

# A WINDOW OF COGNITION: EYETRACKING THE REASONING PROCESS IN SPATIAL BEAUTY CONTEST GAMES

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## Abstract

We study the reasoning process in an environment where final choices are well understood and the associated theory is procedural by introducing two-person beauty contest games played spatially on two-dimensional grid maps. Players choose locations and are rewarded by hitting targets dependent on opponents' choice locations. By tracking subjects' eye movements (lookups), we infer their reasoning process and classify subjects into various levels. More than a half of the subjects' classifications coincides with their classifications using final choices, supporting a literal interpretation of the level- $k$  model for subject's reasoning process. Lookup analyses reveal that the center area is where most subjects initially look at. This sheds light on the level-0 belief. Moreover, learning lookups of a trial on average could increase payoffs of that trial by roughly 60%, indicating how valuable lookups can help predict choices.

**Keywords** beauty contest game, level- $k$  model, best response hierarchy, guessing game, cognitive hierarchy

**JEL** C91, C72, D87

# 1 Introduction

Since Nash (1950) defined equilibrium as mutual best response, game theory has been focusing on interpreting observed choices as the outcome of strategic best responses to consistent beliefs. This strategic approach has achieved tremendous success by simply assuming utility optimization and belief consistency. The focus on explaining final choices is widespread. Nonetheless, this emphasis on final choices should not exclude the possibility of analyzing the decision-making process prior to final decision if the process is observable and contains information about cognition, potentially hard to extract from observing choices alone.

In this paper, we attempt to study the reasoning process as well as final choices in a game-theoretic environment. In particular, we consider the reasoning process people utilize to reach a decision, in which they perform different levels of strategic reasoning. To study the decision-making process, there are three important requirements on the task to use. First, we need a setting in which final choices are well understood and mature theories exist to explain how choices are made. This is because if there is still no consensus regarding which theory best explains final choices and why, it is conceivably harder to come up with satisfactory hypotheses on reasoning processes to base tests on. Secondly, to make a plausible hypothesis on reasoning, we want the associated economic theory to be procedural. In other words, there is room that if the theory is taken literally, it makes predictions on not only choices, but also on a particular reasoning process that leads to final choices. Finally, we require some data collection method that will allow us to observe the reasoning process and for that purpose the task used has to suit the method.

Extending Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006), we design a new set of games, termed two-person spatial beauty contest games, to analyze reasoning process. This set of games, as its name suggests, is a graphical simplification of the  $p$ -beauty contest games for two players but extends to two dimensional grid maps.<sup>1</sup> It is known that initial responses in the  $p$ -beauty contest games can be well explained by theories of heterogeneous levels of rationality such as the level- $k$  model.<sup>2</sup> Since the level- $k$  model can predict choices well in these guessing games, the first requirement that mature theory exists to explain final

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<sup>1</sup>Nagel (1995), Ho et al. (1998) studied the  $p$ -beauty contest game. Variants of two-person guessing games are studied by Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006) and Grosskopf and Nagel (2008). When designing our games, we attempt to mimic the Bertrand competition in price and quality. Imagine firms compete by either cutting the price or increasing the quality of service. Suppose there is a common marginal cost and a best obtainable quality of service. If one firm typically competes by cutting the price while the other by increasing the quality of service, then the equilibrium is where price equals the marginal cost and the best service is obtained.

<sup>2</sup>Level- $k$  models are proposed and applied by Stahl and Wilson (1995), Nagel (1995), Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006), and Ho and Su (2013). A related model, the cognitive hierarchy model is proposed by Camerer et al. (2004).

choices is met.

The spatial beauty contest game satisfies the second requirement since there is a natural hypothesis regarding the reasoning process when taking the level- $k$  model procedurally. In particular, a key in the level- $k$  model is that players of higher levels of rationality best respond to players of lower levels, who in turn best respond to players of even lower levels and so on. This best response hierarchy is the perfect candidate for procedurally modeling the reasoning process of a subject prior to making the final choice, since in a two-person game, the final choice should be a best response to the subject's belief regarding the opponent's choice, which in turn is a best response to the subject's belief about the opponent's belief about her choice, and so on.<sup>3</sup> As an example, a level-2 subject would first focus on what a level-0 subject would choose since her opponent thinks of her as a level-0. She would next consider what a level-1 opponent would choose since her opponent would best respond to a level-0. Finally she would think about her level-2 choice since she would best respond to her level-1 opponent. In other words, to figure out which choice to make, a subject has to go through a particular best response hierarchical procedure.

To fulfill the last requirement, we observe subjects' eye-movements with video-based eyetracking. As we will argue below, the graphical representation of the spatial beauty contest games induces subjects to go through this hierarchical procedure of best responses by counting on the computer screen, leaving footprints that the experimenter can trace. Although in our experiment, a subject could go through the level- $k$  reasoning process in her mind, utilizing the payoff relevant information (always available or recalled from memory), we hypothesize that locations being looked up by a subject reflects how she reasons before making her final choice since counting on the computer screen has the advantage of reducing memory load. We eyetrack the entire sequence of every location a subject has ever fixated at in the experiment real-time. Following the convention, we call this real-time fixation data "lookups" even though there is no hidden payoff-relevant information to be looked up.

We estimate a level- $k$  lookup model as follows. When a subject reasons through a particular best response hierarchy designated by her level- $k$  type, each step of thinking is characterized as a "state." To describe changes between the thinking states of a subject, we construct a constrained Markov-switching model between these states. We classify subjects into various level- $k$  types based on maximum likelihood estimation using individual lookup data. Among the seventeen subjects we tracked, one follows the level-0 ( $L0$ ) best response hierarchy the closest with her lookups, six follow the level-1 ( $L1$ ) hierarchy, four follow the level-2 ( $L2$ ) hierarchy, another four follow the level-3 ( $L3$ ) hierarchy, and the remaining two follow the equilibrium ( $EQ$ ) best response hierarchy, which coincides

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<sup>3</sup>To avoid confusion, the subject is denoted by her while her opponent is denoted by him.

with level-4 ( $L4$ ) hierarchy in most games of our experiment. Treating the  $EQ$  type as having a thinking step of 4, the average thinking step is 2.00, in line with results of other  $p$ -beauty contest games.

To see whether the lookup data indeed aligns well with choice data, we classify subjects by using their final choice data only. After all, if subjects do count on the computer screen and go through the best response hierarchy of the level- $k$  model, the estimated level of a player when we analyze her lookups should coincide with her level when we analyze her choices since  $k$  reflects her strategic sophistication. If contrary to our hypothesis, subjects reason in their mind, one should not expect lookups being informative about final choices. We find that lookup-based and choice-based classifications are pretty consistent, classifying ten of the seventeen subjects as the same type. Consistency between lookup-based and choice-based classifications suggests that if one’s lookups are classified as a particular level- $k$  type, their final choices follow the prediction of that level- $k$  type as well. This is a strong support to a literal interpretation of the level- $k$  model to explain subjects’ reasoning process and final choice altogether in the spatial beauty contest game. It means that the corresponding best response hierarchy implied by each level- $k$  type might be literally carried out by these subjects. This lends support to the level- $k$  model as a procedural theory in addition to a theory of final choice.

Since the level- $k$  model explains both final choices and lookups well for more than half of our subjects, one might wonder what could lookup data tells us beyond which can be learned from final choices. To infer empirical level-0 beliefs, we use initial lookups to identify the starting point of reasoning as mostly the center. The top-left and the top-center, though less likely, are also possible. Since the center and the top-left are salient, it hints on how salience may be important in determining level-0 belief. We also find that relying on lookups of a trial to predict the choice of that same trial is roughly as good as relying on choices of all other trials. Both can increase payoffs of about 60%, indicating how informative lookups are.

In the related literature, procedural data are used to infer the reasoning process and identify the level of subjects. Closest to our work are Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006) and Costa-Gomes et al. (2001). Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006) employs the mouse-tracking technology “mouselab” to study two-person guessing games and explicitly derive the procedural implication of level- $k$  model by tracking how subjects click on payoff-relevant information. However, after relevant information is obtained, the mouse-tracking technology does not record how subjects calculate to form level-0 belief. Hence, narrowing down the level-0 belief is less likely. Burchardi and Penczynski (2014) and Penczynski (2016) uses within-team text messages in the first trial of the  $p$ -beauty contest game to identify empirical level-0 beliefs and the number of steps a subject reasons. Because there

is no feedback and subjects do not interact with other team members in our experiment, the learning effect is minimized. Hence we could use data of multiple trials instead of just the first trial. The use of multiple trials potentially could be helpful in analyzing whether subjects have a constant level throughout the experiment. Despite of these subtle difference, all these approaches are complementary and confirm different aspects of the procedural process to be consistent with the level- $k$  model.<sup>4</sup>

The remaining of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2.1 describes the spatial beauty contest game and its theoretical predictions; Section 2.2 describes details of the experiment; Section 3 reports aggregate statistics on lookups; Section 4 reports classification results from the Markov-switching model based on lookups; Section 5 compares classification results based on lookups with those based on final choices. Section 6 investigates additional insights of lookups, and Section 7 concludes.

