

Chapter Outline

- 14.1. Two More Market Structures
- 14.2. Oligopoly
- 14.3. Monopolistic Competition
- 14.4. The "Broken" Invisible Hand
- 14.5. Summing Up: Four Market Structures

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Kev Ideas

- 1. Two market structures that lie between perfect competition and monopoly are oligopoly and monopolistic competition.
- 2. In both of these markets the seller must recognize actions of competitors.
- 3. In oligopolies, economic profits in the long run can be positive.

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Key Ideas

- 4. In monopolistically competitive markets, entry and exit drive economic profits to zero in the long run.
- 5. There are several important variables such as the number of firms in the industry, the degree of product differentiation, entry barrier, and the presence or absence of collusion that determine the competitiveness of a market.


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
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
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Two More Market Structures: Oligopoly Market where there are only a few firms competing Products can be either homogeneous or differentiated Significant barriers to entry and exit Each firm's decisions are dependent upon other firms' actions Positive economic profits in the long run

Two More Market Structures: Monopolistic Competition Many competing firms Products are similar but slightly differentiated No barriers to entry or exit Zero economic profits in the long run

Oligopoly can sell either... Homogeneous products—examples: Steel Oil Gasoline Computer hard drives Differentiated products—examples: Cereal Automobiles Laundry detergent Cigarettes

Oligopoly

Oligopolist's problem

- 1. Like a monopolist, has
 - significant barriers to entry,
 - resulting in long-run economic profits
- 2. High degree of interdependence
 - ▶ between the few firms that occupy the market

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Oligopoly: Oligopoly Model with


Homogeneous Products

- ▶ Duopoly: Industry with two firms
 - ► Example: two landscaping companies, Dogwood and Rose Petal (sell homogeneous products)
- ▶ How much market power do these companies have?
 - ▶ Because products are perfect substitutes, if they charge the same price, they will split the market.
- ▶ What if one firm lowers its price?

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Oligopoly: Oligopoly Model with Homogeneous Products

- Residual demand
- ▶ The demand not met by the other firm(s) and
- dependent on the prices of all the firms in the industry

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Oligopoly: Oligopoly Model with

Homogeneous Products

- Dogwood is charging \$50
- ▶ Rose Petal is charging \$45
 - ▶ Both have a MC of \$30
 - ▶ Who would you pick to do your landscaping?
- 1. Is this a Nash equilibrium?
- 2. What should Dogwood do?
- 3. What should Rose Petal do?

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Oligopoly: Oligopoly Model with

Homogeneous Products

- ▶ Where does the madness end????
- \rightarrow At P = \$30!
- Long run equilibrium:
 - ▶ P = MC
- Does this look familiar?





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Oligopoly: Oligopoly Model with

Differentiated Products

- ▶ Because products are differentiated,
 - ▶ the demand function is not all-or-nothing.
- Firms can charge higher prices and not lose all sales because
 - the differentiation creates preferences on the part of consumers.

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Oligopoly: Oligopoly Model with Differentiated Products

- ▶ Example: Coke and Pepsi
 - If Coke raises its price, it will lose sales to Pepsi,
 - but (unlike sales of homogeneous products)
- ▶ Coke's sales won't go to zero
 - because of differentiation.
- ▶ Some consumers would still rather have Coke, for example.

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Oligopoly: Oligopoly Model with

Differentiated Products

- How should Coke and Pepsi decide on their prices?
 - ▶ It depends...
- Whether Coke thinks Pepsi will match a lower price
- Whether Coke thinks Pepsi will match a higher price

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Oligopoly:

Collusion: One Way to Keep Prices High

- ▶ How could oligopolists avoid a price war?
- ▶ Collusion
 - ► Firms conspiring to set the quantity or the market price
- ▶ This is illegal! But what if it weren't illegal?
 - ► Could Rose Petal and Dogwood agree to charge \$50, divide the market, and each do 500 jobs?

