

# Budget Constrained Choice with Two Commodities

---

Joseph Tao-yi Wang  
2009/10/2

(Lecture 4, Micro Theory I)





# The Consumer Problem

- We have some powerful tools:
  - Constrained Maximization (Shadow Prices)
  - Envelope Theorem (Changing Environment)
- How can they help us understand behavior of a consumer?
  - Either “maximizing utility while facing a budget constraint”, or “minimizing cost while maintaining a certain welfare level” ...



# Key Problems to Consider

- **Consumer Problem:** How can consumer's Utility Maximization result in demand?
- **Income Effect:** How does an increase (or decrease) in income (budget) affect demand?
- **Dual Problem:** How is Minimizing Expenditure related to Maximizing Utility?
- **Substitution Effect:** How does an increase in commodity price affect compensated demand?
- Total Price Effect = S. E. + I. E.

# Why do we care about this?

## An Example in Public Policy



- Taiwan's ministry of defense has to decide whether to buy more fighter jets, or more submarines given a tight budget
- How does the military rank each combination?
- How do they choose which combination to buy?
- How would a price change affect their decision?
- How would a boycott in defense budget affect their decision?

# Continuous Demand Function



A Consumer with income  $I$ , facing prices  $p_1, p_2$

$$\max_x \{ U(x) \mid p \cdot x \leq I, x \in \mathbb{R}_+^2 \}$$


- Assume:
- LNS (local non-satiation)
  - Consumer spends all his/her income
- $U(x)$  is continuous, strictly quasi-concave on  $\mathbb{R}_+^2$ 
  - There is a unique solution  $x^0 = x(p, I)$
- Then, by Proposition 2.2-1,  
 $x(p, I)$  must be continuous.

# Stronger Convenience Assumptions for this Lecture



- Assume:
- $U(x)$  is continuously differentiable on  $\mathbb{R}_+^2$ 
  - FOC is gradient vectors of utility (+ constraint)
- LNS-plus:  $\frac{\partial U}{\partial x}(x) > 0$  for all  $x \in \mathbb{R}_+^2$ 
  - At least one commodity has MU > 0
- No corners:  $\lim_{x_j \rightarrow 0} \frac{\partial U}{\partial x_j} = \infty, j = 1, 2$ 
  - Always wants to consume some of everything

# Indifference Curve Analysis (Lagrangian Version)



A Consumer with income  $I$ , facing prices  $p_1, p_2$

$$\max_x \{ U(x) \mid p \cdot x \leq I, x \in \mathbb{R}_+^2 \}$$

Lagrangian is  $\mathcal{L} = U + \lambda(I - p \cdot x)$

$$(FOC) \quad \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial x_j} = \frac{\partial U}{\partial x_j}(x^*) - \lambda p_j = 0, j = 1, 2$$

$$\frac{\frac{\partial U}{\partial x_1}}{p_1} = \frac{\frac{\partial U}{\partial x_2}}{p_2} = \lambda$$



# Meaning of FOC

1. Same marginal value for last dollar spent on

each commodity

$$\frac{\frac{\partial U}{\partial x_1}}{p_1} = \frac{\frac{\partial U}{\partial x_2}}{p_2} = \lambda$$

- Does Taiwan get same MU on fighter jets and submarines?


2. Indifference Curve tangent to Budget Line

$$MRS(x^*) = \frac{\frac{\partial U}{\partial x_1}}{\frac{\partial U}{\partial x_2}} = \frac{p_1}{p_2}$$





# Income Effect



$$\mathcal{E}(x_j, I) = \frac{I}{x_j} \frac{\partial x_j}{\partial I} > 0 \text{ (normal goods)}$$



# Income Effect

- Slope of IEP steeper than line joining 0 and  $x^*$

$$\left. \frac{dx_2}{dx_1} \right|_{IEP} = \frac{\frac{\partial x_2}{\partial I}}{\frac{\partial x_1}{\partial I}} > \frac{x_2^*}{x_1^*}$$

- Or,

$$\mathcal{E}(x_2, I) = \frac{I}{x_2} \frac{\partial x_2}{\partial I} > \mathcal{E}(x_1, I) = \frac{I}{x_1} \frac{\partial x_1}{\partial I}$$