## 2 The Experiment

### 2.1 The Spatial Beauty Contest Game

We now introduce our design, the equilibrium prediction, the prediction by the level- $k$  model and formulate the hypotheses which will be tested. To create a spatial version of the  $p$ -beauty contest game, we reduce the number of players to two, so that we can display the action space of all players on the computer screen visually. Players choose locations (instead of numbers) simultaneously on a 2-dimensional grid map attempting to hit one's target location determined by the opponent's choice. The target location is defined as a relative location to the other player's choice of location by a pair of coordinates  $(x, y)$ . We use the standard Euclidean coordinate system. For instance,  $(0, -2)$ , means the target location of a player is "two steps below the opponent," and  $(-4, 0)$  means the target location of a player is "four steps to the left of the opponent." These targets are common knowledge to the players. Payoffs are determined by how "far" (the sum of horizontal distance and vertical distance) a player is away from the target. The larger this distance is, the lower her payoff is. Players can only choose locations on a given grid map, though one's target may fall outside if the opponent is close to or on the boundary.<sup>5</sup> For example, consider the  $7 \times 7$  grid map in Figure I. For the purpose of illustration, suppose a

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<sup>4</sup>Brocas, Carrillo, Wang and Camerer (2014) also use mouselab to study how subjects search payoff-relevant information in a bargaining game and conclude that they often fail to look up the information necessary to find an equilibrium. Agranov, Caplin and Tergiman (2015) introduce an incentivized choice process protocol to help identify the behaviors of level-0 subjects. However, since temporary choices at any time could count as the final choice, every time point in their setup is incentivized, and it is equivalent to observe a sequence of choices.

<sup>5</sup>Similar designs could also be found in Kuo et al. (2009). They addressed different issues.

player’s opponent has chosen the center location labeled O  $((0, 0))$  and the player’s target is  $(-4, 0)$ . Then to hit her target, she has to choose location  $(-4, 0)$ . But location  $(-4, 0)$  is not on the grid map, while choosing location  $(-3, 0)$  is optimal among all 49 feasible choices because location  $(-3, 0)$  is the only feasible location that is one step from location  $(-4, 0)$ .<sup>6</sup>

The spatial beauty contest game is essentially a spatial version of Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006)’s asymmetric two-person guessing games, in which one subject would like to choose  $\alpha$  of her opponent’s choice and her opponent would like to choose  $\beta$  of her choice. Hence, similar to Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006), the equilibrium prediction of this spatial beauty contest game is determined by the targets of both players. For example, if the targets of the two players are  $(0, 2)$  and  $(4, 0)$  respectively, the equilibrium consists of both players choosing the top-right corner of the grid map. This conceptually coincides with a player hitting the lower bound in the two-person guessing game of Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006) where  $\alpha\beta$  is less than 1, or all choosing zero in the  $p$ -beauty contest game where  $p$  is less than 1.<sup>7</sup> Note that in general the equilibrium needs not be at the corner since targets can have opposite signs. For example, when the targets are  $(4, -2)$  and  $(-2, 4)$  played on a  $7 \times 7$  grid map, the equilibrium locations for the two players are both two steps away from the corner (labeled as  $\mathbf{E}_1$  and  $\mathbf{E}_2$  for the two players respectively in Figure I).

Supplementary Appendix A1 derives the equilibrium predictions for general spatial beauty contest games, while Supplementary Appendix A2 develops the predictions of the level- $k$  model and shows that all higher level- $k$  types ( $k \geq \bar{k}$ ) coincide with equilibrium. In Table I we list all the 24 spatial beauty contest games used in the experiment, their various level- $k$  predictions, equilibrium predictions and the thresholds  $\bar{k}$  in which all higher level- $k$  types coincide with equilibrium. Notice that the first 12 games are “easy” games where targets of each player are 1-dimensional, while the last 12 games are “hard” game where targets are 2-dimensional. Also, Games  $(2m - 1)$  and  $(2m)$  (where  $m = 1, 2, \dots, 12$ ) are the same but with reversed roles of the two players, so for instance, Games 1 and 2 are the same, Games 3 and 4 are the same, etc.

Note that the spatial beauty contest game extends the one dimensional two-person guessing games in Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006) to two dimensions. Extending to two dimensions allows us to separate choices and reasoning of two players better. In easy games where targets are 1-dimensional, we let two players’ target be on different dimensions so that the dimension corresponding to one’s target is presumably more salient

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<sup>6</sup>For instance, to go from location  $(-3, 1)$  to  $(-4, 0)$ , one has to travel one step left and one step down and hence the distance is 2.

<sup>7</sup>However, choosing the top-right corner is *not* a dominant strategy in our design, unlike in the symmetric two-person guessing game analyzed by Grosskopf and Nagel (2008).

for that player (and differs from that for the other player). This may lead to more distinct reasoning processes and final choices, providing a better chance to identify when a player is reasoning for herself instead of reasoning for her opponent. In hard games where targets of both players are 2-dimensional, equilibrium choices do not coincide with the corners. This separates equilibrium reasoning from corner-choosing heuristics.

The thresholds  $\bar{k}$  for our 24 games are almost always 4, but some are 3 (Games 1, 10, 17), 5 (Games 5, 11, 12) or 6 (Game 6). This indicates that as long as we include level- $k$  types with  $k$  up to 3 and the equilibrium type, we will not miss the higher level- $k$  types much since higher types coincide with the equilibrium most of the time. Moreover, as evident in Table I, different levels make different predictions. In other words, various levels are strongly separated on the grid map.<sup>8</sup> The level- $k$  model predicts what final choices are made for each level  $k$ . We assume that a subject is of a particular level- $k$  type in all games. This is formulated in Hypothesis 1.

**Hypothesis 1 (Final Choice)** *Consider a series of one-shot spatial beauty contest games without feedback, a subject's final choices for games  $n = 1, 2, \dots, N$  follows the prediction of a particular level- $k$  type where  $k$  is constant across games.*

Since our games are spatial, players can literally count using their eyes how many steps on the grid map they have to move to hit their targets. Thus, a natural way to use lookups is to *take the level- $k$  reasoning processes literally* assuming subjects look through the following best response hierarchy: An  $L1$  best responds to an  $L0$ , an  $L2$  best responds to an  $L1$ ,  $\dots$ , and an  $Lk$  best responds to an  $L(k - 1)$ . Though this process could be carried out solely in one's mind, counting on the map reduces memory load and is more straightforward. Hence, we formulate Hypothesis 2 and base our econometric analysis of lookups on this.

**Hypothesis 2 (Lookup)** *Consider a series of one-shot spatial beauty contest games without feedback where subjects are assumed to carry out the reasoning process on the grid map. A subject's lookup sequence for games  $n = 1, 2, \dots, N$  should follow a particular level- $k$  type where  $k$  is constant across games, and:*

- (a) **(Duration of Lookups):** *Focus on the associated level- $k$  best response hierarchy and fixate longer than random at locations of  $L0$  player's choices,  $\dots$ , own  $L(k - 2)$  player's choice, opponent  $L(k - 1)$  player's choice, and own  $Lk$  player's choice.*
- (b) **(Sequence of Lookups):** *Have adjacent fixations (from level  $i$  to  $i + 1$ ) that correspond to steps of the associated level- $k$  best response hierarchy.*

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<sup>8</sup>The only exceptions are  $L3$  and  $EQ$  in Games 1, 10, 17,  $L2$  and  $L3$  in Games 2, 6, 9, and  $L2$  and  $EQ$  in Game 18. See the underlined predictions in Table I.

## 2.2 Experimental Procedure

We conduct 24 spatial beauty contest games (with various targets and map sizes) randomly ordered without feedback at the Social Science Experimental Laboratory (SSEL), California Institute of Technology.<sup>9</sup> In addition to recording subjects’ final choices (Figure II), we also employ Eyelink II eyetrackers (SR-research Inc.) to track the entire decision process before the final choice is made. The experiment is programmed using the Psychophysics Toolbox of Matlab (Brainard, 1997), which includes the Video Toolbox (Pelli, 1997) and the Eyelink Toolbox (Cornelissen et al., 2002). For every 4 milliseconds, the eyetracker records the location one’s eyes are looking at on the screen and one’s pupil sizes. Location accuracy is guaranteed by first calibrating subjects’ eyetracking patterns (video images and cornea reflections of the eyes) when they fixate at certain locations on the screen (typically 9 points), interpolating this calibration to all possible locations, and validating it with another set of similar locations. Since there is no hidden information in this game, the main goal of eyetracking is not to record information search. Instead, the goal is to capture how subjects carry out reasoning before making their decision and to test whether they think through the best response hierarchy implied by a literal interpretation of the level- $k$  model.

Before each game, a drift correction is performed in which subjects fixate at the center of the screen and hit a button (or space bar). This realigns the calibration at the center of the screen. During each game, when subjects use their eyes to fixate at a location, the eyetracker sends the current location back to the display computer, and the display computer lights up the location (real time) in red (as Figure II shows). Seeing this red location, if subjects decide to choose that location, they could hit the space bar. Subjects are then asked to confirm their choices (“Are you sure?”). They then have a chance to confirm their choice (“YES”) by looking at the bottom left corner of the screen, or restart the process (“NO”) by looking at the bottom right corner of the screen.

In each session, two undergraduate or graduate students at Caltech were recruited through the SSEL website to be eyetracked. Since there was no feedback, each subject was eyetracked in a separate room individually and their results were matched with the other subject at end of the experiment. Three trials were randomly drawn from the 48 trials played to be paid. Average payment is US\$15.24 plus a show-up fee of US\$20. A sample of the instructions can be found at the end of the Supplementary Appendix. Due to insufficient showup of eligible subjects, three sessions were conducted with only one subject eyetracked, and their results matched with a subject from a different session.

