Envelope Theorem

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(Lecture 3, Micro Theory I)

Example: Hunghai (aka Foxconn Tech. Group...)


- Hunghai is a price-taking firm making jpads
 - Sell 3,000 jpads to Pineapple at price $p_i=\$100$
 - Total Cost is C(q) = \$180,000
- What is the elasticity of profit w.r.t. price - If output is held fixed? - If Hung-Hai responds optimally to price change? $\epsilon(\Pi, p_i) = \frac{p_i}{\Pi} \frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial p_i}$
- Hunghai sees a new opportunity and sells 1,500 Vii's to Rentientang at price $p_w = \$200$
 - Production of jpads drop to 2,400, total cost rises to \$300,000. Can you calculate the new $\epsilon(\Pi, p_i)$?

- A price-taking firm has $\cot C(q)$ – Can sell as much as it wishes at fix price p
- Profit is $\pi = p \cdot q C(q)$
- Given a change in prices p, how would profit change (as the firm re-optimizes output q)? – Direct Effect: $\Delta p \cdot q$
 - Indirect Effect: $\Delta \pi$ due to $q \rightarrow q'$
- First assume only three possible outputs...


 $q \in Q = \{0, q_1, q_2\}$

- Profit is straight line for each possible output

Three Output States





Upper Envelope for Three Output States



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Upper Envelope for Six Output States






- Output can be any real number
- Firm solves $q^*(p)$ to $\max \{\pi = p \cdot q C(q)\}$
- Maximized profit is $\Pi(p) = p \cdot q^*(p) C(q^*(p))$
- Initial output price p^0 (fixed)
 - Initial output $q^*(p^0)$
 - Initial profit $\Pi(p^0)$
- Profit (with fixed output) is $\pi = \Pi(p^0) + (p-p^0) \cdot q^*(p^0)$

 Fixing output, increase in price changes profit by $q^*(p)$ per dollar, so (fixed output) profit is $\pi = \Pi(p^0) + (p - p^0) \cdot q^*(p^0)$ Π $\Pi(p$ $\pi = \Pi(p^0) + (p - p^0) \cdot q^*(p^0)$ $\Pi(p^0)$

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- Firm cannot be worse off if it can change quantity
- $\Pi(p)$ is above π
 - Tangent to π if $\Pi(p)$ smooth
- Total effect =
 Direct effect only

- Ignore indirect eff.

Another Graphic Presentation (P-q)

 $q^*(p^0)\Delta p \le \Delta \Pi \le q^*(p^0 + \Delta p)\Delta p$ $P \uparrow q^*(p^0) \le \frac{\Delta \Pi}{\Delta p} \le q^*(p^0 + \Delta p)$ МС $\Pi(=PS)$ **≻**q $a^*(p^0 + \Lambda p)$ Joseph Tao-yi Wang Envelope Theorem

[Simon-Blume] Thm 19.4: Envelope Theorem

- Assume: (Feasible output)
 - $-X \in \mathbf{R}^n$ is closed and bounded, a is a scalar a = p
 - $-f(\vec{x}, a)$ is C^{1} (continuously differentiable) (Profit)

$$\underline{q^{*}(p)}$$
 $\vec{x}^{*}(a) = \arg \max_{\vec{x} \in X} \{f(\vec{x}, a)\}$ is C^{1} ,

• Then, $F(a) = \max_{\vec{x} \in X} \{f(\vec{x}, a)\} = f(\vec{x}^*(a), a),$ the value function is differentiable and has $F'(a) = \frac{df}{dt}(\vec{x}^*(a), a) = \frac{\partial f}{\partial t}(\vec{x}^*(a), a).$

$$T'(a) = \frac{\partial f}{\partial a} (\vec{x}^*(a), a) = \frac{\partial f}{\partial a} (\vec{x}^*(a), a).$$
(Only Direct Effect)

