Envelope Theorem

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(Calculus 4, 19.2)

Example: Hunghai (aka Foxconn Tech. Group...)


- Hunghai is a price-taking firm making jpads
 - Sell 3,000 jpads to Pineapple at price $p_i = \$100$
 - Total Cost is C(q) = \$180,000
- What is the elasticity of profit w.r.t. price $\text{ If output is held fixed?} \qquad \epsilon(\Pi, p_i) = \frac{p_i}{\Pi} \frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial p_i}$
 - If Hung-Hai responds optimally to price change?
- Hunghai sees a new opportunity and sells 1,500 Vii's to Rentientang at price $p_w = \$200$
 - Production of jpads drop to 2,400, total cost rises to \$300,000. Can you calculate the new $\epsilon(\Pi, p_i)$?

- A price-taking firm has cost C(q)
 - Can sell as much as it wishes at fix price p
- Profit is $\pi = p \cdot q C(q)$
- Given a change in prices p, how would profit change (as the firm re-optimizes output q)?
 - Direct Effect: $\Delta p \cdot q$
 - Indirect Effect: $\Delta \pi$ due to $q \to q'$
- First assume only three possible outputs...


$$q \in Q = \{0, q_1, q_2\}$$

- Profit is straight line for each possible output


Three Output States




Upper Envelope for Three Output States



Upper Envelope for Six Output States




Upper Envelope for Continuous Case




- Output can be any real number
- Firm solves $q^*(p)$ to $\max \{\pi = p \cdot q C(q)\}$
- Maximized profit is $\Pi(p) = p \cdot q^*(p) C(q^*(p))$
- Initial output price p^0 (fixed)
 - Initial output $q^*(p^0)$
 - Initial profit $\Pi(p^0)$
- Profit (with fixed output) is

$$\pi = \Pi(p^0) + (p - p^0) \cdot q^*(p^0)$$

• Fixing output, increase in price changes profit by $q^*(p)$ per dollar, so (fixed output) profit is



$$\frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial p}(p^0) = q^*(p^0)$$



- Firm cannot be worse off if it can change quantity
- $\Pi(p)$ is above π
 - Tangent to π if $\Pi(p)$ smooth
- Total effect =
 Direct effect only
 - Ignore indirect eff.

Another Graphic Presentation (P-q)

$$q^{*}(p^{0})\Delta p \leq \Delta \Pi \leq q^{*}(p^{0} + \Delta p)\Delta p$$

$$q^{*}(p^{0}) \leq \frac{\Delta \Pi}{\Delta p} \leq q^{*}(p^{0} + \Delta p)$$

$$p^{0} \qquad \Pi(= PS)$$

$$q^{0} \qquad q^{*}(p^{0} + \Delta p) \rightarrow q$$

Joseph Tao-yi Wang Envelope Theorem

In fact, we have Thm 19.4: Envelope Theorem

- Assume: (Feasible output)
 - $-X \in \mathbf{R}^n$ is closed and bounded, a is a scalar a=p
 - $f(\vec{x}, a)$ is C^1 (continuously differentiable) (Profit)

$$q^*(p)$$
 $\vec{x}^*(a) = \arg\max_{\vec{x} \in X} \{f(\vec{x}, a)\}$ is C^1 , $\Pi(p)$

• Then, $F(a) = \max_{\vec{x} \in X} \{f(\vec{x}, a)\} = f(\vec{x}^*(a), a),$ the value function is differentiable and has

$$F'(a) = \frac{df}{da}(\vec{x}^*(a), a) = \frac{\partial f}{\partial a}(\vec{x}^*(a), a).$$
 (Only Direct Effect)

Thm 19.4: Envelope Theorem (Unconstrained)

- $-X \in \mathbf{R}^n$ is closed and bounded, a is a scalar
- $-f(\vec{x},a)$ is C^1 (continuously differentiable)

$$\vec{x}^*(a) = \arg\max_{\vec{x} \in X} \left\{ f(\vec{x}, a) \right\} \text{ is } C^{\scriptscriptstyle 1}\text{,}$$