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<sup>9</sup>Each game is played twice with two different presentations that are mathematically identical. Since the results are similar, we focus on the presentation shown in Figure II that allows us to trace the decision-making process through observing the lookups. See Supplementary Appendix A5 for results of the alternative presentation.



Hence, we have eyetracking data for 17 subjects. Summary statistics of individual response time are reported in Supplementary Table 7.

### 3 Lookup Summary Statistics

We first summarize subjects’ lookups to test Hypothesis 2a, namely, subjects do look at and count on the grid map during their reasoning process.

We present aggregate data regarding empirical lookups for all 24 Spatial Beauty Contest games in Supplementary Figures 1 through 24. For each game, we calculate the percentage of time a subject spent on each location. The radius of the circle is proportional to the average percentage of time spent on each location, so bigger circles indicate longer time spent. The level- $k$  choice predictions are labeled as L0, L1, L2, L3, E for each game.

Consistent with Hypothesis 2a, subjects indeed spend more time at locations corresponding to the thinking steps of a particular best response hierarchy, so the empirical lookups concentrate on locations predicted by the level- $k$  best response hierarchy.<sup>10</sup> However, there seems to be a lot of noise in the lookup data: Many locations *other than* those specified in the best response hierarchy are also looked up.

We attempt to quantify this concentration of attention game-by-game. First, we define *Hit* area for every level- $k$  type as the minimal convex set enveloping the locations predicted by this level- $k$  type’s best response hierarchy in game  $n$ . Figure III shows an example of *Hit* areas for various level- $k$  types in a  $7 \times 7$  spatial beauty contest game with target  $(4, -2)$  and the opponent’s target  $(-2, 4)$  (Game 16). An  $L2$  player 1 has a best response hierarchy consisting of locations O,  $\mathbf{L1}_2$ ,  $\mathbf{L2}_1$ . Thus we can construct a minimal convex set enveloping these three locations (the dash line area in Figure III). For each game, we then take the union of *Hit* areas of all level- $k$  types and see if aggregate lookups of all subjects are indeed within the union.<sup>11</sup>

We define the empirical percentage of time spent on an area as hit time, denoted as  $h_t$ . Figure IV shows the hit time on the union of *Hit* areas for various level- $k$  types. Across the 24 games, average hit time is 0.63, ranging from  $h_t = 0.81$  (in Game 10), to  $h_t = 0.43$

<sup>10</sup>However, not all locations are looked up. This is likely because the error structure of high speed video-based eyetracking is very different from the error structure of mouse-tracking (such as Mouselab). In particular, eyetrackers have imprecise spatial resolution due to imperfect calibration and peripheral vision, but little temporal error (usually 250 or more samples per second). In contrast, mouse-tracking has very precise spatial resolution for cursor locations and mouse clicks, but movements of the mouse cursor need not correspond to movements of the eye. Hybrid methods are a promising direction for future research.

<sup>11</sup>We consider the union of *Hit* areas to incorporate all level- $k$  types since lookup patterns are reported at the population level. We later conduct more detailed analyses at the individual level (Section 4) and trial-by-trial (Section 6).

(in Game 22). In fact, sometimes subjects have hit time nearly 1. For example, Figure V shows the lookups of subject 2 in round 14, acting as a Member B. The diameter of each fixation circle is proportional to the length of each lookup. Note that these circles fall almost exclusively on the best response hierarchy of an  $L2$ , which is exactly her level- $k$  type (based on lookups) according to the fifth column of Table II. In contrast, Figure VI shows noisier lookups of an  $L3$  type (subject 1) in trial 8 acting as member A.

However, hit time depends on the size of the area we study. Even if subjects scan over the grid map uniformly, hit time would not be zero. Instead, it would be proportional to the size percentage of the area. Hence we define the size percentage of an area as hit area size, denoted as  $h_{as}$ . To correct for the contribution of hit area size, we calculate the difference between hit time and hit area size,  $h_t - h_{as}$ , and report it as the *LookupScore* in Figure VII. Note that this is essentially Selten (1991)’s linear “difference measure of predicted success.” In fact, if subjects scan randomly over the grid map, her *LookupScore* for any area is expected to be zero, since the percentage of time she spends on an area will roughly equal the hit area size of that area. By subtracting the hit area size, we can evaluate how high hit time is compared with random scanning over the grid map. These measures are all positive (except for Game 22), strongly rejecting the null hypothesis of random lookups. The  $p$ -value of one sample t-test is 0.0001, suggesting that subjects indeed spend a disproportionately long time on the union of *Hit* areas for various level- $k$  types.

To sum up, the aggregate result is largely consistent with Hypothesis 2a that subjects look at locations of the level- $k$  best response hierarchy longer than random scanning would imply, although the data is noisy. We next turn to test Hypothesis 2b and consider whether individual lookup data can be used to classify subjects into various level- $k$  types.

## 4 Markov-Switching Level- $k$ Reasoning

We now analyze subjects’ lookups with a constrained Markov-switching model to classify them into various level- $k$  types to test Hypothesis 2b. As a part of the estimation, we employ Vuong’s test for non-nested but overlapping models to ensure separation between competing types. We summarize the estimation method here and provide the details in Appendix A3.

We define *each stage of the reasoning process* as a *state*. The states are in the mind of a subject. If she is a level-2, there are three states according to the best response hierarchy of reasoning. For example, in Game 16 shown in Figure I, the three states are  $s = 0$  (she thinks her opponent thinks she is a level-0),  $s = -1$  (she thinks her opponent is a level-1), and  $s = 2$  (she is a level-2). Note that to distinguish a state regarding beliefs

about self from beliefs about the opponent, if a state is about the opponent, we indicate it by a minus sign.<sup>12</sup>

To account for the transitions of states within a subject’s mind, we employ a Markov-switching model by Hamilton (1989) and characterize the transition using a Markov transition matrix. Instead of requiring a level- $k$  subject to “strictly” obey a monotonic order of level- $k$  thinking going from lower states to higher states, we allow subjects to move back from higher states to lower states. However, since a level- $k$  player best responds to a level- $(k - 1)$  opponent, it is difficult to imagine a subject directly jumping from the reasoning state of say  $s = (k - 2)$  to that of  $s = k$  without first going through the reasoning state of  $s = -(k - 1)$ . Thus, we restrict the probabilities for all transitions that involve a jump to higher states to be zero.<sup>13</sup>

When a subject is in a particular state, her reasoning will be reflected in the lookups which we can track. We now describe this mapping between the particular state a subject is in and her lookup. For instance, if a level-2 player with target  $(4, -2)$  in Game 16 (player 1 as shown in Figure I) is at state  $s = 0$  at a point of time, her state-to-lookup mapping would give us the location  $(0, 0)$  which a level-0 player would choose (O in Figure I) since at this particular point of time, she is thinking about what her opponent thinks she would choose as a level-0. Similarly, if a level-2 player is in state  $-1$ , the mapping would give us the location  $(-2, 3)$  which a level-1 opponent would choose (**L1**<sub>2</sub> in Figure I) since at this particular point of time, she is thinking about what her opponent would choose as a level-1. Finally, if a level-2 player 1 is in state 2, then the mapping would give us the location  $(2, 1)$  which a level-2 subject would choose (**L2**<sub>1</sub> in Figure I) since at this particular point of time, she is thinking about her choice as a level-2.

Suppose a level-2 player is inferred to be in state  $s = -1$  thinking about what her opponent as a level-1 would choose, then by the state-to-lookup mapping, her lookup should fall exactly on the location  $(-2, 3)$ , or the location a level-1 opponent would choose. If her lookup is not on that location, we interpret this as an error. We assume a logistic distribution of error so that looking at locations farther away from  $(-2, 3)$  is less likely.

To summarize, for each level  $k$ , we estimate a state transition matrix and a precision parameter for the logistic distribution of error. Thus for a given initial distribution of

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<sup>12</sup>We hasten to point out that these states are in the mind of a subject. It is not the level of a player. Take a level-2 subject as an example. Her level, according to the level- $k$  model, is 2. But there are three states,  $s = 0$ ,  $s = -1$ , and  $s = 2$ , in her mind. Which state she is in depends on what she is currently reasoning about. A level-2 subject could be at state  $s = -1$  because at that point of time, she is thinking about what her opponent would choose, who is a level-1 according to the best response hierarchy. However, this state  $s = -1$  is not to be confused with a level-1 subject (whose  $k = 1$  and states of thinking consist of  $s = -0$  and  $s = 1$ ).

<sup>13</sup>Estimation results without such restrictions are similar to the results presented below and are provided in Supplementary Table 3: 12 of the 17 subjects are classified as the same level- $k$  lookup type. The remaining five subjects (3, 6, 14, 15, 17) all feature in Appendix A6.

the states, we know the probability distribution of states at any point of time using the state transition matrix. Moreover, at any point of time, the mapping from the state to the lookup gives us the lookup location corresponding to any state when there is no error. Coupled with the error structure, we can calculate the probability distribution of various errors and therefore the distribution of predicted lookup locations. We then maximize the likelihood to explain the entire observed sequence of lookups. We do this for various level- $k$  types. The final step is to select the  $k$  in various level- $k$  types to best explain the observed sequence of lookups for each subject.

