Security Market Equilibrium

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(Lecture 14, Micro Theory I)

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Security Market Equilibrium

Why do we care about this?

- Any asset can be reproduced via state-claims
- In reality, State-Claim Markets (aka Arrow-Debreu Markets) are rarely used
 - Except artificially created prediction markets!
- But we can construct all S state-claims using S linearly independent assets (securities)
 - And can in turn reproduce any asset using them!
- Security Market Equilibrium
 - = Arrow-Debreu Equilibrium

Arrow-Debreu Equilibrium: 1-good, 1-period

▶ S States: Stat	te $s=1,,S$ eac	$h w / prob. \pi_s$
Firms: Firm	f = 1, 2, , F ea	ach with Production
production ve	clor $ec{y}^f = (y_1^f, y_2^f, \cdot$	$\ldots, y^f_S) \in \mathcal{V}^f$ Set
• <i>H</i> Consumers: Consumer $h = 1, 2,, H$		
• Endowment: $\vec{\omega}^h = (\omega_1^h, \omega_2^h, \cdots, \omega_S^h), \omega_i = \sum \omega_i^h$		
$\rightarrow \theta_f^h = \text{Shareholding of firm } h$		
• Consumption: $\vec{x}^h = (x_1^h, x_2^h, \cdots, x_S^h) \in X^h \subset \mathbb{R}^S$		
VNM Utility Function:		
(Continuous, Strictly Increasing) $U^{n}(\vec{x}^{n}) = \sum \pi_{s}^{n} u^{n}(x_{s}^{n})$		
		s=1
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Arrow-Debreu Equilibrium (1-good, 1-period)

- Allocation $\{\vec{x}^h \in X^h\}_{h=1}^H, \{\vec{y}^f \in \mathcal{Y}^f\}_{f=1}^F$
- is a feasible allocation if



- Exchange Economy: No production!
- Consider an economy with a market for each of the S state-claims...

Security Market Equilibrium

Arrow-Debreu Equilibrium (1-good, 1-period)

 $\{\vec{x}^h \in X^h\}_{h=1}^H, \{\vec{y}^f \in \mathcal{Y}^f\}_{f=1}^F$ is an Arrow-Debreu Equilibrium allocation if for some $\vec{p} \gg \vec{0}$ 1. Consumption allocations are in budget sets: $\vec{p} \cdot \vec{x}^h \le \vec{p} \cdot \vec{\omega}^h + \sum \theta_f^h \vec{p} \cdot \vec{y}^f$ 2. No strictly preferred allocation is in budget set: $U^{h}(\vec{z}) > U^{h}(\vec{x}^{h}) \Rightarrow \vec{p} \cdot \vec{z} > \vec{p} \cdot \vec{x}^{h}$ 3. Markets clear: $\sum_{i=1}^{H} \vec{x}^{h} = \sum_{i=1}^{H} \vec{\omega}^{h} + \sum_{i=1}^{H} \vec{y}^{f}$ Н h=1h=1Security Market Equilibrium 2019/10/30 Joseph Tao-yi Wang

Security Market Equilibrium: 1-good, 1-period

- For an economy without state-claim markets...
- A Assets: Asset a = 1, ..., A has a price P_a
- and yields state-contingent dividend $\vec{d_a} = (d_{1a}, d_{2a}, \cdots, d_{Sa})$
- Consumer h holds ξ_a^h units of asset a

≤ 0 if start with no asset

a=1

Security Market Equilibrium: 1-good, 1-period

 $(\vec{x}^{h} = \vec{\omega}^{h} + \sum_{a=1}^{A} \vec{d_{a}} \xi_{a}^{h})$

 $\{\vec{x}^h \in X^h, \vec{\xi}^h \in \mathbb{R}^S\}_{h=1}^H$ is a Security Market Equilibrium allocation if for some $\vec{P} = (P_1, \cdots, P_A)$ 1. Consumption allocations are in budget sets: $\vec{P} \cdot \vec{\xi}^{h} = 0 \ (h = 1, 2, \cdots, H) = \sum_{k=1}^{n} P_{a}\xi_{a}^{h}$ 2. No strictly preferred allocation is in budget set: $U^{h}\left(\vec{\omega}^{h} + \sum_{a=1}^{A} \vec{d_{a}}\psi^{h}_{a}\right) > U^{h}(\vec{x}^{h}) \Rightarrow \vec{P} \cdot \vec{\psi}^{h} > 0$ H3. Markets clear: $\sum \vec{x}^h = \sum \vec{\omega}^h, \ \sum \vec{\xi}^h = \vec{0}$ h=1h=1h=

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Security Market Equilibrium

A-D Equilibrium is SM Equilibrium!

