Edgeworth Box Experiment

Joseph Tao-yi Wang 2012/11/28

(Lecture 4, Micro Theory I)


PEA with Cobb-Douglas Utility


$$\max_{x,y} U^{A}(x,y) = x^{\alpha} y^{1-\alpha}$$

s.t. $U^{B} = (\overline{x} - x)^{\beta} (\overline{y} - y)^{1-\beta} \ge U^{B}$
 $\mathcal{L} = x^{\alpha} y^{1-\alpha} + \lambda \cdot \left[(\overline{x} - x)^{\beta} (\overline{y} - y)^{1-\beta} - U^{B} \right]$
FOC: (for interior solutions)
 $\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial x} = \alpha \cdot \frac{y^{1-\alpha}}{x^{1-\alpha}} - \beta \lambda \cdot \frac{(\overline{y} - y)^{1-\beta}}{(\overline{x} - x)^{1-\beta}} = 0$
 $\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial y} = (1 - \alpha) \cdot \frac{x^{\alpha}}{y^{\alpha}} - (1 - \beta)\lambda \cdot \frac{(\overline{x} - x)^{\beta}}{(\overline{y} - y)^{\beta}} = 0$
 $\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \lambda} = (\overline{x} - x)^{\beta} (\overline{y} - y)^{1-\beta} - U^{B} = 0$

PEA with Cobb-Douglas Utility

Meaning of FOC: $MRS^A = MRS^B$





Walrasian Equilibrium: Consumer A's Problem

$$\max_{x,y} U^{A}(x,y) = x^{\alpha} y^{1-\alpha}$$

s.t. $P_{x} \cdot x + P_{y} \cdot y \leq I^{A} = P_{x} \cdot \omega_{x}^{A} + P_{y} \cdot \omega_{y}^{A}$
 $\mathcal{L} = x^{\alpha} y^{1-\alpha} + \lambda \cdot \left[I^{A} - P_{x} \cdot x - P_{y} \cdot y\right]$
FOC: (for interior solutions)
$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial x} = \alpha \cdot \frac{y^{1-\alpha}}{x^{1-\alpha}} - \lambda \cdot P_{x} = 0$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial y} = (1-\alpha) \cdot \frac{x^{\alpha}}{y^{\alpha}} - \lambda \cdot P_{y} = 0$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \lambda} = I^{A} - P_{x} \cdot x - P_{y} \cdot y = 0$$

Walrasian Equil.: Consumer's Optimal Choice Meaning of FOC: $MRS^A = \frac{P_x}{P}$

 $\frac{P_x}{P_y} = \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \cdot \frac{y}{x} \quad \Rightarrow x = \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \cdot \frac{P_y}{P_x} \cdot y$ $\Rightarrow I^A = P_x \cdot x + P_y \cdot y = \frac{P_y}{1-\alpha} \cdot y$

$$\Rightarrow y_A^* = (1 - \alpha) \cdot \frac{I^A}{P_y}, \quad x_A^* = \alpha \cdot \frac{I^A}{P_x}$$

Similarly, $y_B^* = (1 - \beta) \cdot \frac{I^B}{P_y}, \quad x_B^* = \beta \cdot \frac{I^B}{P_x}$

The Walrasian Equilibrium: Markets Clear

$$x_{A}^{*} = \alpha \cdot \frac{P_{x}\omega_{x}^{A} + P_{y}\omega_{y}^{A}}{P_{x}} = \alpha \omega_{x}^{A} + \alpha \cdot \frac{P_{y}}{P_{x}} \cdot \omega_{y}^{A}$$


$$x_{B}^{*} = \beta \cdot \frac{P_{x}\omega_{x}^{B} + P_{y}\omega_{y}^{B}}{P_{x}} = \beta \omega_{x}^{B} + \beta \cdot \frac{P_{y}}{P_{x}} \cdot \omega_{y}^{B}$$


Markets Clear: $x_A^* + x_B^* = \omega_x^A + \omega_x^B$ $\Rightarrow \left(\alpha \cdot \omega_y^A + \beta \cdot \omega_y^B\right) \cdot \frac{P_y}{P_x} = (1 - \alpha)\omega_x^A + (1 - \beta)\omega_x^B$ $\frac{P_y}{P_x} = \frac{(1 - \alpha)\omega_x^A + (1 - \beta)\omega_x^B}{\alpha \cdot \omega_y^A + \beta \cdot \omega_y^B}$


Walrasian Equil. in Edgeworth Box Experiment


$$\alpha = 0.6, \beta = 0.8$$

 $(\omega_x^A, \omega_y^A) = (44, 9), \quad (\omega_x^B, \omega_y^B) = (6, 41),$
 $\Rightarrow \frac{P_y}{P_x} = \frac{(1 - \alpha)\omega_x^A + (1 - \beta)\omega_x^B}{\alpha \cdot \omega_y^A + \beta \cdot \omega_y^B}$
 $= \frac{(0.4)44 + (0.2)6}{0.6 \cdot 9 + 0.8 \cdot 41} = \frac{17.6 + 1.2}{5.4 + 32.8} = \frac{94}{191}$
 $\Rightarrow \frac{P_x}{P_y} = \frac{191}{94} \approx 2.032$














Experimental Results: 黃貞穎個經: 第二回合











What Have We Learned?

- Bilateral trade happens in the Eye
- Prices converge toward WE prices
- Final positions converge toward core and WE

 Average closer in 2nd round; variance decreases
- Still a lot of noise (but doesn't effect results)
- Markets work without full information (Hayek)
- What provided the force of competition?
 - Existence of perfect substitute (other A's and B's)
- How can we get further converge?
 - Experience? Larger space? Other trading rules?