The above econometric model may be plagued by an overfitting problem since higher level- $k$  types have more states and hence more parameters. It is not surprising if one discovers that models with more parameters fit better.<sup>14</sup> Hence, we need to make sure our estimation does not select higher levels merely because it contains more states and more parameters. However, usual tests for model restrictions may not apply, since the parameters involved in different level- $k$  types could be non-nested. In particular, the state space of a level-2 subject  $\{0, -1, 2\}$  and the states of a level-1 subject  $\{0, 1\}$  are not nested. Yet, the state space of a level-1 type,  $\{0, 1\}$ , is nested in the state space of a level-3 type,  $\{0, 1, -2, 3\}$ . In order to evaluate the classification, we use Vuong’s test for non-nested but overlapping models (Vuong, 1989).<sup>15</sup>

Let  $Lk^*$  be the type which has the largest likelihood based on lookups. Let  $Lk^a$  be an alternative type having the next largest likelihood among all lower level types based on lookups.<sup>16</sup> If according to Vuong’s test,  $Lk^*$  is a better model than  $Lk^a$ , we can be assured that the maximum likelihood criterion does not pick up the reported type by mere chance. Thus, we conclude that the lookup-based type is  $Lk^*$ . If instead we find that according to Vuong’s test,  $Lk^*$  and  $Lk^a$  are equally good, then we conservatively classify the subject as the second largest lower type  $Lk^a$ .

Table II shows the results of maximum likelihood estimation and Vuong’s test for each subject. For each subject, we list her  $Lk^*$  type, her  $Lk^a$  type, her Vuong’s test statistic, and her lookup-based type according to Vuong’s test in order. Six of the seventeen subjects (subjects 1, 5, 6, 8, 11, 13) pass Vuong’s test and have their lookup-based type

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<sup>14</sup>In particular, the Markov-switching model for level- $k$  has  $(k + 1)$  states with a  $(k + 1) \times (k + 1)$  transition matrix. This gives the model  $\frac{k(k+3)}{2}$  parameters in the transition matrix alone: Since each row sums up to one and elements with the column index greater than the row index plus one are zero, we have in total  $(k + 1)(k + 1) - (k + 1) - k(k - 1)/2 = k(k + 3)/2$  parameters. For example, a level-2 subject has 3 states and 5 parameters, but a level-1 subject has only 2 states and 2 parameters.

<sup>15</sup>See Supplementary Appendix A4 for the details of Vuong’s test for non-nested but overlapping models. Note that this is the generalized version of the well-known “nested” Vuong’s test.

<sup>16</sup>Recall that the reason why we look at Vuong’s test is to avoid overfitting. Hence, if the alternative type has a larger transition matrix (more parameters) but a lower likelihood, there is no point to perform a test, since  $Lk^*$  has fewer parameters but a higher likelihood. This leads us to consider only lower level types as the alternative type.

as  $Lk^*$ . The remaining eleven subjects are conservatively classified as  $Lk^a$ . The overall results are summarized in column (A) of Table III. After employing Vuong’s test, the type distribution for  $(L0, L1, L2, L3, EQ)$  is  $(1, 6, 4, 4, 2)$ . The distribution is slightly higher than typical type distributions reported in previous studies. In particular, there are two  $EQ$ ’s and four  $L3$ ’s, accounting for more than one third of the data. Treating the  $EQ$  type as having a thinking step of 4, we find that the average number of thinking steps is 2.00, in line with results of the standard  $p$ -beauty contest games using Caltech subjects, but higher than normal subjects.<sup>17</sup> Neither employing Hansen (1992)’s test (to avoid nuisance parameter problems), nor iteratively applying Vuong’s test (until the likelihood of the current type is significantly higher than that of the next alternative) alters the distribution of level- $k$  types by much (see Supplementary Appendix A4 and Supplementary Table 2).

Up to now, we have shown that lookups do fall on the hotspots of the best response hierarchy (Hypothesis 2a). Classifying subjects based on lookups (Hypothesis 2b) gives us a reasonable level of sophistication as argued above. However, one might still wonder whether the results reported in Table II are merely a misspecification, as many assumptions are required for Hypothesis 2b to hold. In the next section, we take up this issue by matching subject lookup results with their final choices. Our argument is that if we take the level- $k$  theory literally to interpret the underlying reasoning process, the classification based on lookups should match well with the classification using final choices since the level  $k$  reflects a player’s sophistication.

## 5 Matching Up with Final Choices

Following the literature, we classify individual subjects into various level- $k$  types based on final choices. Supplementary Appendix A5 provides details of maximum likelihood estimation. The classification results are reported in the third column of Table IV, and the aggregate distribution of types are reported in column (B) of Table III. In Table III, the choice-based and lookup-based classification results look similar. The choice results indicate slightly more steps of reasoning (2.12 for choice-based types instead of 2.00 for lookup-based types). To examine whether there are clusters of subjects whose choices resemble each other’s and thus predict other’s choices in the cluster better than the pre-specified level- $k$  types, we conduct the pseudotype test of Costa-Gomes and Crawford

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<sup>17</sup>Camerer (1997) reports that Caltech students play an average of 21.88 in a  $p$ -beauty contest game with  $p = 0.7$ . This is between  $L2$ ’s choice of 24.5 and  $L3$ ’s choice of 17.15. Higher than typical distributions could also result from the spatial beauty contest game being intuitive and not requiring mathematical multiplication (as compared with say, the standard  $p$ -beauty contest game), as Chou et al. (2009) show that a graphical presentation of the standard  $p$ -beauty contest game yields results closer to equilibrium.

(2006) and report the results in Supplementary Table 1(a).<sup>18</sup> We find only one cluster of pseudo-17 types, consisting of subject 3 and subject 17, indicating at most a small cluster of subjects that are not explained well by the predefined level- $k$  model.<sup>19</sup> In fact, if we consider the classification results on a subject-by-subject basis, the similarity between the two estimations are even more evident. As reported in Table IV, overall, for ten out of the seventeen subjects, their lookup-based types and the choice-based types are the same. In other words, for those subjects, when their choices reflect a particular level of sophistication, their lookup data suggests the same level of sophistication. This supports a literal interpretation of the level- $k$  model—When a subject’s choice data indicates a particular level of sophistication, her lookups suggest that the best response hierarchy of that level is carried out when she reasons.

Since the classification based on lookups and that based on choices align for more than half of the subjects, we next turn to discuss the subtle differences between them. We evaluate the robustness of individual choice-based classification by performing bootstrap (Efron, 1979; Efron and Tibshirani, 1994),<sup>20</sup> as maximum likelihood estimation may not have enough power to distinguish between various types. For example, reading from Supplementary Table 1, for subject 14, the log likelihood is  $-98.89$  for  $L0$ ,  $-84.17$  for  $L1$ ,  $-96.99$  for  $L2$ ,  $-76.67$  for  $L3$ , and  $-74.45$  for  $EQ$ . Maximum likelihood estimation classifies her as  $EQ$ , although the likelihood of  $L3$  is also close. In particular, suppose a subject is classified as a particular level- $k$  type with the logistic distribution of error parameter  $\lambda_k$  from the maximum likelihood estimation. We then draw (with replacement) 24 new trials out of the original dataset and re-estimate her  $k$  and  $\lambda_k$ . We do this 1000 times to generate the discrete distribution of  $k$  (and corresponding  $\lambda_k$ ), and evaluate the robustness of  $k$  by looking at the distribution of  $k$ . Each level- $k$  type estimated from a re-sampled dataset that is not the same as her original level- $k$  type is viewed as a “misclassification,” and counted against the original classification  $k$ . By calculating the total misclassification rate (out of 1000 re-samples), we can measure the robustness of the original classification. This bootstrap procedure is in the spirit of Salmon (2001), which evaluates the robustness of the parameters estimated in a learning model using simulated data.

The results of this bootstrap procedure are listed in Table IV. For each subject, we report the bootstrap distribution of  $k$  (the number of times a subject is classified into  $L0$ ,  $L1$ ,  $L2$ ,  $L3$  or  $EQ$  in the 1000 resampled datasets). The bootstrap misclassification rate (percentage of times classifying the subject as a type different from her original type) is

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<sup>18</sup>The idea of pseudotypes is to treat each subject’s choices as a possible type. Since we have 17 subjects, we include 17 pseudotypes, each constructed from one of our subject’s choices in 24 trials.

<sup>19</sup>The type distribution with pseudotypes is very similar and reported in Column (C) of Table III.

<sup>20</sup>Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006) use various information criteria to perform the horse-race instead.

listed in the last column. For example, subject 14 is originally classified as *EQ*, but is only re-classified as *EQ* 587 times during the bootstrap procedure. Subject 14 is instead classified as *L3* 228 times and as *L1* 185 times. Hence, the distribution on the number of times that subject 14 is classified into *L0*, *L1*, *L2*, *L3* or *EQ* in the 1000 resampled datasets is (0, 185, 0, 228, 587) and the corresponding misclassification rate is 0.413.