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Oligopoly:

Collusion: One Way to Keep Prices High

- ▶ Collusion is not illegal in some places!
- ▶ Cartel
 - ▶ A formal organization of producers who collude
- OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries)
 - ► Comprised of oil-producing nations that collude to control the price of oil by limiting production

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Oligopoly:

Collusion: One Way to Keep Prices High

- ▶ When can collusion work?
 - ▶ If there is an enforcement mechanism
 - ▶ If the long-run profits associated with not cheating outweigh the short-run gains of cheating


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
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
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



Monopolistic Competition Shares all of the characteristics of perfect competition except monopolistic competitors sell products that are slightly different. Examples: Clothing firms Restaurants Over-the-counter medications Food manufacturers Imperfect Competition(s) Joseph Tao-yi Wang


















The "Broken" Invisible Hand Regulating Market Power Should the government regulate, in the case of market power? It depends. It might if There is suspected collusion The benefits exceed the costs The industry is too concentrated





Evidence-Based Economics Example

How many firms are necessary to make a market competitive?





Homework

- ▶ ALL Chap.14, Problem 2, 4, 8, 10
- ▶ Bonus Question (See next slide)
- ▶ Challenge Questions (from Past Finals)
 - ▶ 2007 Essay Q1, Q3
 - ▶ 2008 Multi-Choice Q6-Q8, Essay C
 - ▶ 2009 Multi-Choice Q6, Q8, Essay A, B, C
 - ▶ 2010 Multi-Choice Q1, Q7, Q8
- ▶ 2012 Essay III
- ▶ 2013 Essay II, III
- ▶ 2014 Essay A, C
- ▶ 2015 Essay C & D

Bonus Question 1 (ALL 14-6)

- ▶ Tobacco companies have often argued that they advertise to attract more people who already smoke and not to persuade more people to begin smoking.
- ▶ Suppose there were just two cigarette manufacturers, Jones and Smith.
 - Each can either advertise or not advertise.
- If neither advertises, they each capture 50 percent of the market and each earns \$10 million.

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Bonus Question 1 (ALL 14-6)

- If they both advertise, they again split the market evenly, but each spends \$2 million on ads and so each earns just \$8 million
 - (remember, advertising is not supposed to encourage more people to smoke).
- If one company advertises but the other does not, then the company that advertises attracts many of its rival's customers.
 - As a result, the advertising company earns \$12 million and the other earns just \$6 million.

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Bonus Question 1 (ALL 14-6)

- 1. Show that advertising is a dominant strategy.
- 2. Suppose the government proposes a ban on cigarette ads.
 - ▶ Should the two cigarette companies favor the ban or should they oppose the ban
 - if advertising did not persuade some people to become smokers?

- Major league baseball teams have imposed the "luxury tax" on themselves.
 - A team is subject to the tax if its payroll exceeds a specific level. The annual threshold for the luxury tax is \$189 million for 2014-16.
- A team that exceeds the threshold must pay
- ▶ 17.5% to 50% of the amount by which
 - its payroll is above the threshold, where the "tax rate" depends on the number of years the team is over.

Bonus Question 1 (ALL 14-11)

- ▶ This question looks at why teams might subject themselves to this tax.
- ▶ Suppose there are two MLB teams,
 - Yankees and Red Socks.
- ▶ They will both choose to offer either high salaries to players or low salaries.
 - ▶ They will make their decisions simultaneously.
- If both choose low, each will earn \$0;
- ▶ if both choose high each will earn \$400.

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Bonus Question 1 (ALL 14-11)

- If one chooses high & the other chooses low,
 - ▶ the high team will attract the best players and earn \$600, but the low team will earn just \$300.
- 1. Show that high is a dominant strategy but both would be better off if both chose low.
- ▶ Under a 1922 Supreme Court decision, MLB is not subject to many antitrust laws.
- 2. Suppose these two teams agree to a luxury tax so whoever chooses high must pay a tax of \$250. Find the new equilibrium.

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Bonus Question 1 (ALL 14-11)

- ▶ Some people might argue that the luxury tax in MLB is not an important determinant of major league salaries.
- As evidence, they show that team payrolls rarely exceed the threshold level and so teams rarely pay the tax.
- 3. What does your answer to this question suggest about the logic of this claim?