- Lemma 2.2-2: Expenditure share weighted income elasticity average = 1
- So,  $\mathcal{E}(x_2, I) > 1 > \mathcal{E}(x_1, I)$



# Three Examples

- Quasi-Linear Convex Preference


$$U(x) = v(x_1) + \alpha x_2$$

- Cobb-Douglas Preferences

$$U(x) = x_1^{\alpha_1} x_2^{\alpha_2}, \alpha_1, \alpha_2 > 0$$

- CES Utility Function

$$U(x) = \left( \alpha_1 x_1^{1-\frac{1}{\theta}} + \alpha_2 x_2^{1-\frac{1}{\theta}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\frac{1}{\theta}}}$$




# Quasi-Linear Convex Utility

$$\max_x \{ U(x) = v(x_1) + \alpha x_2 \mid p_1 x_1 + p_2 x_2 \leq I, x \in \mathbb{R}_+^2 \}$$

- FOC:  $\frac{\frac{\partial U}{\partial x_1}}{p_1} = \frac{\frac{\partial U}{\partial x_2}}{p_2} = \frac{v'(x_1)}{p_1} = \frac{\alpha}{p_2} (= \lambda)$
- Implication:  $\frac{p_1}{p_2} = \frac{v'(x_1)}{\alpha}$  (MRS=price)
- Note that  $x_2$  is irrelevant...
- What does this mean?



# Income Effect



- Vertical Income Expansion Path...



# Cobb-Douglas Preferences

$$\max_{x_1, x_2} U(x_1, x_2) = x_1^{\alpha_1} x_2^{\alpha_2}$$

$$\text{s.t. } P_{x_1} \cdot x_1 + P_{x_2} \cdot x_2 \leq I = P_{x_1} \cdot \omega_{x_1} + P_{x_2} \cdot \omega_{x_2}$$

$$\mathcal{L} = x_1^{\alpha_1} x_2^{\alpha_2} + \lambda \cdot [I - P_{x_1} \cdot x_1 - P_{x_2} \cdot x_2]$$

FOC: (for interior solutions)

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial x_1} = \alpha_1 \cdot \frac{x_2^{\alpha_2}}{x_1^{\alpha_1}} - \lambda \cdot P_{x_1} = 0$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial x_2} = \alpha_2 \cdot \frac{x_1^{\alpha_1}}{x_2^{\alpha_2}} - \lambda \cdot P_{x_2} = 0$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \lambda} = I - P_{x_1} \cdot x_1 - P_{x_2} \cdot x_2 = 0$$



# Cobb-Douglas Preferences

- Meaning of FOC:  $MRS = \frac{P_{x_1}}{P_{x_2}}$


$$\frac{P_{x_1}}{P_{x_2}} = \frac{\alpha_1}{\alpha_2} \cdot \frac{x_2}{x_1} \quad \Rightarrow \quad x_1 = \frac{\alpha_1}{\alpha_2} \cdot \frac{P_{x_2}}{P_{x_1}} \cdot x_2$$

$$\Rightarrow I = P_{x_1} \cdot x_1 + P_{x_2} \cdot x_2 = \frac{\alpha_1 + \alpha_2}{\alpha_2} \cdot P_{x_2} \cdot x_2$$

$$\Rightarrow x_2^* = \frac{\alpha_2}{\alpha_1 + \alpha_2} \cdot \frac{I}{P_{x_2}}, \quad x_1^* = \frac{\alpha_1}{\alpha_1 + \alpha_2} \cdot \frac{I}{P_{x_1}}$$



# Income Effect



- Linear Income Expansion Path...





# CES Utility Function

$$U(x) = \left( \alpha_1 x_1^{1-\frac{1}{\theta}} + \alpha_2 x_2^{1-\frac{1}{\theta}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\frac{1}{\theta}}}$$


$$\mathcal{L} = \left( \alpha_1 x_1^{1-\frac{1}{\theta}} + \alpha_2 x_2^{1-\frac{1}{\theta}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\frac{1}{\theta}}} + \lambda \cdot [I^A - P_x \cdot x - P_y \cdot y]$$

- FOC: (for interior solutions)