The bootstrap results align surprisingly well with whether the lookup-based classifications match their choice-based types. In particular, for the ten subjects whose two classifications match, all but three of them have (choice-based) bootstrap misclassification rates lower than 0.05, suggesting that their classifications are truly sharp.<sup>21</sup> In contrast, for six of the remaining seven subjects whose two classifications do not match, their choice-based type have bootstrap misclassification rates higher than 18.4%. The difference is significant, having a  $p$ -value of 0.0123 according to Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon rank sum test. There may be some reasons why the two classifications sometimes disagree and why their choices seem noisy. We attempt a more systematic analysis using lookup and choice data next.

## 6 Extracting Valuable Information From Lookups and Choices

We now address what lookups can tell us beyond final choices and whether subjects are literal constant level- $k$  players. To answer what lookups can do whereas choices cannot, we explore two possibilities. First, we narrow down a subject's level-0 belief by analyzing where she initially looks at in every game. Second, we attempt to predict the final choice of any trial using only lookups of that particular trial. Choice data of several trials can be used to predict the choice of some other trial. Yet because there is only one choice in each trial, attempting to predict the choice using only the choice within a trial is impossible. We will see how informative the within-trial lookups prior to choice are. On examining whether subjects are literal constant level- $k$  players, note that our lookups and choice classifications so far are based on three implicit assumptions. First, subjects are characterized by the level- $k$  theory. Second, they have a constant  $k$ . Third, they are literal. Hence when their lookups follow a particular level, their choices will follow that level as well. We will examine these assumptions in a more systematic way.

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<sup>21</sup>One of these three subjects (subject 17) fails the pseudotype test and is unlikely to resemble any of the level- $k$  types. The remaining two subjects (subjects 2 and 4) have misclassification rates of 0.076 and 0.110, respectively. These are marginally higher than 0.05.

## 6.1 Starting Point for Level-k Reasoning

One possibility lookups can help where final choices cannot is to narrow down level-0 belief. If a subject carries out the best response hierarchy, her initial lookup may reflect the level-0 play in her mind. To look into that, a natural way is to look at where initial lookups distribute. Since the grid map of each game is different, we need a way to summarize how initial lookups distribute over maps of different sizes. Hence for every game, we partition both dimensions of the map into three equal-sized bins. This way we divide each map into  $3 \times 3 = 9$  equal-sized areas. Most salient areas for level-0 belief arguably are the center (O) and the top-left (TL), with the latter being focal because of the reading habit in English. However, for completeness, we also include the top-center (TC), the top-right (TR), the middle-left (ML), the middle-right (MR), the bottom-left (BL), the bottom-center (BC) and the bottom-right (BR) of the map. When subjects are free to look at any place in the map, we record which area their initial lookups lie. In particular, we consider the first 1% of the time spent on the grid map and count the percentage time spent in each area. The subject-by-subject percentage distribution of the initial lookups is reported in Table V. We further illustrate the aggregate percentage distribution over all subjects in Figure VIII.

We find that O, TL, TC together account for 71% of the initial lookups. If subjects scan on the map uniformly, these three areas should account for only 1/3 of the time.<sup>22</sup> Reading from the last column of Table V, 8 out of 17 subjects have their modal initial lookups at O whereas 4 at TL and 4 have TC. This is broadly in support of using the center as the level-0 belief since indeed it is looked up most often initially. Moreover, subject 3 has her modal initial lookups at TL, in agreement with the observation that she starts her reasoning from TL reported in Appendix A6 where we outline what we find by viewing the animated videos of lookups of the entire experiment.<sup>23</sup> The three subjects (8, 11, 15) suspected to first perform reasoning regarding the horizontal dimension and then the vertical dimension in Appendix A6 have their modal initial lookups at TC. This is possible if they start reasoning near the top row of the grid map.<sup>24</sup> Finally, subject 14 is the only one whose modal initial lookups are not at O, TL or TC but at BL. However, as we point out in Appendix A6, she has very few lookups and quickly chooses a corner.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>22</sup>In fact, dividing the map even finer into  $5 \times 5$  equal-sized areas yield similar results where these three areas (out of 25) account for 37% of the initial lookups. If subjects scan on the map uniformly, these three areas should account for only 3/25 of the time. This results in a *LookupScore* of 0.27.

<sup>23</sup>Supplementary Figure 29(a) shows  $5 \times 5$  results that indicate initial lookup concentration at the top-left of subject 3.

<sup>24</sup>Supplementary Figure 29(c)-(e) report  $5 \times 5$  partition results indicating that initial lookups indeed concentrate on the top row. Interestingly,  $5 \times 5$  results for the other pseudotype (subject 17) reported in Supplementary Figure 29(b) show a mixture of initial lookups at the top row and top-left.

<sup>25</sup>Her average number of lookups on the map per trial is only 3.92 (3.69) with a maximum of 15, much smaller than the average of 23.61 (20.09) for all subjects (s.d. in parenthesis).



Her initial lookups fall on the four corner areas (TL, TR, BL, BR) quite evenly, totaling 82.6% of the time. This may reflect her quick final choices closely since choosing the corner directly does not rely on starting the reasoning process from a fixed location of the map.<sup>26</sup>

To summarize, we find evidence from initial lookups that the center area may most often be where subjects start reasoning. The top-left and the top-center may also be important but not as much as the center. Since the center and the top-left are salient, it is consistent with the importance of salience in determining level-0 belief (Burchardi and Penczynski, 2014).

## 6.2 Trial-by-Trial Lookup Estimation

Another possibility that lookups can do whereas final choices cannot is a trial-by-trial out-of-sample prediction. To this end, for each trial, we use lookups of only that trial to predict the final choice of the same trial. Relying on choice data alone cannot make such predictions because by definition each trial has only one choice data point, i.e. the choice itself, giving no further choice data to base predictions on. Appendix A7 describes in detail how we use lookups of a trial to predict the final choice of that trial (shorthand as the 1-trial lookup model).<sup>27</sup> In essence, taking the reasoning process of a level literally would imply particular locations to be looked at most often. We classify every trial of a subject into a level if her lookups of that trial are closest to a mixture of these locations, among all possible levels. Her choice of that trial is then predicted to be the choice of that classified level. In short, we classify every trial of a subject into a level based on only lookups of that trial before choice. She is then predicted to make a final choice of that level. We caution that such within-trial prediction may be noisy because we constrain ourselves to use only lookups of a single trial. However this arguably tests whether lookups contain valuable information despite of the noisiness.

We use the economic value (EV) to make judgements in the following. EV is a widely-used measure to indicate how well a model performs (for instance, see Camerer et al., 2004). It is normalized so that  $EV = 0\%$  means the model prediction leads to the same expected payoff of the actual subjects. On the other hand,  $EV = 100\%$  implies the model prediction leads to the highest possible payoff as if playing the best response. Hence EV is interpreted as percentage gain from the prediction of a model, treating actual payoffs or 0 as the baseline. Rightly because so, if the model performs worse than the actual

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<sup>26</sup>Indeed, we report exact hits for 18 out of 23 trial; the remaining trial was excluded for having only one lookup.

<sup>27</sup>Estimating the full-blown Markov switching model trial-by-trial as we did in Section 4 may not be feasible because there may be too few lookups to identify the transition matrix. See Appendix A7 for detailed explanations.

subjects, EV could be negative.<sup>28</sup>

Note that the level- $k$  theory imposes the maximal prediction power of the 1-trial lookup model. Take Figure I as an example. The level- $k$  theory predicts that player 1 chooses O,  $\mathbf{L1}_1$ ,  $\mathbf{L2}_1$ ,  $\mathbf{L3}_1$  or  $\mathbf{E}_1$  if her level is 0, 1, 2, 3 or 4 correspondingly. Accordingly, the 1-trial lookup model must eventually predict her choice to be from O,  $\mathbf{L1}_1$ ,  $\mathbf{L2}_1$ ,  $\mathbf{L3}_1$  or  $\mathbf{E}_1$ . Therefore the prediction power of the 1-trial lookup model cannot exceed that of the best-predicting level among all possible  $k$ 's. We first calculate the EV for each level  $k$  and find the maximum over all possible  $k$ 's for each trial. We do this trial-by-trial, allowing the best level to differ from trial to trial. We then average this maximum EV over all trials. This is the maximal prediction power of the level- $k$  theory with a trial-by-trial dependent level  $k$ . It is reported in column 2 of Table VI as Maximum Level- $k$  EV. Averaging over all subjects, the maximum EV imposed by the level- $k$  theory is 83.7%. This is quite a significant amount, indicating if the various best predicting level of every trial is known, payoffs can be increased substantially. The question is whether the lookups before choice can help obtain this valuable information trial-by-trial.

To evaluate performance of the 1-trial lookup model, for each trial, we divide the EV based on the prediction of the 1-trial lookup model by the maximum EV to obtain the EV ratio of that trial. This ratio reflects the fraction of possible EV realized by the 1-trial lookup model in that trial. Averaging over all trials we construct a measure of how well the 1-trial lookup model performs, compared with the upper bound imposed by the level- $k$  theory. This is reported in column 3 as 1-Trial Lookup. Averaging over all subjects, the EV ratio of the 1-trial lookup model is 0.71, roughly indicating that 0.71 of the 83.7% gain can indeed be realized by relying on the lookups of a trial to form a prediction. Hence if an opponent knows a subject's lookups of a trial before making a choice, his payoffs can be increased roughly by 60%. This supports that lookups contain valuable information for making choices optimally.