Proposition 8.2-1:

An Arrow-Debreu (A-D) Equilibrium is a Security Market (SM) Equilibrium if asset dividends span \mathbb{R}^S

Proposition 8.2-2:

An Security Market (SM) Equilibrium is an Arrow-Debreu (A-D) Equilibrium if asset dividends span ℝ^S

If Asset Dividends d_a Span \mathbb{R}^S

- Can re-label (or reconstruct) 1^{st} S assets to get linearly independent dividend vectors $\{\vec{d}_a\}_{a=1}^A$
 - Any allocation in \mathbb{R}^S can be reproduced by a linear combination of these S assets: $\sum \vec{d_a} \xi_a^h$
- For consumer *h*, there exists a portfolio $\vec{\xi}^h$ such that $\vec{x}^h - \vec{\omega}^h = \sum \vec{d}_a \xi^h_a$ • Let $P_a = \vec{p} \cdot \vec{d_a} \ (a = 1, \cdots, A)$ a=1Final Then, $\vec{p} \cdot \vec{x}^h - \vec{p} \cdot \vec{\omega}^h = \sum \vec{p} \cdot \vec{d}_a \xi^h_a = \sum P_a \xi^h_a$

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Security Market Equilibrium

 $a \equiv$

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a=1

A

$$P_{a} = \vec{p} \cdot \vec{d}_{a} \ (a = 1, \cdots, A) \quad \vec{x}^{h} - \vec{\omega}^{h} = \sum_{a=1}^{A} \vec{d}_{a} \xi_{a}^{h}$$

Arrow-Debreu Equilibrium (1-good, 1-period)

 $\{\vec{x}^h \in X^h\}_{h=1}^H$ is an Arrow-Debreu Equilibrium allocation if for some $\vec{p} \gg \vec{0}$

1. Consumption allocations are in budget sets: A

$$\vec{p} \cdot \vec{x}^{h} - \vec{p} \cdot \vec{\omega}^{h} = \sum_{\substack{a=1 \\ a=1}} P_{a}\xi_{a}^{h} = 0 \text{ since } U^{h} \text{ strictly increasing!!}$$
2. No strictly preferred allocation is in budget set:

$$U^{h}\left(\vec{\omega}^{h} + \sum_{a=1}^{A} \vec{d_{a}}\psi_{a}^{h}\right) > U^{h}(\vec{x}^{h}) \Rightarrow \vec{P} \cdot \vec{\psi}^{h} > 0$$

$$\vec{p} \cdot \left(\vec{\omega}^{h} + \sum_{a=1}^{A} \vec{d_{a}}\psi_{a}^{h}\right) > \vec{p} \cdot \vec{x}^{h} = \vec{p} \cdot \vec{\omega}^{h}$$

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$$P_{a} = \vec{p} \cdot \vec{d_{a}} \ (a = 1, \dots, A) \quad \vec{x}^{h} - \vec{\omega}^{h} = \sum_{a=1}^{A} \vec{d_{a}} \xi_{a}^{h}$$

Arrow-Debreu Equilibrium (1-good, 1-period)

 ${\vec{x}^h \in X^h}_{h=1}^H$ is an Arrow-Debreu Equilibrium allocation if for some $\vec{p} \gg \vec{0}$



Since dividend vectors are linear independent,

• The coefficients are all zero:

$$\sum_{a}^{n} \xi_{a}^{h} = 0$$

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Security Market h=1

A-D Equilibrium = SM Equilibrium!

Proposition 8.2-1:

- An Arrow-Debreu (A-D) Equilibrium is a Security Market (SM) Equilibrium if asset dividends span \mathbb{R}^S
 - Similarly, we have...
 - Proposition 8.2-2:
- An Security Market (SM) Equilibrium is an Arrow-Debreu (A-D) Equilibrium if asset dividends span \mathbb{R}^S

Summary of 8.2

- Apply WE to Markets of Uncertainty
- State Claim Markets vs. Asset Markets
- I did not teach any thing new, just another (very important) application...
- Homework: Riley 8.2-3, 4, 5; 2008 Final Q4, 2009 Final B, 2013 Final A, 2014 Final A