[Simon-Blume] Thm 19.4: Envelope Theorem (Unconstrained)

$$-X \in \mathbf{R}^{n} \text{ is closed and bounded, } a \text{ is a scalar}$$
$$-f(\vec{x}, a) \text{ is } C^{1} \text{ (continuously differentiable)}$$
$$\vec{x}^{*}(a) = \arg \max_{\vec{x} \in X} \{f(\vec{x}, a)\} \text{ is } C^{1},$$
$$\text{For, } F(a) = \max_{\vec{x} \in X} \{f(\vec{x}, a)\} = f(\vec{x}^{*}(a), a),$$
$$F'(a) = \sum_{i} \frac{\partial f}{\partial x_{i}} (\vec{x}^{*}(a), a) \cdot \frac{dx_{i}^{*}}{da} (a) + \frac{\partial f}{\partial a} (\vec{x}^{*}(a), a)$$
$$= \frac{\partial f}{\partial a} (\vec{x}^{*}(a), a) \text{ since } \frac{\partial f}{\partial x_{i}} (\vec{x}^{*}(a), a) = 0$$

[Simon-Blume]

Thm 19.4: Envelope Theorem (Unconstrained)

- Direct Effect = Total Effect (at the margin)
- This only allows the maximand to be affected by the parameter change...
- To allow for both the maximand and the constraints to be affected by the parameter change, need slightly stronger assumptions...

[Simon-Blume] Thm 19.5: Envelope Theorem (Constrained) $F(a) = \max_{\vec{x}} \{f(\vec{x}, a) | h_1(\vec{x}, a) = 0, \cdots, h_k(\vec{x}, a) = 0\}$

Suppose:

$$\mathcal{L} = f(\vec{x}, a) + \sum_{i} \mu_{i} h_{i}(\vec{x}, a)$$

$$- f(\vec{x}, a) \text{ and } h_{i}(\vec{x}, a) \text{ are } C^{1}$$

$$- \vec{x}^{*}(a), \vec{\mu}^{*}(a) \text{ unique solutions; NDCQ hold.}$$

$$- \vec{x}^{*}(a), \vec{\mu}^{*}(a) \text{ are } C^{1} \text{ continuously differentiable}$$

$$\text{ at } a^{0} \text{ (implicit function theorem applies)}$$
Then,

$$F'(a^{0}) = \frac{\alpha}{da} f(\vec{x}^{*}(a^{0}), a^{0}) = \frac{\partial 2}{\partial a} \left(\vec{x}^{*}(a^{0}), \vec{\mu}^{*}(a^{0}), a^{0}\right)$$

Example: Hunghai (aka Foxconn Tech. Group...)

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Example: Hunghai

- Hunghai is a price-taking firm making jpads
 - Sell 3,000 jpads to Pineapple at price $p_i = \$100$ – Total Cost is C(q) = \$180,000

$$\Pi = p \times q - C(q)$$

= \$100 \times 3,000 - \$180,000 = \$120,000
$$\frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial p_i} = q_i = 3,000 \Rightarrow \epsilon = \frac{p_i}{\Pi} \frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial p_i} = \frac{\$100 \cdot 3,000}{\$120,000} = \frac{5}{2}$$

 Hunghai's elasticity of profit wrt. jpad price is 2.5 for both fixed and variable output (by ET!)

Example: Hunghai

- Hunghai sees a new opportunity and sells 1,500 Vii's to Rentientang at price $p_w = \$200$
 - Production of jpads drop to 2,400, price $p_i = \$100$
 - -total cost rises to \$300,000. Calculate new $\epsilon(\Pi, p_i)$
 - $\Pi = \$100 \times 2,400 + \$200 \times 1,500 \$300,000$

= \$240,000

$$\frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial p_i} = q'_i = 2,400 \Rightarrow \epsilon = \frac{p_i}{\Pi} \frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial p_i} = \frac{\$100 \cdot 2,400}{\$240,000} = 1$$

What does this all mean?

- Hunghai used to only produce jpads
- Since it is a price-taker, if Pineapple Corp. decides to lower prices by 10%, Hunghai's profit would decrease by 25%
- Even if Hunghai tries to re-optimize! (ET)
- After diversifying to producing also Vii's, it's profit is now less prone to Pineapple's price cuts (lowers by 10% if prices are cut by 10%)
- Isn't this what firms in Hsinchu Science Park do?

Summary of 1.3

- Re-maximize under environmental change
 Direct Effect: Change in profit (objective function)
 - Indirect Effect: Change due to re-optimization
- Envelope Theorem(s):
 Only have Direct Effect at the margin
- Homework:
 - Exercise Simon-Blume 19.11, 19.13
 - Find a Hunghai example in the news
- Homework: Exercise 1.3-4 (Optional: 1.3-3)