For comparison, we also look into how valuable information on choices is. Since there are 24 trials in the experiment, we conduct the leave-1-choice-out model. This assumes a stable level for every 23 trials, and relies on choices of these 23 trials to classify a subject into a level. She is then predicted to make a final choice of that level in the remaining left-out trial. This is similar to what we did in Section 5 except we do it for every 23 trials and hence 24 times. For each trial, we again divide the EV based on the prediction of the leave-1-choice-out model by the maximum EV to obtain the EV ratio of that trial.

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<sup>28</sup>Precisely,  $EV = \frac{\pi^{\text{Follow}} - \pi^{\text{Actual}}}{\pi^{\text{BR}} - \pi^{\text{Actual}}}$ . To illustrate, suppose a model predicts subject 1 to be level-3. Then  $\pi^{\text{Follow}}$  is her opponent's payoff should he follow the model prediction and best respond to level-3.  $\pi^{\text{Actual}}$  is his actual payoff.  $\pi^{\text{BR}}$  is her opponent's payoff should he best respond to subject 1's choice. Hence EV is the percentage of the gain should a model be followed, compared with the maximum possible gain implied by playing best response to subject 1's choice.

Averaging over all trials we construct a measure of how well the leave-1-choice-out model performs, compared with the upper bound imposed by the level- $k$  theory. This is reported in column 5 of Table VI as Leave-1-Choice-Out. Averaging over all subjects, the EV ratio of the leave-1-choice-out model is 0.72, similar to the EV ratio of the 1-trial lookup model. In words, this means, in terms of playing optimally, learning the lookups of a trial is as useful as learning choices of 23 trials. This is important in situations where the entire history of choices is unavailable, in which case the 1-trial lookup model would be a good substitute to make a prediction.

### 6.3 Literal Constant Level- $k$

We next turn to address whether the constant level- $k$  reasoning process is carried out literally. If a player is a literal level- $k$  whose  $k$  is constant throughout, we argue three criteria have to be met. First, the maximum EV the level- $k$  theory imposes on has to be high enough. After all, if the maximum EV is low, the level- $k$  theory does not help reaching optimal plays and some alternative theory may perform better. Second, the EV ratio of the leave-1-choice-out model has to be high as well. Since the leave-1-choice-out model assumes a stable level for every 23 trials, a low EV ratio could suggest a violation of the stability of levels, questioning the constant level assumption. Third, the EV ratio of the 1-trial lookup has to be high too. Otherwise, one may doubt whether the literal level- $k$  reasoning process is carried out before choice is made, suggesting alternative reasoning processes that might reach similar choice predictions.

We use the criteria that the maximum EV has to be at least 70% and the two EV ratios at least 0.7.<sup>29</sup> Among all 17 subjects, 11 pass the criteria. This suggests that for most subjects, we cannot reject that the literal, constant level- $k$  theory predicts optimal plays quite well, even though we cannot directly prove that they are indeed carrying out the constant level- $k$  reasoning literally. This lends support to the level- $k$  theory as coming up with a good prediction as far as EV is concerned.<sup>30</sup> Moreover, this demonstrates the lookup and choice analyses in Sections 4 and 5 are well-founded since the underlying three implicit assumptions are justified for most subjects.

The remaining 6 subjects, 14, 9, 4, 3, 7, 17 fail the criterion. We now look into why their EV or EV ratio is not as high and how lookup information may help.

Subjects 3, 7 and 17 have the lowest maximum EV. While other subjects have a maximum EV around 80% or higher, they all have maximum EV below 70%. This

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<sup>29</sup>The criteria are rather arbitrary. But results are exactly the same when using instead a rule of requiring at least two of the three criteria satisfying a higher threshold of 80% (or 0.8).

<sup>30</sup>In Appendix A6, we find subjects 1 and 10 as textbook literal level- $k$  types. Indeed, their precision parameter  $\lambda$  has a median of 8.58 and 9.00, which is extremely large for logistic distribution of errors, compared with the rest who at most has a median of 2.35. See column 4 of Table VI.

indicates they likely do not follow the level- $k$  model some way or the other. In fact, the pseudotype test of Section 5 reveals that subject 3 and 17 are pseudotypes to each other, and subject 7 is classified as level-0, or close to random, both suggesting that the level- $k$  theory may not work well for them. From the analysis on the initial lookups in Section 6.1 and watching the raw videos in Appendix A6, we have good reasons to conjecture that they might follow level- $k$  reasoning with the alternative starting point of the top-left corner instead of the center.<sup>31</sup> We thus expand the level- $k$  model by adding alternative types which start the reasoning process from the top-left corner. If we classify every trial of a subject into a level of this expanded set based on only lookups of that trial, the EV ratios of the 1-trial lookup model in column 3 of Table VI are substantially increased from -0.08 to 2.36 for subject 3, from 0.74 to 0.98 for subject 7 and from 0.94 to 1.33 for subject 17. The fact that the EV ratio is higher than 1 for subjects 3 and 17 implies that allowing the reasoning process from the top-left corner makes the 1-trial lookup model even more informative than the maximum level- $k$  model. We thus are more confident that subjects 3 and 17 might have started their reasoning process from the top-left corner as this makes their lookups become so informative presumably because starting from the top-left corner fits their lookups well.<sup>32</sup>

Subjects 9 and 4 have maximum EV around 80%, but especially low EV ratios (0.47 and 0.36 respectively) for the leave-1-choice-out model. This suggests that we may question the stability of a fixed level for them. As we find in Appendix A6, subject 9 initially behaves like level-2, but eventually has very few lookups (indicating not reasoning) and chooses the center as level-0 in the later trials. Subject 4 seems to jump around initially, but eventually settles down as level-1 and hits the level-1 choice perfectly in the last 8 trials. Hence the stability of levels may indeed be questionable for them. Relying on their lookups instead, their 1-trial lookup model has somewhat higher EV ratios (0.71 for subject 9 and 0.57 for subject 4) presumably because the 1-trial lookup model does not assume a fixed level. Hence the trade-offs of relying on 1-trial lookup model for these subjects are that within-trial predictions by lookups potentially could be noisy yet the noisy prediction trial-by-trial has the flexibility to better predict them whose levels are not constant.

Subject 14 has a maximum EV of 87.1%, but a low EV ratio of 0.30 for the 1-trial lookup model. This suggests that she likely does not follow level- $k$  reasoning literally. As we indicate in Section 6.1, subject 14 has very few lookups and seems to jump straight to

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<sup>31</sup>Subjects 3 and 7 have their modal initial lookups at TL according to Table V. Subject 17, though having her modal initial lookups at TC, has a substantial percentage (38%) of her initial lookups at TL.

<sup>32</sup>In Appendix A6, subjects 3 and 17 are indeed classified as level-1 starting start reasoning from the top-left corner when performing choice-based classification including possible level- $k$  types that start reasoning from the top-left corner. See Supplementary Table 6.

a corner. We believe she follows the corner heuristics by choosing the equilibrium corner in easy games, but the corner in the direction of her goals in hard games. In fact, if we include this particular corner heuristic, her EV ratio is significantly improved from 0.30 to 1.29. Hence for this subject, the low EV ratio of the 1-trial lookup model helps indicate she might perform an alternative reasoning process to arrive at the same choice.

Overall, in terms of EV, for 11 subjects, we find support that the literal, constant level- $k$  theory predicts optimal plays quite well. This echoes our finding in Section 5 that subjects' lookup-based types and their choice-based types are quite consistent. For the remaining subjects, lookup information can help us confirm the conjecture whether they start the reasoning process instead from the top-left corner (for subjects 3 and 17), they might not have a stable level (subjects 9 and 4) or they may not go through the best response hierarchy literally (subject 14).

## 7 Conclusion

We introduce a spatial beauty contest game in which the process of reasoning can be tracked, and provide theoretical predictions and a procedural interpretation of the level- $k$  theory. The procedural interpretation yields a plausible hypothesis on the decision-making process. We then conduct laboratory experiments using video-based eyetracking technology to test this conjecture, and fit the eyetracking data on lookups using a constrained Markov-switching model of level- $k$  reasoning. Results show that based on lookups, experimental subjects' lookup sequences could be classified into following various level- $k$  best response hierarchies, which for more than a half of them coincide with levels that they were classified into using final choices. Finally, initial lookup data and trial-by-trial lookup estimation indicate that most subjects indeed follow the constant level- $k$  reasoning literally on the grid map starting from the center. In fact, lookups of a trial contain valuable information to predict the choice of that same trial well.

Analyzing reasoning processes is a hard task. The spatial beauty contest game is designed to fully exploit the structure of the  $p$ -beauty contest so that subjects are induced to literally count on the grid map to carry out their reasoning as implied by the best response hierarchy of a level- $k$  theory. The high percentage of subjects whose classifications based on lookups and those based on choices align could be read as a support to the level- $k$  model as a complete theory of reasoning and choice altogether in the spatial beauty contest game. Whether this holds true for more general games remains to be seen. Nevertheless, the paper adds on the literature and points out a possibility of analyzing reasoning before arriving at choices. To best utilize the procedural data, a design which suits the tracking technology used is indispensable.

