Coordination -A Teaser Experiment

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Team Production Game

- Each of you belong to a team
- Each of you can choose effort X=1~4
 - Spade = 4, Heart = 3, Diamond = 2, Club = 1
- Earnings depend on your own effort and the "smallest effort of your team"
 - Each person has to do his/her job for the whole team project to fly
- Have you every had such a project team?

Team Production Game

• Payoff = $60 + 10 * min\{X_j\} - 10 * (X_j - min\{X_j\})$

Team Project Payoff | Cost of Effort X

	-,				
Vour	S	Smallest X	in the tean	n	
Your X —	4	3	2	1	
4	100	80	60	40	
3	-	90	70	50	
2	-	-	80	60	
1	-	-	-	70	
7.1					

Team Production Game

- What is your choice when...
- Group size = 2?
- Group size = 3?
- Group size = 20?
- · Can some kind of communication help coordinate everyone's effort?

Coordination

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Why is Coordination Important?

- Which Equilibrium to Select Among Many?
 - This requires Coordination!
- Examples of Coordination in Daily Life:
 - Language
 - Trading in Markets (Liquidity)
 - Industry Concentration

Why is Coordination Important?

- Equilibrium Selection in Game Theory
- · Desirable Features:
 - Payoff-Dominance, Risk Dominance, etc.
- Convergence via Adaptation / Learning
 Weibull (1995), Fudenberg and Levine (1998)
- Empirical: Infer "Selection Principles" by putting people in experiments and observe

Why is Coordination Important?

- Possible "Selection Principles":
 - Precedent, focal, culture understanding, etc.
- Why are observations useful?
- Schelling (1960, p.164):
 - One cannot, without empirical evidence, deduce what understandings can be perceived in a nonzero-sum game of maneuver any more than one can prove, by purely formal deduction, that a particular joke is bound to be funny."

Why is Coordination Important?

- Can't Communication Solve This?
- Not always... (See Battle of Sexes below)
- Sometimes communication is not feasible:
 - Avoiding Traffic Jams
 - Speed Limits (useful because they reduce speed "variance", and hence, enhance coordination!)
- Miscommunication can have big inefficiency!

Examples of Coordination Impact

- The standard width of US railroad tracks is 4 feet and 8.5 inch Because English wagons were about 5 feet (width of two horses)
 - Space Shuttle rockets are smaller than ideal...
- Industries are concentrated in small areas
 - Silicon Valley, Hollywood, Hsin-chu Science Park
- Urban Gentrification I want to live where others (like me) live

Examples of Coordination Impact

- Drive on the Left (or Right) side of the road
 - Right: Asia, Europe (Same continent!)
 - Left: Japan, UK, Hong Kong (all islands!)
 - Sweden switched from left to right around 1900
- · What about America?
 - Right: to avoid hitting someone with the whip on your right hand
- · Bolivians switch to "Left" in mountainous area

Examples of Coordination Impact

- Categorizing Products
 - Where should you find Narnia? Family or Action?
 - Can you find your favorite grocery at a new store?
- Common Language: Internet promotes English
 - Some Koreans even get surgery to loosen their tongues, hoping to improve their pronunciation
- Key: Agreeing on something is better than not; but some coordinated choices are better.

3 Types of Coordination Games

- · Matching Games
 - Pure Coordination Game
- Games with Asymmetric Payoffs
 - Battle of Sexes, Market Entry Game
- · Games with Asymmetric Equilibria
 - Stag Hunt, Weak-Link Game
- Applications: Market Adoption and Culture

Matching Game

- GAMES magazine (1989)
- · Pick one celebrity for President, one for Vice-President
- One person is randomly awarded prize among those who picked most popular one
- 王建民、陳金鋒、林志傑、周杰倫、蔡依 林、楊宗緯、黃國倫、隋棠、陳冠希、許純美

Matching Game

- US Results:
- Bill Cosby (1489): successful TV show
- Lee lacocca (1155): possible US candidate
- Pee-Wee Herman (656): successful TV show
- Oprah Winfrey (437): successful TV show
- Shirley MacLaine (196): self-proclaimed reincarnate

Pure Coordination Game



• Both get 1 if pick the same; both get 0 if not

В

1,1

0,0

0,0

• Two pure NE, one mixed NE

1,1


• Which one will be played empirically?

Matching Game

- Mehta, Starmer and Sugden (AER 1994)
- Picking Condition (P): Just pick a strategy
- Coordinating Condition (C): Win \$1 if your partner picks the same as you do
- Difference between P and C = How focal
- Choices: Years, Flowers, Dates, Numbers, Colors, Boy's name, Gender, etc.

