## Team Production Game

－Each of you belong to a team
－Each of you can choose effort X＝1～4 - Spade $=4$ ，Heart $=3$ ，Diamond $=2$, Club $=1$
－Earnings depend on your own effort and the＂smallest effort of your team＂
－Each person has to do his／her job for the whole team project to fly
－Have you every had such a project team？

## Team Production Game

－What is your choice when．．．
－Group size $=2$ ？
－Group size $=3$ ？
－ Group size $=20$ ？
－Can some kind of communication help coordinate everyone＇s effort？


## Coordination

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## Why is Coordination Important？

－Which Equilibrium to Select Among Many？
－This requires Coordination！
－Examples of Coordination in Daily Life：
－Language
－Trading in Markets（Liquidity）
－Industry Concentration

## Why is Coordination Important?

- Equilibrium Selection in Game Theory
- Desirable Features:
- Payoff-Dominance, Risk Dominance, etc.
- Convergence via Adaptation / Learning
- Weibull (1995), Fudenberg and Levine (1998)
- Empirical: Infer "Selection Principles" by putting people in experiments and observe


## Why is Coordination Important?

- Can't Communication Solve This?
- Not always... (See Battle of Sexes below)
- Sometimes communication is not feasible:
- Avoiding Traffic Jams
- Speed Limits (useful because they reduce speed "variance", and hence, enhance coordination!)
- Miscommunication can have big inefficiency!



## Examples of Coordination Impact

- Drive on the Left (or Right) side of the road
- Right: Asia, Europe (Same continent!)
- Left: Japan, UK, Hong Kong (all islands!)
- Sweden switched from left to right around 1900
- What about America?
- Right: to avoid hitting someone with the whip on your right hand
- Bolivians switch to "Left" in mountainous area



## Why is Coordination Important?

- Possible "Selection Principles":
- Precedent, focal, culture understanding, etc.
- Why are observations useful?
- Schelling (1960, p.164):
- One cannot, without empirical evidence, deduce what understandings can be perceived in a nonzero-sum game of maneuver any more than one can prove, by purely formal deduction, that a particular joke is bound to be funny."


## Examples of Coordination Impact

- The standard width of US railroad tracks is 4 feet and 8.5 inch Because English wagons were about 5 feet (width of two horses)
- Space Shuttle rockets are smaller than ideal...
- Industries are concentrated in small areas - Silicon Valley, Hollywood, Hsin-chu Science Park
- Urban Gentrification - I want to live where others (like me) live


## Examples of Coordination Impact

- Categorizing Products
- Where should you find Narnia? Family or Action?
- Can you find your favorite grocery at a new store?
- Common Language: Internet promotes English
- Some Koreans even get surgery to loosen their tongues, hoping to improve their pronunciation
- Key: Agreeing on something is better than not; but some coordinated choices are better.


## 3 Types of Coordination Games

－Matching Games
－Pure Coordination Game
－Games with Asymmetric Payoffs
－Battle of Sexes，Market Entry Game
－Games with Asymmetric Equilibria
－Stag Hunt，Weak－Link Game
－Applications：Market Adoption and Culture


## Matching Game

－US Results：
－Bill Cosby（1489）：successful TV show
－Lee lacocca（1155）：possible US candidate
－Pee－Wee Herman（656）：successful TV show
－Oprah Winfrey（437）：successful TV show
－．．．
－Shirley MacLaine（196）：self－proclaimed reincarnate

## Matching Game

－Mehta，Starmer and Sugden（AER 1994）
－Picking Condition（P）：Just pick a strategy
－Coordinating Condition（C）：Win \＄1 if your partner picks the same as you do
－Difference between P and $\mathrm{C}=$ How focal
－Choices：Years，Flowers，Dates，Numbers， Colors，Boy＇s name，Gender，etc．

## Matching Game

－GAMES magazine（1989）
－Pick one celebrity for President，one for Vice－ President
－One person is randomly awarded prize among those who picked most popular one
－王建民，陳金鋒，林志傑，周杰倫，蔡依林，楊宗緯，黄國倫，隋棠，陳冠希，許純美


Pure Coordination Game



## Asymmetric Players: Battle of Sexes

- Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe \& Ross (AER 90')
- BOS-1W: 1 way communication by Row
- BOS-2W: 2 way communication by both
- BOS-SEQ: Both know that Row went first, but Column doesn't know what Row did
- Information set same as simultaneous move
- Would a sequential move act as an coordination device?