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## Figures and Tables

3		<b>L1<sub>2</sub></b>		<b>L3<sub>2</sub></b>	<b>E<sub>2</sub></b>		
2					<b>L2<sub>2</sub></b>		
1						<b>L2<sub>1</sub></b>	<b>E<sub>1</sub></b>
0				O			<b>L3<sub>1</sub></b>
-1							
-2							<b>L1<sub>1</sub></b>
-3							
	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3

Figure I: Equilibrium and Level- $k$  Predictions of a 7x7 Spatial Beauty Contest Game with Targets (4, -2) and (-2, 4) (Game 16). Predictions specifically for player 1 with Target (4,-2) are  $\mathbf{L1}_1 \sim \mathbf{E}_1$ , and predictions for player 2 with Target (-2,4) are  $\mathbf{L1}_2 \sim \mathbf{E}_2$ . O stands for the prediction of  $L0$  for both players. Note that  $\mathbf{Lk}_1$  and  $\mathbf{Lk}_2$  are the best responses to  $\mathbf{L(k-1)}_2$  and  $\mathbf{L(k-1)}_1$ , respectively. For example,  $\mathbf{L2}_2$ 's choice (1,2) is the best response to  $\mathbf{L1}_1$  since  $(3,-2) + (-2, 4) = (1, 2)$ .

Figure II: Screen Shot of the Experiment







Figure III: *Hit* Areas for Various Level- $k$  Types in Game 16 (7x7 with Target (4, -2) and the Opponent Target (-2, 4)). *Hit* area is the minimal convex set enveloping the locations predicted by each level- $k$  type's best response hierarchy.



Note: If we refer to Figure 1, for player 1, the *Hit* Area for level-1 is the minimal convex set enveloping the locations (O, L1<sub>1</sub>). The *Hit* Area for level-2 is the minimal convex set enveloping the locations (O, L1<sub>2</sub>, L2<sub>1</sub>), and so on.

Figure IV: Aggregate Empirical Percentage of Time Spent on the Union of *Hit* Areas (“Hit Time”) in Each Game




Figure V: Subject 2's Eye Lookups in Trial 14 (as a Member B). The radius of the circle is proportional to the length of that lookup, so bigger circles indicate longer time spent.




Figure VI: Subject 1's Eye Lookups in Trial 8 (as a Member A). The radius of the circle is proportional to the length of that lookup, so bigger circles indicate longer time spent.



Figure VII: Aggregate Linear Difference Measure (*LookupScores*) of Predicted Success in Each Game. It measures the difference between hit time and the hit area size.




Figure VIII: Aggregate Distribution of Initial Lookups (1% Time on Map, All Subjects)




Table I: Level- $k$ , Equilibrium Predictions and Minimum  $\bar{k}$ 's in All Games

Game	Map size	Player 1 target	Player 2 target	$L0$	$L1$	$L2$	$L3$	$EQ$	$\bar{k}$
1	$9 \times 9$	-2, 0	0, -4	0, 0	-2, 0	-2, -4	<u>-4, -4</u>	<u>-4, -4</u>	3
2	$9 \times 9$	0, -4	-2, 0	0, 0	0, -4	<u>-2, -4</u>	<u>-2, -4</u>	-4, -4	4
3	$7 \times 7$	2, 0	0, -2	0, 0	2, 0	2, -2	3, -2	3, -3	4
4	$7 \times 7$	0, -2	2, 0	0, 0	0, -2	2, -2	2, -3	3, -3	4
5	$11 \times 5$	2, 0	0, 2	0, 0	2, 0	2, 2	4, 2	5, 2	5
6	$11 \times 5$	0, 2	2, 0	0, 0	0, 2	<u>2, 2</u>	<u>2, 2</u>	5, 2	6
7	$9 \times 7$	-2, 0	0, -2	0, 0	-2, 0	-2, -2	-4, -2	-4, -3	4
8	$9 \times 7$	0, -2	-2, 0	0, 0	0, -2	-2, -2	-2, -3	-4, -3	4
9	$7 \times 9$	-4, 0	0, 2	0, 0	-3, 0	<u>-3, 2</u>	<u>-3, 2</u>	-3, 4	4
10	$7 \times 9$	0, 2	-4, 0	0, 0	0, 2	-3, 2	<u>-3, 4</u>	<u>-3, 4</u>	3
11	$7 \times 9$	2, 0	0, 2	0, 0	2, 0	2, 2	3, 2	3, 4	5
12	$7 \times 9$	0, 2	2, 0	0, 0	0, 2	2, 2	2, 4	3, 4	5
13	$9 \times 9$	-2, -6	4, 4	0, 0	-2, -4	2, -2	0, -4	2, -4	4
14	$9 \times 9$	4, 4	-2, -6	0, 0	4, 4	2, 0	4, 2	4, 0	4
15	$7 \times 7$	-2, 4	4, -2	0, 0	-2, 3	1, 2	0, 3	1, 3	4
16	$7 \times 7$	4, -2	-2, 4	0, 0	3, -2	2, 1	3, 0	3, 1	4
17	$11 \times 5$	6, 2	-2, -4	0, 0	5, 2	4, 0	<u>5, 0</u>	<u>5, 0</u>	3
18	$11 \times 5$	-2, -4	6, 2	0, 0	-2, -2	<u>3, -2</u>	2, -2	<u>3, -2</u>	4
19	$9 \times 7$	-6, -2	4, 4	0, 0	-4, -2	-2, 1	-4, 0	-4, 1	4
20	$9 \times 7$	4, 4	-6, -2	0, 0	4, 3	0, 2	2, 3	0, 3	4
21	$7 \times 9$	-2, -4	4, 2	0, 0	-2, -4	1, -2	0, -4	1, -4	4
22	$7 \times 9$	4, 2	-2, -4	0, 0	3, 2	2, -2	3, 0	3, -2	4
23	$7 \times 9$	-2, 6	4, -4	0, 0	-2, 4	1, 2	0, 4	1, 4	4
24	$7 \times 9$	4, -4	-2, 6	0, 0	3, -4	2, 0	3, -2	3, 0	4

Note: Each row corresponds to a game and contains the following information in order: (1) the game number, (2) the size of the grid map for that game, (3) the target of player 1, (4) the target of player 2, (5) the theoretic prediction of  $L0$  for player 1, (6) the theoretic prediction of  $L1$  for player 1, (7) the theoretic prediction of  $L2$  for player 1, (8) the theoretic prediction of  $L3$  for player 1, (9) the theoretic prediction of  $EQ$  for player 1, and (10) the minimum  $\bar{k}$  for player 1 such that as long as the level is weakly higher, the choice of that type is the same as the choice of  $EQ$ . We underline the predictions of different levels if they coincide.

Table II: Level- $k$  Types Based on Lookup Data

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
subject	$Lk^*$	$Lk^a$	Vuong's $V$	$LK'$
1	L3	L2	4.425 +	<b>L3</b>
2	L3	L2	0.689	<b>L2</b>
3	L3	L1	1.577	L1
4	L3	L1	1.597	<b>L1</b>
5	EQ	L2	2.977 +	<b>EQ</b>
6	EQ	L2	2.400 +	EQ
7	L2	L0	1.582	<b>L0</b>
8	L3	L1	2.812 +	L3
9	EQ	L2	1.001	L2
10	L3	L1	1.226	<b>L1</b>
11	L3	L2	2.087 +	L3
12	L3	L1	0.853	<b>L1</b>
13	L3	L1	3.939 +	<b>L3</b>
14	L3	L1	1.692	L1
15	L3	L2	1.470	L2
16	L3	L2	1.342	<b>L2</b>
17	L3	L1	1.778	<b>L1</b>

Note: + indicates Vuong's statistic  $V$  is significant or  $|V| > 1.96$ . ( $Lk^*$  denotes the type with the largest likelihood;  $Lk^a$  denotes the alternative lower level type which has the next-largest likelihood;  $LK'$  denotes the classified type based on Vuong's test;  $Lk^c$  denotes level- $k$  type based on final choices alone.)

Each row corresponds to a subject and contains the following information in order: (1) the subject number, (2) based on her lookups, the type with the largest likelihood, (3) based on her lookups, the alternative lower level type which has the next-largest likelihood, (4) Vuong's statistic in testing whether  $Lk^*$  and  $Lk^a$  are equally good models, (5) subject's lookup type based on Vuong's test result, (Notice that in (5) we classify a subject as her  $Lk^*$  type if according to Vuong's test,  $Lk^*$  is a better model than  $Lk^a$ . If  $Lk^*$  and  $Lk^a$  are equally good, since  $Lk^a$  has fewer parameters, to avoid overfitting, we classify a subject as her  $Lk^a$  type. The result in (5) is summarized in column (A) of Table III.) .

Table III: Distribution of Types under Various Specifications

	(A) Lookup-based with Vuong's test	(B) Choice-based without Pseudotypes	(C) Choice-based with Pseudotypes
<i>L0</i>	1	2	2
<i>L1</i>	6	4	3
<i>L2</i>	4	4	4
<i>L3</i>	4	4	3
<i>Equilibrium</i>	2	3	3
<i>Pseudo-17</i>	-	-	2
<i>Aver. step</i>	2.00	2.12	2.13

Note: In each row we list the number of subjects of that particular type based on various classifications. In the bottom row we list the average of thinking steps. We consider three ways to classify subjects. The first classification, reported in column (A), is based on the lookup data and we classify subjects to the type with the largest likelihood if according to Vuong's test, this type is a better model than the type with the next largest likelihood among all lower level types (and to the type with the next largest likelihood among all lower level types otherwise). The second classification, reported in column (B), uses the choice data in which pseudotypes are not included. The third classification, reported in column (C), also uses the choice data but in addition, pseudotypes are included.

