# Consumer Choice with N Commodities

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(Lecture 5, Micro Theory I)

#### From 2 Goods to N Goods...

- More applications of tools learned before...
- Questions we ask: What is needed to...
- 1. Obtain the compensated law of demand?
- 2. Have a concave minimized expenditure function?
- 3. Recover consumer's demand?
- 4. "Use" a representative agent (in macro)?

#### **Key Problems to Consider**



- Revealed Preference: Only assumption needed:
  - Compensated Law of Demand
  - Concave Minimized Expenditure Function
- Indirect Utility Function: (The Maximized Utility)
  - Roy's Identity: Can recover demand function from it
- Homothetic Preferences: (Revealed Preference)
  - Demand is proportional to income
  - Utility function is homogeneous of degree 1
  - Group demand as if one representative agent

# Why do we care about this?

- Three separate questions:
- 1. How general can revealed preference be?
- 2. How do we back out demand from utility maximization?
- 3. When can we aggregate group demand with a representative agent (say in macroeconomics)?
- Are these convincing?

# Proposition 2.3-1 Compensated Price Change

Consider the dual consumer problem

$$M(p, U^*) = \min_x \left\{ p \cdot x | U(x) \ge U^* \right\}$$

For  $x^0$  be expenditure minimizing for prices  $p^0$  $x^1$  be expenditure minimizing at prices  $p^1$  $x^0, x^1$  satify  $U(x) \ge U^*$ 

 $\Rightarrow$  compensated price change is  $\Delta p \cdot \Delta x \leq 0$ 

## Proposition 2.3-1 Compensated Price Change

Proof:

$$p^{0} \cdot x^{0} \leq p^{0} \cdot x^{1}, \quad p^{1} \cdot x^{1} \leq p^{1} \cdot x^{0}$$
  
Since  $x^{0}$  be expenditure minimizing for prices  $p^{0}$   
 $x^{1}$  be expenditure minimizing at prices  $p^{1}$   
 $-p^{0} \cdot (x^{1} - x^{0}) \leq 0, \quad p^{1} \cdot (x^{1} - x^{0}) \leq 0$   
 $\Rightarrow \Delta p \cdot \Delta x = (p^{1} - p^{0}) \cdot (x^{1} - x^{0}) \leq 0$ 

# Proposition 2.3-1 Compensated Price Change

- This is true for any pair of price vectors
  For p<sup>0</sup> = (\$\overline{p}\_1\$, \dots, \$\overline{p}\_{j-1}\$, \$p\_j^0\$, \$\overline{p}\_{j+1}\$, \dots, \$\overline{p}\_n\$)
  p<sup>1</sup> = (\$\overline{p}\_1\$, \$\dots\$, \$\overline{p}\_{j-1}\$, \$p\_j^1\$, \$\overline{p}\_{j+1}\$, \$\dots\$, \$\overline{p}\_n\$)
- We have the (compensated) law of demand:

 $\Delta p_j \cdot \Delta x_j \le 0$ 

- Note that we did not need differentiability to get this, just "revealed preferences"!!
- But if differentiable, we have  $\frac{\partial x_j^c}{\partial p_i} \leq 0$

# First and Second Derivatives of the Expenditure Function

But what is  $\frac{\partial x_j}{\partial p_j}$ ? Consider the dual problem as a maximization:

$$\begin{split} -M(p, U^*) &= \max_x \left\{ -p \cdot x | U(x) \ge U^* \right\} \\ \text{Lagrangian is } \mathfrak{L} &= -p \cdot x + \lambda (U(x) - U^*) \\ \text{Envelope Theorem yields } - \frac{\partial M}{\partial p_i} = \frac{\partial \mathfrak{L}}{\partial p_i} = -x_j^c \end{split}$$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{\partial}{\partial p_i} \left( \frac{\partial M}{\partial p_j} \right) = \frac{\partial x_j^c}{\partial p_i}$$

# First and Second Derivatives of the Expenditure Function

Hence, compensated law of demand yields

$$\frac{\partial x_j^c}{\partial p_j} = \frac{\partial^2 M}{\partial p_j^2} \le 0$$

 $\Rightarrow$  Expenditure function concave for each  $p_j$ .