For,
$$F(a) = \max_{\vec{x} \in X} \{ f(\vec{x}, a) \} = f(\vec{x}^*(a), a),$$

$$F'(a) = \sum_{i} \frac{\partial f}{\partial x_i} \left(\vec{x}^*(a), a \right) \cdot \frac{dx_i^*}{da} (a) + \frac{\partial f}{\partial a} \left(\vec{x}^*(a), a \right)$$

$$= \frac{\partial f}{\partial a} \left(\vec{x}^*(a), a \right) \text{ since } \frac{\partial f}{\partial x_i} \left(\vec{x}^*(a), a \right) = 0$$

Thm 19.4: Envelope Theorem (Unconstrained)

- Direct Effect = Total Effect (at the margin)
- This only allows the maximand to be affected by the parameter change...
- To allow for both the maximand and the constraints to be affected by the parameter change, need slightly stronger assumptions...

Thm 19.5: Envelope Theorem (Constrained)

$$F(a) = \max_{\vec{x}} \{ f(\vec{x}, a) | h_1(\vec{x}, a) = 0, \dots, h_k(\vec{x}, a) = 0 \}$$

$$\mathcal{L} = f(\vec{x}, a) + \sum \mu_i h_i(\vec{x}, a)$$

- $-f(\vec{x},a)$ and $h_i(\vec{x},a)$ are $\mathit{C}^{\scriptscriptstyle 1}$
- $-\vec{x}^*(a), \vec{\mu}^*(a)$ unique solutions; NDCQ hold.
- $-\vec{x}^*(a), \vec{\mu}^*(a)$ are C^1 continuously differentiable at a^0 (implicit function theorem applies)

Then,

$$F'(a^0) = \frac{d}{da} f(\vec{x}^*(a^0), a^0) = \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial a} \left(\vec{x}^*(a^0), \vec{\mu}^*(a^0), a^0 \right)$$

Example: Hunghai (aka Foxconn Tech. Group...)

- Hunghai is a price-taking firm making jpads
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Example: Hunghai

- Hunghai is a price-taking firm making jpads
 - Sell 3,000 jpads to Pineapple at price $p_i = \$100$
 - Total Cost is C(q) = \$180,000

$$\Pi = p \times q - C(q)$$

$$= \$100 \times 3,000 - \$180,000 = \$120,000$$

$$\frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial p_i} = q_i = 3,000 \Rightarrow \epsilon = \frac{p_i}{\Pi} \frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial p_i} = \frac{\$100 \cdot 3,000}{\$120,000} = \frac{5}{2}$$

 Hunghai's elasticity of profit wrt. jpad price is 2.5 for both fixed and variable output (by ET!)

Example: Hunghai

- Hunghai sees a new opportunity and sells 1,500 Vii's to Rentientang at price $p_w = \$200$
 - Production of jpads drop to 2,400, price $p_i = \$100$
 - total cost rises to \$300,000. Calculate new $\epsilon(\Pi, p_i)$

$$\Pi = \$100 \times 2,400 + \$200 \times 1,500 - \$300,000$$
$$= \$240,000$$

$$\frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial p_i} = q_i' = 2,400 \Rightarrow \epsilon = \frac{p_i}{\Pi} \frac{\partial \Pi}{\partial p_i} = \frac{\$100 \cdot 2,400}{\$240,000} = 1$$

What does this all mean?

- Hunghai used to only produce jpads
- Since it is a price-taker, if Pineapple Corp. decides to lower prices by 10%, Hunghai's profit would decrease by 25%
- Even if Hunghai tries to re-optimize! (ET)
- After diversifying to producing also Vii's, it's profit is now less prone to Pineapple's price cuts (lowers by 10% if prices are cut by 10%)
- Isn't this what firms in Hsinchu Science Park do?

Summary of 19.2

- Re-maximize under environmental change
 - Direct Effect: Change in profit (objective function)
 - Indirect Effect: Change due to re-optimization
- Envelope Theorem(s):
 - Only have Direct Effect at the margin
- Homework:
 - Exercise 19.11, 19.13
 - Find a Hunghai example in the news