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial x_1} = \alpha_1 x_1^{-\frac{1}{\theta}} \cdot \left( \alpha_1 x_1^{1-\frac{1}{\theta}} + \alpha_2 x_2^{1-\frac{1}{\theta}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta-1}} - \lambda \cdot P_{x_1} = 0$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial x_2} = \alpha_2 x_2^{-\frac{1}{\theta}} \cdot \left( \alpha_1 x_1^{1-\frac{1}{\theta}} + \alpha_2 x_2^{1-\frac{1}{\theta}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta-1}} - \lambda \cdot P_{x_2} = 0$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \lambda} = I - P_{x_1} \cdot x_1 - P_{x_2} \cdot x_2 = 0$$



# CES Utility Function

$$\frac{P_{x_1}}{P_{x_2}} = \frac{\alpha_1}{\alpha_2} \cdot \left( \frac{x_2}{x_1} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \Rightarrow x_1 = \left( \frac{\alpha_1}{\alpha_2} \cdot \frac{P_{x_2}}{P_{x_1}} \right)^{\theta} \cdot x_2$$

$$\Rightarrow I = P_{x_1} \cdot x_1 + P_{x_2} \cdot x_2$$


$$= \left[ \left( \frac{\alpha_1}{\alpha_2} \right)^{\theta} \cdot \left( \frac{P_{x_2}}{P_{x_1}} \right)^{\theta-1} \right] \cdot P_{x_2} \cdot x_2$$

$$\Rightarrow x_2^* = \frac{\alpha_2^{\theta} P_{x_1}^{\theta-1}}{\alpha_1^{\theta} P_{x_2}^{\theta-1} + \alpha_2^{\theta} P_{x_1}^{\theta-1}} \cdot \frac{I}{P_{x_2}},$$

$$x_1^* = \frac{\alpha_1^{\theta} P_{x_1}^{\theta-1}}{\alpha_1^{\theta} P_{x_2}^{\theta-1} + \alpha_2^{\theta} P_{x_1}^{\theta-1}} \cdot \frac{I}{P_{x_1}}$$



# Income Effect



- Linear Income Expansion Path...
- Cobb-Douglas is a special case of CES!

# Dual Problem: Minimizing Expenditure



- Consider the least costly way to achieve  $\bar{U}$

$$M(p, \bar{U}) = \min_x \{p \cdot x \mid U(x) \geq \bar{U}\}$$

- How can you solve this?

$$\mathcal{L} = -p \cdot x + \lambda(U(x) - \bar{U})$$

$$(FOC) \quad \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial x_j} = -p_j + \lambda \frac{\partial U}{\partial x_j}(x^*) = 0, j = 1, 2$$

$$\frac{p_1}{\frac{\partial U}{\partial x_1}} = \frac{p_2}{\frac{\partial U}{\partial x_2}} = \lambda \Rightarrow \text{Solve for } x^c(p, \bar{U})$$

# Dual Problem: Minimizing Expenditure



- We can also use it's “sister” (dual) problem:

$$\max_x \{U(x) | p \cdot x \leq I\}$$

- Note that, for  $x(p, I)$  solving this problem,
- $U(x(p, I))$  is strictly increasing over  $I$  (LNS+)
- Hence, for any  $\bar{U}$ , there is a unique income  $M$  such that  $\bar{U} = U(x(p, M))$
- Inverting this, we can solve for  $M(p, \bar{U})$

# Dual Problem: Minimizing Expenditure



- In fact, minimizing expenditure yields:


$$\frac{p_1}{\frac{\partial U}{\partial x_1}} = \frac{p_2}{\frac{\partial U}{\partial x_2}} = \lambda$$

- Maximize Utility's FOC yields:

$$\frac{\frac{\partial U}{\partial x_1}}{p_1} = \frac{\frac{\partial U}{\partial x_2}}{p_2} = \lambda$$

- This close relationship between  $x^c(p, \bar{U})$  and  $x(p, I)$  indicates why they are “sisters”...

# Substitution Effect for Compensated Demand



- Compensated Demand

$$x^c(p, \bar{U}) \text{ solves } M(p, \bar{U}) = \min_x \{p \cdot x \mid U(x) \leq \bar{U}\}$$

- By Envelope Theorem:

- Effect of Price Change  $\frac{\partial M}{\partial p_j} = x_j^c(p, U^0)$

- (Substitution Effect...)


- How much more does Taiwan have to pay if the price of submarines increase (to maintain the same level of defense)?