Is the entire Expenditure function concave?

Requires the matrix of second derivatives

$$\left[\frac{\partial^2 M}{\partial p_i \partial p_j}\right] = \left[\frac{\partial x_j^c}{\partial p_i}\right]$$
to be negative semi-definite

# Proposition 2.3-2 Concave Expenditure Function



$$\begin{split} &M(p,U^*) \text{ is a concave function over } p.\\ &\text{i.e. For any } p^0, p^1,\\ &M(p^\lambda,U^*) \geq (1-\lambda)M(p^0,U^*) + \lambda M(p^1,U^*) \end{split}$$

We can show this with only revealed preferences... (even without assuming differentiability!)

#### Proposition 2.3-2 Concave Expenditure Function

Proof: For any  $x^{\lambda}$ , feasible,

$$M(p^0, U^*) = p^0 \cdot x^0 \le p^0 \cdot x^{\lambda},$$
  
$$M(p^1, U^*) = p^1 \cdot x^1 \le p^1 \cdot x^{\lambda}$$

Since  $M(p, U^*)$  minimizes expenditure.

Hence

$$(1 - \lambda)M(p^{0}, U^{*}) + \lambda M(p^{1}, U^{*})$$

$$\leq \left[(1 - \lambda)p^{0} \cdot x^{\lambda}\right] + \left[\lambda p^{1} \cdot x^{\lambda}\right]$$

$$= p^{\lambda} \cdot x^{\lambda} = M(p^{\lambda}, U^{*})$$

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#### What Have We Learned?

- Method of Revealed Preferences
- Used it to obtain:
- 1. Compensated Price Change
- 2. Compensated Law of Demand
- 3. Concave Expenditure Function
  - Special Case assuming differentiability
- Next: How can we get demand from utility?



## **Indirect Utility Function**



Let demand for consumer  $U(\cdot)$  with income I, facing price vector p be  $x^* = x(p, I)$ .


$$V(p, I) = \max_{x} \{ U(x) | p \cdot x \le I, x \ge 0 \}$$
$$= U(x^*(p, I))$$

is maximized U(x), aka **indirect utility function** 

Why should we care about this function?

# Proposition 2.3-3 Roy's Identity





Get this directly from indirect utility function...

# **Proposition 2.3-3 Roy's Identity**



Proof:

 $V(p, I) = \max_{x} \{U(x)|p \cdot x \leq I, x \geq 0\}$ Lagrangian is  $\mathfrak{L}(x, \lambda) = U(x) + \lambda(I - p \cdot x)$ Envelope Theorem yields  $\frac{\partial V}{\partial I} = \frac{\partial \mathfrak{L}}{\partial I}(x^*, \lambda^*) = \lambda^*$ And  $\frac{\partial V}{\partial p_j} = \frac{\partial \mathfrak{L}}{\partial p_j}(x^*, \lambda^*) = -\lambda^* x_j^*(p, I)$  $\partial V$ 


$$\Rightarrow x_j^*(p,I) = -\frac{\overline{\partial p_j}}{\frac{\partial V}{\partial I}}$$

#### Example: Unknown Utility...

Consider indirect utility function

$$V(p,I) = \prod_{i=1}^{n} \left(\frac{\alpha_i I}{p_i}\right)^{\alpha_i} \text{ where } \sum_{i=1}^{n} \alpha_i = 1$$

What's the demand (and original utility) function?  $\ln V = \ln I - \sum_{i=1}^{n} \alpha_i \ln p_i + \sum_{i=1}^{n} \alpha_i \ln \alpha_i$   $\Rightarrow \frac{\partial}{\partial I} \ln V = \frac{1}{V} \frac{\partial V}{\partial I} = \frac{1}{I}, \quad \frac{\partial}{\partial p_i} \ln V = \frac{1}{V} \frac{\partial V}{\partial p_i} = -\frac{\alpha_i}{p_i}$ 





# **Example: Cobb-Douglas Utility**

- Plugging back in  $U(x) = V = \prod_{i=1}^{n} \left(\frac{\alpha_i I}{p_i}\right)^{\alpha_i} = \prod_{i=1}^{n} (x_i)^{\alpha_i}$
- What is this utility function?
- Cobb-Douglas!
- Note: This is an example where demand is proportion to income. In fact, we have...