Matching Game

Cotogory	Group P		Group C		
Category	Response	%	Response	%	
Years	1971	8.0	1990	61.1	
Flowers	Rose	35.2	Rose	66.7	
Dates	Dec. 25	5.7	Dec. 25	44.4	
Numbers	7	11.4	1	40.0	
Colors	Blue	38.6	Red	58.9	
Boys' Name	John	9.1	John	50.0	
Gender	Him	53.4	Him	84.4	
SSIIGO		33.1		<u> </u>	



Asymmetric Players: Battle of Sexes

- Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe & Ross (AER 90')
- BOS: Baseline (MSE mismatch 62.5%)
- BOS-300: Row player has outside option 300
 Forward induction predicts (2,1)
- BOS-100: Row player's outside option is 100
 Forward induction doesn't apply
- Compare BOS-100 and BOS-300 shows if "any outside option" works...

Asymmetric Players: Battle of Sexes

- Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe & Ross (AER 90')
- BOS-1W: 1 way communication by Row
- BOS-2W: 2 way communication by both
- BOS-SEQ: Both know that Row went first, but Column doesn't know what Row did
 - Information set same as simultaneous move
 - Would a sequential move act as an coordination device?

Battle of Sexes (Last 11 Periods) Outside (1,2) (2,1)Other Total Obs Game BOS 37(22%) 31(19%) 97(59%) 165 **BOS-300** 165 33 0(0%) 119(90%) 13(10%) **BOS-100** 3 5(3%) 102(63%) 55(34%) 165 BOS-1W 165 1(1%) 158(96%) 6(4%)

49(30%) 47(28%) 69(42%)

6(4%) 103(62%) 56(34%)


165

165

BOS-2W

BOS-SEQ

Where Does Meaning Come From? Communication can help us coordinate But how did the common language for communication emerge in the first place? Put people in a situation of "no meaning" and see how they create it! Blume, DeJong, Kim & Sprinkle (AER 98') – See also BDKS (GEB 2001) which is "better"



Evolution of Meaning

- Blume et al. (AER 1998)
- Game 1: Baseline as above
- Game 1NH: See only history of own match
- Game 2: Receiver can choose C (safe action) that gives (4,4) regardless of T1/T2
- Game 3: "Coordinate payoffs" become (2,7) so sender wants to disguise types to force receiver to choose C (safe action)

Percentage Consistent w/ Separating						
Game \ Period	1	5	10	15	20	
1st Session						
Game 1	48	65	74	89	95	
2nd Session						
Game 1	49	72	61	89	100	
Game 1NH	55	55	28	55	72	
Game 2						
Separating	44	88	88	88	94	
Pooling	. 39	05	00	05	05	

Evolution of Meaning

- Blume et al. (AER 1998)
- Game 3: "Coordinate payoffs" become (2,7) so sender wants to disguise types to force receiver to choose C (safe action)
- Allowed to send 2 or 3 messages to be sent

Results of Game 3						
# of Messages	1-10	11-20	21-30	31-40	41-50	51-60
2-Separating	43	53	38	39		
2-Pooling	33	34	41	43	2nd S	ession
3-Separating	43	38	33	24		
3-Pooling	33	37	42	60		
2-Separating	39	27	23	24	24	23
2-Pooling	39	48	51	60	63	61
3-Separating	23	22	23	25	22	24
3-Pooling	55	61	58	56	57	61
7.7	1			7	1st Se	ession

Example of Asymmetric Payoffs

- Market Entry Game
- n players decide to enter a market with capacity c
- Payoffs are declines as number of entrants increase; <0 if number > c
- Kahneman (1988): Number close to equil.
 "To a psychologist, it looks like magic."

Games with Asymmetric Equilibria 1 2 • Stag Hunt: Cooper et al. (AER 1990) 1 800, 800, 0 • 100 lottery tickets = 10% chance to win \$1 or \$2 after round 2 0, 1000, 1000, • Pure NE: (1,1) and (2,2) • Which would you pick?

Games with Asymmetric Equilibria

- Cooper et al. (AER 1990)
- CG: Baseline Stag Hunt
- CG-900: Row's outside option is 900 each
 Forward induction predicts (2,2)
- CG-700: Row's outside option is 700 each
 Forward induction won't work
- CG-1W: 1 way communication by Row
- CG-2W: 2 way communication by both