# Elasticity of Substitution (for Compensated Demand)



$$\begin{aligned}\sigma &= \mathcal{E} \left( \frac{x_2^c}{x_1^c}, p_1 \right) \\ &= \mathcal{E} \left( \frac{x_1^c}{x_2^c}, p_2 \right)\end{aligned}$$

- The change in consumption ratio in response to a change in prices...







**Why**  $\sigma = \mathcal{E} \left( \frac{x_2^c}{x_1^c}, p_1 \right) = \mathcal{E} \left( \frac{x_1^c}{x_2^c}, p_2 \right) ?$

- On the indifference curve,


$$U(x_1^c(p, \bar{U}), x_2^c(p, \bar{U})) = \bar{U}$$

- Hence,  $\frac{\partial U}{\partial x_1} \frac{\partial x_1^c}{\partial p_i} + \frac{\partial U}{\partial x_2} \frac{\partial x_2^c}{\partial p_i} = 0$

- By FOC,  $\frac{p_1}{\frac{\partial U}{\partial x_1}} = \frac{p_2}{\frac{\partial U}{\partial x_2}} \Rightarrow p_1 \frac{\partial x_1^c}{\partial p_i} + p_2 \frac{\partial x_2^c}{\partial p_i} = 0$

- Since,  $\frac{\partial M}{\partial p_j} = x_j^c(p, U^0) \Rightarrow \frac{\partial x_1^c}{\partial p_2} = \frac{\partial^2 M}{\partial p_2 \partial p_1} = \frac{\partial x_2^c}{\partial p_1}$

**Why**  $\sigma = \mathcal{E} \left( \frac{x_2^c}{x_1^c}, p_1 \right) = \mathcal{E} \left( \frac{x_1^c}{x_2^c}, p_2 \right) ?$



$$\sigma = \mathcal{E} \left( \frac{x_2^c}{x_1^c}, p_1 \right) = \mathcal{E} (x_2^c, p_1) - \mathcal{E} (x_1^c, p_1)$$

$$= \frac{p_1}{x_2^c} \frac{\partial x_2^c}{\partial p_1} - \frac{p_1}{x_1^c} \frac{\partial x_1^c}{\partial p_1} = \frac{p_1}{x_2^c} \frac{\partial x_1^c}{\partial p_2} - \frac{1}{x_1^c} \cdot (-p_2) \frac{\partial x_2^c}{\partial p_1}$$

$$= -\frac{p_2}{x_2^c} \frac{\partial x_2^c}{\partial p_2} + \frac{p_2}{x_1^c} \frac{\partial x_1^c}{\partial p_2}$$

$$\frac{\partial x_1^c}{\partial p_2} = \frac{\partial x_2^c}{\partial p_1}$$

$$= -\mathcal{E} (x_2^c, p_2) + \mathcal{E} (x_1^c, p_2)$$

$$= \mathcal{E} \left( \frac{x_1^c}{x_2^c}, p_2 \right)$$

$$p_1 \frac{\partial x_1^c}{\partial p_i} + p_2 \frac{\partial x_2^c}{\partial p_i} = 0$$

# Elasticity of Substitution (for Compensated Demand)



- Proposition 2.2-3:

$$\sigma = \mathcal{E} \left( \frac{x_2^c}{x_1^c}, p_1 \right) = \frac{\mathcal{E}(x_2^c, p_1)}{k_1}, \quad k_1 = \frac{p_1 x_1}{p \cdot x}$$

\left( \frac{\text{compensated cross price elasticity}}{\text{expenditure share}} \right)

$$= - \frac{\mathcal{E}(x_1^c, p_1)}{1 - k_1}$$

# Elasticity of Substitution (for Compensated Demand)



- Proof of Proposition 2.2-3:

$$p_1 \frac{\partial x_1^c}{\partial p_i} + p_2 \frac{\partial x_2^c}{\partial p_i} = 0$$

$$k_1 \mathcal{E}(x_1^c, p_1) + k_2 \mathcal{E}(x_2^c, p_1)$$

$$= \frac{\cancel{p_1 x_1}}{I} \cdot \frac{p_1}{\cancel{x_1}} \frac{\partial x_1^c}{\partial p_1} + \frac{\cancel{p_2 x_2}}{I} \cdot \frac{p_1}{\cancel{x_2}} \frac{\partial x_2^c}{\partial p_1} = \underline{\underline{0}}$$

