

107 BL, Add. MSS. 44290, Rosebery to Gladstone, 24 Feb. 1894.

108 H. F. Wood, *op. cit.*, 191.

109 Rosebery's speech in the Tudor Street Hall, Sheffield, 20 Oct. 1885, in Lord Rosebery, *op. cit.*, 75.

110 Rosebery's speech at the Albert Hall, 5 July 1895, in Lord Rosebery, *op. cit.*, 75.

the Liberal Party and that of the Conservatives. In fact, the policy of the Liberal Government in Egypt during 1893-94 met with general approval of the Conservative Party. Curiously enough, with a majority of 40, the Gladstone Government in the House of Commons relied heavily on the support of the Opposition to win the divisions on foreign affairs, as an important section of the ruling party was disposed to support the foreign policy of Salisbury. And the Prime Minister from time to time took the blame for 'misdeeds' overseas, and was embarrassed by the praise of the Government's forward policy beyond the Empire. The defeats which British arms and policy under the Liberal governments had sustained in South Africa and the Sudan had left a deep scar. Thus, the school of Liberal Imperialists, led by Rosebery, came into being in the early 1890s. Paradoxically, when the Liberal Imperialist was strengthened in his allegiance to his party, the Liberal Party lost its appeal as an opposition to conservatism. Only moderate men of all parties felt gratified at the turn affairs had taken; serious critics were keen to lodge their protests. As Blunt noted, 'It marks the beginning of an obstinate determination on the part of our Foreign Office under the Liberal, no less than under the Conservative administrations in Downing Street, to cling to Egypt right or wrong, wisely or foolishly, to its own hurt 20 years later.'¹¹¹

Explaining why the British, against the will of the Egyptian nation, did not retire from the country, Rosebery gave a fourfold answer. Firstly, it was not clear that the real feeling of the country was anything but friendly and grateful; secondly, it would not be proper to allow British policy to be dictated by the whim of the Khedive; thirdly, Britain could not abandon the work of 10 years to his caprice; and lastly, British retirement would be followed by the reinstatement of the old corrupt officials.¹¹² Rosebery apparently based all his arguments for the continued occupation on Britain's rights and the civilization that they unfailingly entailed. Good

111 W. S. Blunt, *My Diaries*, 98. During the First World War, after Turkey joined the Central Powers, the British Government declared Egypt a protectorate and deposed Abbas II, who had made his pro-German position clear, substituting Husein Kamil (1914-17). After the war the Egyptian nationalists were especially vigorous in demanding for freedom. Under the rule of Ahmad Fuad (Fuad I), a treaty providing for Egypt's independence was concluded in 1922.

112 PRO, FO633/7/122, Rosebery to Cromer, 27 Jan. 1893.

government as a justification of imperialism was not self-evident: it was forcible only after the ruled were forced to experience it for a certain period of time. To be sure, the British Government, particularly under a Liberal cabinet, was not desirous of putting Egypt under its direct control. The British were content to see the natives run the administrative business themselves as far as it did not prejudice British interests and prestige. The political crises of 1893-94 undermined the system of indirect rule, or 'imperial liberalism,' and drove Britain into deeper involvement. Already the British had begun around 1890 to nose into the Departments of Justice and the Interior, previously Egyptian domains, causing bitter antagonism to foreigners. Unfortunately, the Liberal Government was forced into vigorous action at this juncture both by Egyptian belligerence – substantially stimulated by the illusion about the Liberals' ideas of restraining the Empire – and the Conservative course of policy. After this, British influence was increased and introduced into almost all the branches of the Egyptian administration,¹¹³ and it was made clear that the Liberal Party would not evacuate Egypt according to its earlier pledges. After the Frontier Incident the nationalist movement was brought to a standstill by British enmity.¹¹⁴ And until the First World War, the question of evacuation was never again revived in an acute form, either by the Liberals or by the Egyptians. Although the Radicals continued to grapple with the Egyptian question, most of the issues they raised were about administrative technicalities, rather than the foundation of British occupation.

113 R. L. Tignor, *op. cit.*, 173-74; and E. D. Steele, 'Britain and Egypt 1882-1914: The Containment of Islamic Nationalism', in K. M. Wilson ed., *Imperialism and Nationalism in the Middle East: The Anglo-Egyptian Experience 1882-1982* (London: Mansell, 1983), 17. In 1898 the Ministry of the Interior was the last to come under the control of a British adviser.

114 Abbas' revolt in January 1893 had greatly enhanced his personal reputation and the morale of the nationalist party, but his second strike resulted in the frustration of all the anti-English movement.

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