

Look for the answers to these questions:

- What outcomes are possible under oligopoly?
- Why is it difficult for oligopoly firms to cooperate?
- How are antitrust laws used to foster competition?

Measuring Market Concentration

- Concentration ratio
 - Percentage of total output in the market supplied by the four largest firms
 - The higher the concentration ratio, the less competition
- This chapter focuses on oligopoly, a market structure with high concentration ratios.


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Concentration Ratios in Selected U.S. Industries			
Industry	Concentration ratio		
Video game consoles	100%		
Tennis balls	100%		
Credit cards	99%		
Batteries	94%		
Soft drinks	94%		
Web search engines	92%		
Breakfast cereal	92%		
Cigarettes	89%		
Greeting cards	88%		
Beer	85%		
Cell phone service	82%		
Autos	79%		

	Oligopoly	
• Oligo	opoly	-
	arket structure in which only a few llers offer <mark>similar or identical</mark> products	
– Sti	rategic behavior in oligopoly:	
-	A firm's decisions about P or Q can affect other firms and cause them to react	
	The firm will consider these reactions when making decisions	
• Gam	ne theory: the study of how people	
	ve in strategic situations	
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EXAMPLE : Gasoline Duopoly in Smalltown			
Ρ	Q	 Daiwan, not to be confused with Taiwan, has 23 million residents 	
\$0	140		
5	130	• The "good": Gasoline, fuel to power	
10	120	vehicles for personal transportation	
15	110	Daiwan's demand schedule	
20	100		
25	90	• Two firms: T-CPC and FPC	
30	80	(duopoly: an oligopoly with two firms)	
35	70	• Each firm's costs: <i>FC</i> = \$0, <i>MC</i> = \$10	
40	60		
45	50		

EXAMPLE: Gasoline Duopoly in Daiwan					
Ρ	Q	Revenue	Cost	Profit	Competitive outcome:
\$0	140	\$0	\$1,400	-1,400	P = MC = \$10
5	130	650	1,300	-650	Q = 120
10	120	1,200	1,200	0	Q = 120 Profit = \$0
15	110	1,650	1,100	550	ΡΙΟΙΙΙ – ΦΟ
20	100	2,000	1,000	1,000	
25	90	2,250	900	1,350	Monopoly
30	80	2,400	800	1,600	outcome:
35	70	2,450	700	1,750	P = \$40
40	60	2,400	600	1,800	Q = 60
45	50	2,250	500	1,750	Profit = \$1,800
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
P	Q	Duopoly outcome with collusion:
\$0	140	Each firm agrees to produce $Q = 30$,
5	130	earns profit = \$900.
10	120	1. If T-CPC reneges on the agreement
15	110	and produces $Q = 40$, what happens
20	100	to the market price? T-CPC's profits?
25	90	2. Is it in T-CPC's interest to renege on
30	80	the agreement?
35	70	3. If both firms renege and produce Q =
40	60	40, determine each firm's profits.
45	50	40, determine each linn s pronts.

А	ctive	Learning 1 Answers	
Ρ	Q	If both firms stick to agreement, each firm's	
\$0	140	profit = \$900	
5	130	1. If T-CPC reneges on agreement,	
10	120	produces $Q = 40$:	
15	110	– Market quantity = 70, P = \$35	
20	100	- T-CPC's profit = 40 x (\$35 – 10)= <mark>\$1000</mark>	
25	90	2. T-CPC's profits are higher if it reneges.	
30	80	3. FPC will conclude the same, both firms	
35	70	renege, each produces Q = 40:	
40	60	– Market quantity = 80, P = \$30	
45	50	– Each firm's profit =40x(\$30–10) = <mark>\$800</mark>	
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
Collusion vs. Self-Interest Both firms would be better off if both stick


- Both firms would be better off if both stick to the cartel agreement.
 - But each firm has incentive to renege on the agreement.
 - Lesson: It is difficult for oligopoly firms to form cartels and honor their agreements.

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, 	Active	Learning 2 Answers	Equilibrium for an Oligopoly
P	Q	 If each firm produces Q = 40, 	• Nash equilibrium
\$0	140	then each firm's profit = \$800.	
5	130	 If T-CPC increases output to Q = 50: 	 Economic actors interacting with one another, each choose their best strategy
10	120	– Market quantity = 90, P = \$25	
15	110	- T-CPC's profit = 50 x (\$25 – 10) =	 Given the strategies that all the other
20	100	\$750	actors have chosen
25	90	 T-CPC's profits are higher at Q = 	Duopoly example has a Nash equilibrium
30	80	40 than at $Q = 50$.	• Given that FPC produces Q = 40,
35	70		T-CPC's best move is to produce $Q = 40$,
40	60	 The same is true for FPC. 	 Given that T-CPC produces Q = 40,
45	50		FPC's best move is to produce $Q = 40$
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The Size of the Oligopoly


- As the number of sellers in an oligopoly increases:
 - The price effect becomes smaller
 - The oligopoly looks more and more like a competitive market
 - P approaches MC
 - The market quantity approaches the socially efficient quantity


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
Another benefit of international trade


ASK THE EXPERTS Nash Equilibrium


"Behavior in many complex and seemingly intractable strategic settings can be understood more clearly by working out what each party in the game will choose to do if they realize that the other parties will be solving the same problem. This insight has helped us understand behavior as diverse as military conflicts, price setting by competing firms and penalty kicking in soccer."