$$\Rightarrow \sigma = \mathcal{E}(x_2^c, p_1) - \mathcal{E}(x_1^c, p_1)$$

$$= \mathcal{E}(x_2^c, p_1) \cdot \left( 1 + \frac{k_2}{k_1} \right) = \frac{\mathcal{E}(x_2^c, p_1)}{k_1}$$

$$= \mathcal{E}(x_1^c, p_1) \cdot \left( -\frac{k_1}{k_2} \right) \cdot \frac{1}{k_1} = -\frac{\mathcal{E}(x_1^c, p_1)}{1 - k_1}$$

# Elasticity of Substitution (for Compensated Demand)



- Verify that  $\sigma = \theta$  for CES:

- Since  $x_1 = \left( \frac{\alpha_1 p_2}{\alpha_2 p_1} \right)^\theta \cdot x_2 \Rightarrow \frac{x_2}{x_1} = \left( \frac{\alpha_2 \cdot p_1}{\alpha_1 \cdot p_2} \right)^\theta$

$$\Rightarrow \ln \left( \frac{x_2^c}{x_1^c} \right) = \theta (\ln p_1 - \ln p_2 + \ln \alpha_2 - \ln \alpha_1)$$


$$\Rightarrow \sigma = \mathcal{E} \left( \frac{x_2^c}{x_1^c}, p_1 \right) = p_1 \cdot \frac{\partial}{\partial p_1} \left[ \ln \left( \frac{x_2^c}{x_1^c} \right) \right]$$

$$= p_1 \cdot \frac{\theta}{p_1} = \theta$$

# Summary for Elasticity of Substitution



- 1.  $\sigma = \mathcal{E} \left( \frac{x_2^c}{x_1^c}, p_1 \right)$
- 2.  $= \frac{\mathcal{E}(x_2^c, p_1)}{k_1}$
- $= - \frac{\mathcal{E}(x_1^c, p_1)}{1 - k_1}$
- $k_1 = \frac{p_1 x_1}{p \cdot x}$
- 3.  $\sigma = \theta$  for CES...



# Total Price Effect = Income Effect + Substitution Effect



- For  $M(p, \bar{U})$  &  $x_1(p, I)$   $x_2$

- Compensated Demand:


$$x_1^c(p, \bar{U}) = x_1(p, M(p, \bar{U}))$$

$$\frac{\partial x_1^c}{\partial p_1} = \frac{\partial x_1}{\partial p_1} + \frac{\partial x_1}{\partial I} \cdot \frac{\partial M}{\partial p_1}$$

$$\left( \frac{\partial M}{\partial p_1} = x_1^c \right)$$

- Slutsky Equation:

$$\underbrace{\frac{\partial x_1}{\partial p_1}}_{A \rightarrow B} = \underbrace{\frac{\partial x_1^c}{\partial p_1}}_{A \rightarrow C} - \underbrace{x_1 \cdot \frac{\partial x_1}{\partial I}}_{C \rightarrow B}$$



# Total Price Effect = Income Effect + Substitution Effect



- Slutsky Equation:

$$\frac{\partial x_1}{\partial p_1} = \frac{\partial x_1^c}{\partial p_1} - x_1 \cdot \frac{\partial x_1}{\partial I}$$

- Elasticity Version:

$$\frac{p_1}{x_1} \frac{\partial x_1}{\partial p_1} = \frac{p_1}{x_1} \frac{\partial x_1^c}{\partial p_1} - \frac{p_1 x_1}{I} \frac{I}{x_1} \cdot \frac{\partial x_1}{\partial I}$$

- Or,

$$\mathcal{E}(x_1, p_1) = \mathcal{E}(x_1^c, p_1) - k_1 \cdot \mathcal{E}(x_1, I)$$





# Summary of 2.2

- Consumer Problem: Maximize Utility
- Income Effect
- Dual Problem: Minimize Expenditure
- Substitution Effect:
  - =Compensated Price Effect
  - Elasticity of Substitution
- Total Price Effect:
  - = Compensated Price Effect + Income Effect



# Summary of 2.2

- Homework:
- Riley 2.2-4, 5, 6
- J/R – 1.17, 1.18, 1.27, 1.37, 1.43, 1.50, 1.53