## Where Does Meaning Come From?

- Communication can help us coordinate
- But how did the common language for communication emerge in the first place?
- Put people in a situation of "no meaning" and see how they create it!
- Blume, DeJong, Kim \& Sprinkle (AER 98')
- See also BDKS (GEB 2001) which is "better"


## Asymmetric Players: Battle of Sexes

- Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe \& Ross (AER 90')
- BOS: Baseline (MSE mismatch 62.5\%)
- BOS-300: Row player has outside option 300 - Forward induction predicts $(2,1)$
- BOS-100: Row player's outside option is 100 - Forward induction doesn't apply
- Compare BOS-100 and BOS-300 shows if "any outside option" works...



## Evolution of Meaning

- Blume et al. (AER 1998)
- Game 1: Baseline as above
- Game 1NH: See only history of own match
- Game 2: Receiver can choose C (safe action) that gives $(4,4)$ regardless of T1/T2
- Game 3: "Coordinate payoffs" become $(2,7)$ so sender wants to disguise types to force receiver to choose C (safe action)


## Evolution of Meaning

- Blume et al. (AER 1998)
- Game 3: "Coordinate payoffs" become $(2,7)$ so sender wants to disguise types to force receiver to choose C (safe action)
- Allowed to send 2 or 3 messages to be sent


## Example of Asymmetric Payoffs

- Market Entry Game
- $n$ players decide to enter a market with capacity c
- Payoffs are declines as number of entrants increase; <0 if number > c
- Kahneman (1988): Number close to equil. - "To a psychologist, it looks like magic."


## Percentage Consistent w/ Separating

| Game $\backslash$ Period | 1 | 5 | 10 | 15 | 20 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1st Session |  |  |  |  |  |
| Game 1 | 48 | 65 | 74 | 89 | 95 |
| 2nd Session |  |  |  |  |  |
| Game 1 | 49 | 72 | 61 | 89 | 100 |
| Game 1NH | 55 | 55 | 28 | 55 | 72 |
| Game 2 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Separating | 44 | 88 | 88 | 88 | 94 |
| Pooling | 39 | 05 | 00 | 05 | 05 |


| Results of Game 3 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| \# of Messages | $1-10$ | $11-20$ | $21-30$ | $31-40$ | $41-50$ | $51-60$ |
| 2-Separating | 43 | 53 | 38 | 39 |  |  |
| 2-Pooling | 33 | 34 | 41 | 43 | 2nd Session |  |
| 3-Separating | 43 | 38 | 33 | 24 |  |  |
| 3-Pooling | 33 | 37 | 42 | 60 |  |  |
| 2-Separating | 39 | 27 | 23 | 24 | 24 | 23 |
| 2-Pooling | 39 | 48 | 51 | 60 | 63 | 61 |
| 3-Separating | 23 | 22 | 23 | 25 | 22 | 24 |
| 3-Pooling | 55 | 61 | 58 | 56 | 57 | 61 |
| Pr |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Games with Asymmetric Equilibria


## Games with Asymmetric Equilibria

- Cooper et al. (AER 1990)
- CG: Baseline Stag Hunt
- CG-900: Row's outside option is 900 each - Forward induction predicts $(2,2)$
- CG-700: Row's outside option is 700 each - Forward induction won't work
- CG-1W: 1 way communication by Row
- CG-2W: 2 way communication by both

Stage Hunt (Last 11 Periods)

| Game | Outside | $(1,1)$ | $(2,2)$ | Other | Total Obs |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| CG | - | $160(97 \%)$ | $0(0 \%)$ | $5_{(3 \%)}$ | 165 |
| CG-900 | 65 | $2_{(2 \%)}$ | $77_{(77 \%)}$ | $21(21 \%)$ | 165 |
| CG-700 | 20 | $119(82 \%)$ | $0(0 \%)$ | $26_{(18 \%)}$ | 165 |
| CG-1W | - | $26(16 \%)$ | $88(53 \%)$ | $51(31 \%)$ | 165 |
| CG-2W | - | $0(0 \%)$ | $150(91 \%)$ | $15(9 \%)$ | 165 |
| $2 \times$ |  |  |  |  |  |