Active Learning 3 The fare wars game The players: China Airlines and EVA Air The choice: cut fares by 50% or leave fares alone – If both airlines cut fares, each airline's profit = \$400 million – If neither airline cuts fares, each airline's profit = \$600 million

- If only one airline cuts its fares, its profit = \$800 million; the other airline's profits = \$200 million
- Draw the payoff matrix, find the Nash equilibrium

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Active Learning 3 Answers Nash equilibrium: **China Airlines** both firms cut fares Cut fares Don't cut fares \$400 million \$200 million Cut fares EVA Air \$400 million \$800 million \$800 million \$600 million Don't cut fares \$600 million \$200 million pied or duplicated, or posted to a publicly accessible website, in whole or in part, except fo duct or service or otherwise on a password-protected website or school-approved learning

Other Examples of the Prisoners' Dilemma Ad Wars Two firms spend millions on TV ads to steal business from each other. Each firm's ad cancels out the effects of the other, and both firms' profits fall by the cost of the ads. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries Member countries try to act like a cartel, agree to limit oil production to boost prices and profits. But agreements sometimes break down when individual countries renege.

<u>Arms race between military superpowers</u> <u>Arms race between military superpowers</u> Each country would be better off if both disarm, but each has a dominant strategy of arming. <u>Common resources</u> All would be better off if everyone conserved common resources, but each person's dominant strategy is overusing the resources. <u>Public goods contribution</u> Everyone would be better off if we all contributed to the pool, but it's a dominant strategy to free ride.

Other Examples of

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Welfare of Society

- Noncooperative oligopoly equilibrium
 - -May be bad for oligopolists
 - Prevents them from achieving monopoly profits
 - May be bad for society
 - Examples: Arms race game, Common resource game, public goods contribution
 - May be good for society
 - Quantity and price closer to optimal level


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
Another Example:

Negative Campaign Ads

- Daiwan Presidential Election: 2 candidates "Hsiao-Ying (HY)" and "Korean Fish (KF)"
- If Hsiao-Ying runs a negative ad attacking Korean Fish, 3m fewer people will vote for Korean Fish (1m of these vote for Hsiao-Ying, the rest abstain).
- If Korean Fish runs a negative ad attacking Hsiao-Ying, Hsiao-Ying loses 3m votes, Korean Fish gains 1m votes, 2m of these abstain.
- The two agree to refrain from running attack ads. Will each of them stick to the agreement?

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Why People Sometimes Cooperate	
-When the game is repeated many times, cooperation may be possible	• Gov
Two strategies may lead to cooperation: "Orim Trigger"	• Pol
 - "Grim-Trigger" If your rival reneges in one round, you renege in all subsequent rounds. 	
– "Tit-for-tat"	
Whatever your rival does in one round	
(whether renege or cooperate), you do in	
the following round.	
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Public Policy Toward Oligopolies
Antitrust laws
– The Sherman Antitrust Act, 1890
 Elevated agreements among oligopolists from an unenforceable contract to a criminal conspiracy
– The Clayton Act, 1914
 Further strengthened the antitrust laws
 Used to prevent mergers
 Used to prevent oligopolists from colluding
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Controversies Over Antitrust Policy

- Most people agree that price-fixing agreements among competitors should be illegal.
- Some economists are concerned that policymakers go too far when using antitrust laws to stifle business practices that are not necessarily harmful, and may have legitimate objectives.
- We consider three such practices...

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1. Resale Price Maintenance ("Fair Trade")	2. Predatory Pricing
A manufacturer imposes lower limits on the prices retailers can charge	 A firm cuts prices to prevent entry or drive a competitor out of the market
 Often opposed because it appears to reduce competition at the retail level 	So that it can charge monopoly prices laterIllegal under antitrust laws
 Yet, any market power the manufacturer has is at the wholesale level 	– Difficult: when a price cut is predatory and when it is competitive & beneficial to consumers?
 No gains from restricting competition at the retail level 	 Many economists doubt that predatory pricing is a rational strategy:
 Legitimate objective: preventing discount retailers from free-riding on the services provided by full-service retailers 	 It involves selling at a loss (costly for the firm) It can backfire
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Summary

- Oligopolists can maximize profits if they form a cartel and act like a monopolist.
- Yet, self-interest leads each oligopolist to a higher quantity and lower price than under the monopoly outcome.
- The larger the number of firms, the closer will be the quantity and price to the levels that would prevail under competition.

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Summary

- The prisoners' dilemma shows that selfinterest can prevent people from cooperating, even when cooperation is in their mutual interest. The logic of the prisoners' dilemma applies in many situations.
- Policymakers use the antitrust laws to prevent oligopolies from engaging in anticompetitive behavior such as price-fixing. But the application of these laws is sometimes controversial.

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Chapter 17: Oligopoly

- When there are only a few firms
- Firms care about each other's actions
 - Game Theory; Nash Equilibrium
 - Dominant Strategy; P.D.
- Collusion (Monopoly) vs. Self-Interest
- Policy: Increase competition; Antitrust Laws
- Homework: Mankiw, Ch.17: 1-3, 6, 8-9

Challenge Qu	estions (Past	Finals)
▶ 2007 - Part 3	1	
▶ 2008 - Essay	B	
▶ 2010 - Essay	, C, D	
> 2012 - Part I	III 10-14	
> 2013 - Part I	IV	
2014 - Essay	A5-10	
2015 - Essay	, C, D	
2016 - Essay	А, В, С	
2017 - Essay	B1-B5, C, D4	
▶ 2018 - Essay	B1-3, C1, 3-4	
2019/12/5	Oligopoly	Joseph Tao-vi Wang