

# Chapter 5: Outcome and Instruments

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# Taiwanese Local Factions and Democratic Development(地方派系)

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- **Introduction of Local Factions**
- **Module 5.1: Theory of Change**
- **Module 5.2: Specifying Data Sources**
- **Module 5.3: Assess the Measures**
- **Module 5.4: Nonsurvey Instruments**

# Local factions = Political Gangsters

(派系網絡)  
**Faction Network**  
Political Interest

(樁腳網絡)  
**Vote Broker**  
Economic Interest

(俗民網絡)  
**Folk Society**

Because of local factions, Taiwanese local democracy is facing serious problems.....

Let's focus on an important issue:

**Why there are so many low-quality local councilors in Taiwan?**

# Theory of Change

A structured approach used in the design and evaluation of social programs.

- **Inputs (activities)**
- **Output**
- **Outcome (project objective)**
- **Impact (overall objective)**

## The key component: The Voting Rule

The voting rule of local councilors is: “**Large-Size District**”. (cf. “Single-Member District”)

One of a drawback of large-size district is that **candidates can be elected with very low votes.**

## 2005 Local Councilors Election Result

<b>County</b>	<b>Minimal required votes to be elected</b>
<b>Penghu County</b>	1109
<b>Keelung City</b>	1394
<b>Pingdong County</b>	1676
<b>Yunlin County</b>	2060
<b>Taidong County</b>	2072
<b>Hualian County</b>	2278
<b>Tainan City</b>	3319
<b>Taichung City</b>	3856





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老師

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追蹤中

發訊息

...

動態時報

關於

相片

說讚的粉絲

更多



2,845 人說這讚

曾筱涵和其他 110 位朋友

2845 Fans

相片/影片



邀請朋友對這個粉絲專頁按讚

留個言吧.....

**Pingdong County**

1676

**Yunlin County**

2060

**Taidong County**

2072

**Hualian County**

2278

**Tainan City**

3319

**Taichung City**

3856

## Example of the theory:

Inputs (activities)	Large-Size District → Single-Member District
Output	The seats in local councils decrease.
Outcome	Better candidates will appear.
Impact	<b>The councilor's performance may improve.</b>

## Specify Data Sources

Once we have specified our logical chain and outcomes of interest, we now need to **decide the indicators** and then **think about how to collect the data.**

## Continue the Example above:

Inputs (activities)	Large-Size District → Single-Member District
Output	The seats in local councils decrease.
Outcome	Better candidates will appear.
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## Continue the Example above:

Inputs (activities)      Large-Size District → Single-Member District

Passage of the law

Output                      The seats in local councils decrease.

Outcome                    Better candidates will appear.

Impact                      The councilor's performance may improve.

## Continue the Example above:

Inputs (activities)      Large-Size District → Single-Member District

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Number of Seats

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## Continue the Example above:

Inputs (activities)      Large-Size District → Single-Member District

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Output      The seats in local councils decrease.

Number of Seats

Outcome      Better candidates will appear.

Candidate's Educational Level

Impact      The councilor's performance may improve.

## Continue the Example above:

Inputs (activities)	Large-Size District → Single-Member District
Passage of the law	Existing Data
Output	The seats in local councils decrease.
Number of Seats	Existing Data
Outcome	Better candidates will appear.
Candidate's Educational Level	Existing Data
Impact	The councilor's performance may improve.



## Continue the Example above:

Impact

**The councilor's performance may improve.**

## Continue the Example above:

satisfaction of voter services

Impact

The councilor's performance may improve.

## Continue the Example above:

Non-existing Data

satisfaction of voter services

Impact

The councilor's performance may improve.

## Continue the Example above:

satisfaction of voter services

Non-existing Data

Survey

Impact

The councilor's performance may improve.

## Continue the Example above:

satisfaction of voter services

Non-existing Data

Survey

# of transactions under the table

Impact

The councilor's performance may improve.

## Continue the Example above:

satisfaction of voter services

Non-existing Data

Survey

# of transactions under the table

Non-survey

Impact

The councilor's performance may improve.

# How to evaluate an indicator?

- Logically valid

Quality of the councilors & single-member district

- Measurable

1. **Observable**

2. **Feasible**

3. **Detectable**

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Observed in the real world

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Allowed to quantize

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3. **Detectable**

Remarkable difference

# Indicators and Measurability

Outcome	Indicators	Measurable		
		Observable	Feasible	Detectable
Candidates' quality	Candidates' educational level			
Illegal factional union behavior	Number of factional meetings			
Voters' attitude before election	Polls before election			

# Indicators and Measurability

Outcome	Indicators	Measurable		
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Voters' attitude before election	Polls before election	YES	NO	NO

## Precision


The more exhaustive and exclusive the indicator, the more precise it is.

### ● Exhaustive Indicator:


More exhaustive indicators capture more instances of the outcome we need to measure.

### ● Exclusive Indicator:

An indicator that is affected by the outcome of interest and **by nothing else**.







# Direct Observations

## ● **Mystery Client**

Ex: Police vs. private casino

## ● **Incognito Enumerators (匿名調查員)**

Ex: Police vs. private casino (again)

## ● **Observing group interaction and structured community activities**

Ex: Hold a campaign!

# Indirect Observations

## ● Participatory Resource Appraisals

- Example:

The promotion of the local infrastructure



**Local democracy is the root of Taiwanese democracy.**

**5.1 Theory of Change**

**5.2 Specify data sources**

**5.3 Assess the measures**

**5.4 Nonsurvey Instruments**

# Thank you for your attention!