#### Definition: Homothetic Preferences



Strictly monotonic preference  $\succeq$  is **homothetic** if, for any  $\theta > 0$  and  $x^0, x^1$  such that  $x^0 \succeq x^1$ ,  $\theta x^0 \succeq \theta x^1$ 

In fact, if  $x^0 \sim x^1$ , Then,  $\theta x^0 \sim \theta x^1$ 



# Why Do We Care About This?

- Proposition 2.3-4:
  - Demand proportional to income
- Proposition 2.3-5:
  - Homogeneous functions represent homothetic preferences
- Proposition 2.3-6:
  - Homothetic preferences are represented by functions that are homogeneous of degree 1
- Proposition 2.3-7: Representative Agent

#### Proposition 2.3-4: Demand Proportional to Income

If preferences are homothetic, and  $x^*$  is optimal given income I, Then  $\theta x^*$  is optimal given income  $\theta I$ . Proof:

Let  $x^{**}$  be optimal given income  $\theta I$ , Then  $x^{**} \succeq \theta x^*$  since  $\theta x^*$  is feasible with  $\theta I$ . By revealed preferences,  $x^* \succeq \frac{1}{\theta} x^{**}$  ( $\frac{1}{\theta} x^{**}$  feasible) By homotheticity,  $\theta x^* \succeq x^{**}$ Thus,  $\theta x^* \sim x^{**}$  (optimal for income  $\theta I$ )

# Proposition 2.3-5: Homogeneous Functions → Homothetic Preferences

If preferences are represented by  $U(\lambda x) = \lambda^k U(x)$ , Then preferences are homothetic.


Proof: Suppose  $x \succeq y$ , Then  $U(x) \ge U(y)$ . Since U(x) is homogeneous,  $U(\lambda x) = \lambda^k U(x) \ge \lambda^k U(y) = U(\lambda y)$ Thus,  $\lambda x \succeq \lambda y$  i.e. Preferences are homothetic.

#### Proposition 2.3-6: Representation of Homothetic Preferences

If preferences are homothetic, They can be represented by a function that is  $x_2$ homogeneous of degree 1.

Proof:  $\hat{e} = (1, \dots, 1)$ For  $\hat{x}$ , exists  $u\hat{e} \sim \hat{x}$ Utility function U(x) = uBy homotheticity,  $\lambda \hat{x} \sim (\lambda u)\hat{e}$ 

Hence,  $U(\lambda \hat{x}) = \lambda u = \lambda U(\hat{x})$ 



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#### **Proposition 2.3-7: Representative Preferences**



If a group of consumers have the same homothetic preferences,

Then group demand is equal to demand of a representative member holding all the income. Proof:

Suppose Alex and Bev have the same homothetic preferences, and same demand  $x^h = x(p, I^h)$ . By Prop. 2.3-4,  $x^A = I^A x(p, 1), x^B = I^B x(p, 1)$ .  $\Rightarrow x^A + x^B = (I^A + I^B) x(p, 1)$  $= x(p, I^A + I^B)$  by homotheticity <sup>24</sup>

# Summary of 2.3

- Revealed Preference:
  - Compensated Law of Demand
  - Concave Minimized Expenditure Function
- Indirect Utility Function:
  - Roy's Identity: Recovering demand function
- Homothetic Preferences:
  - Demand is proportional to income
  - Utility function is homogeneous of degree 1
  - Group demand as if one representative agent



#### Summary of 2.3

- Homework:
- Riley 2.3-1, 3, 4
- J/R 1.22, 1.28, 1.32, 1.35, 1.64, 1.66