Table IV: Distribution of Types in 1000 Bootstraps of Final Choice Data

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
subject	$LK'$	$LK^c$	L0	L1	L2	L3	EQ	bootstrap miss rate
1	<b>L3</b>	<b>L3</b>	0	0	0	<u>1000</u>	0	0.000*
2	<b>L2</b>	<b>L2</b>	1	0	<u>924</u>	75	0	0.076
3	L1	L3	0	<u>233</u>	1	756	10	0.244
4	<b>L1</b>	<b>L1</b>	63	<u>890</u>	11	36	0	0.110
5	<b>EQ</b>	<b>EQ</b>	0	0	1	11	<u>988</u>	0.012*
6	EQ	L2	0	3	764	5	<u>228</u>	0.236
7	<b>L0</b>	<b>L0</b>	<u>966</u>	0	12	17	5	0.034*
8	L3	EQ	0	0	0	<u>0</u>	1000	0.000*
9	L2	L0	528	3	<u>440</u>	4	25	0.472
10	<b>L1</b>	<b>L1</b>	0	<u>1000</u>	0	0	0	0.000*
11	L3	L2	0	0	635	<u>363</u>	2	0.365
12	<b>L1</b>	<b>L1</b>	0	<u>990</u>	6	4	0	0.010*
13	<b>L3</b>	<b>L3</b>	0	1	3	<u>996</u>	0	0.004*
14	L1	EQ	0	<u>185</u>	0	228	587	0.413
15	L2	L3	0	9	<u>165</u>	816	10	0.184
16	<b>L2</b>	<b>L2</b>	0	0	<u>1000</u>	0	0	0.000*
17	<b>L1</b>	<b>L1</b>	0	<u>768</u>	1	231	0	0.232

Note: \* indicates misclassification rate less than 0.05. ( $LK'$  denotes the classified type based on lookup data;  $LK^c$  denotes level- $k$  type based on final choices alone.) 10 pairs of **boldfaced** level- $k$  types in columns (2)-(3) indicate agreement between the two. Underlined numbers in columns (4)-(8) indicate each subject's lookup-based type. Notice that they are typically the second most frequent types subjects are classified into (if not the most frequent) if we resample their choices. The only exception is subject 14.

Each row corresponds to a subject and contains the following information in order: (1) the subject number, (2) subject's lookup type based on her lookups, (3) her choice-based level- $k$  type denoted by  $LK^c$ , (4)-(8) the number of times that she is classified as an  $L0/L1/L2/L3/EQ$  in 1000 times of bootstrapping her choice data, (9) the bootstrap misclassification rate, i.e., the ratio that she is not classified as her original choice-based type ( $LK^c$ ).

Table V: Lookups Distribution For Initial 1% Time Spent on Grid Map (3x3 Partition)

Subject	TL	TC	TR	ML	O	MR	BL	BC	BR	Mode
1	-	0.08	0.08	0.04	<u>0.79</u>	-	-	-	-	O
2	-	0.23	-	-	<u>0.77</u>	-	-	-	-	O
3	<u>0.62</u>	0.25	-	0.13	0.01	-	-	-	-	TL
4	<u>0.38</u>	0.04	0.13	0.25	0.08	0.04	0.08	-	-	TL
5	0.18	0.17	0.19	0.08	<u>0.19</u>	0.15	-	0.04	-	O
6	0.04	0.13	0.06	0.08	<u>0.58</u>	0.06	0.04	-	-	O
7	<u>0.38</u>	0.13	0.04	0.13	0.33	-	-	-	-	TL
8	0.21	<u>0.44</u>	0.17	-	0.06	-	0.08	-	0.04	TC
9	0.13	0.04	-	0.17	<u>0.54</u>	0.04	-	-	0.08	O
10	0.14	0.13	-	0.08	<u>0.65</u>	-	-	-	-	O
11	0.18	<u>0.41</u>	0.29	0.12	-	-	-	-	-	TC
12	0.04	0.21	0.13	0.21	<u>0.38</u>	0.04	-	-	-	O
13	<u>0.21</u>	0.17	0.08	0.08	0.14	0.20	0.04	0.08	-	TL
14	0.13	0.04	0.26	0.04	-	0.09	<u>0.30</u>	-	0.13	BL
15	0.27	<u>0.40</u>	0.33	-	-	-	-	-	-	TC
16	0.04	0.25	0.04	-	<u>0.67</u>	-	-	-	-	O
17	0.38	<u>0.54</u>	0.08	-	0.00	-	-	-	-	TC
Overall	0.19	0.22	0.11	0.08	0.31	0.04	0.03	0.01	0.01	

Note: We underline where the modal initial lookups lie for each subject. This is further summarized in the last column.



Table VI: Average Ratio of Economic Value for Competing Models

Subject	Maximum Level-k EV	1-Trial Lookup	(Median $\lambda$ )	Leave-1-Choice-Out
16	96.6%	0.75	(1.53)	0.96†
1	96.4%	0.89†	<b>(8.58)</b>	0.95†
8	94.7%	0.82†	(1.34)	0.86†
11	94.3%	0.79	(2.35)	0.93†
6	92.9%	0.83†	(1.94)	0.95†
5	89.5%	0.79	(0.98)	0.83†
10	87.2%	0.84†	<b>(9.00)</b>	1.00†
14	87.1%	0.30	(0.78)	0.72
12	84.1%	0.82†	(1.63)	0.77
2	83.1%	0.74	(1.39)	0.81†
15	82.9%	0.82†	(1.22)	0.75
13	82.6%	0.83†	(2.01)	0.70
9	81.7%	0.71	(1.70)	0.47
4	79.3%	0.57	(1.26)	0.36
3	68.0%	-0.08	(0.47)	0.09
7	63.1%	0.74	(0.86)	0.92†
17	59.0%	0.94†	(0.61)	0.15
Overall	83.7%	0.71	2.21	0.72

Note:  $\lambda$  estimated by minimizing the absolute difference between duration heat map and level-k path with logit-error. † indicates model yields average EV ratio of 0.80 or higher.

# Supplementary Appendix [For Online Reference Only]

## A1 Equilibrium of the Spatial Beauty Contest Game

We derive the equilibrium predictions for the general case as follows. Formally, consider a spatial beauty contest game with targets  $(a_1, b_1)$  and  $(a_2, b_2)$  where  $a_i, b_i$  are integers. With some abuse of notation, suppose player  $i$  chooses location  $(x_i, y_i)$  on a map  $G$  satisfying  $(x_i, y_i) \in G \equiv \{-X, -X + 1, \dots, X\} \times \{-Y, -Y + 1, \dots, Y\}$  where  $|a_i| \leq 2X$ ,  $|b_i| \leq 2Y$ . Here,  $(0, 0)$  is the center of the map.  $X$  is the rightmost column a player can go and  $Y$  is the topmost row a player can go. For instance,  $(x_i, y_i) = (X, Y)$  means player  $i$  chooses the Top-Right corner of the map. The other player  $-i$  also chooses a location  $(x_{-i}, y_{-i})$  on the same map:  $(x_{-i}, y_{-i}) \in G$ . The payoff to player  $i$  in this game is:

$$p_i(x_i, y_i; x_{-i}, y_{-i}; a_i, b_i) = \bar{s} - (|x_i - (x_{-i} + a_i)| + |y_i - (y_{-i} + b_i)|)$$

where  $\bar{s}$  is a constant. Notice that payoffs are decreasing in the number of steps a player is away from her target, which in turn depend on the choice of the other player. There is no interaction between the choices of  $x_i$  and  $y_i$ . Hence the maximization can be obtained by choosing  $x_i$  and  $y_i$  separately to minimize the two absolute value terms. We thus consider the case for  $x_i$  only. The case for  $y_i$  is analogous.

To ensure uniqueness, in all our experimental trials,  $a_1 + a_2 \neq 0$ . Without loss of generality, we assume that  $a_1 + a_2 < 0$  so that the overall trend is to move leftward.<sup>1</sup> Since the overall trend is to move leftward, at least one player has to move leftward. Suppose it is player 1 so  $a_1 < 0$ . If  $a_2 > 0$ , since player 1 would like to move leftward but player 2 would like to move rightward, due to the overall trend to move leftward, it is straightforward to see that the force of equilibrium would make player 1 hit the lower bound while player 2 will best respond to that. The equilibrium choices of both, denoted by  $(x_1^e, x_2^e)$ , are characterized by  $x_1^e = -X$  and  $x_2^e = -X + a_2$ . If  $a_2 \leq 0$ , since both players would like to move leftward, they will both hit the lower bound. The equilibrium is characterized by  $x_1^e = x_2^e = -X$ . To summarize, when  $a_1 + a_2 < 0$ , only the player whose target is greater than zero will not hit the lower bound. Therefore, as a spatial analog to Observation 1 of Costa-Gomes & Crawford (2006), we obtain:

**Proposition 1.** *In a spatial beauty contest game with targets  $(a_1, b_1)$  and  $(a_2, b_2)$  where two players each choose a location  $(x_i, y_i) \in G$  satisfying  $|a_1|, |a_2| \leq 2X$ ,  $|b_1|, |b_2| \leq 2Y$ , and  $G \equiv \{-X, -X + 1, \dots, X\} \times \{-Y, -Y + 1, \dots, Y\}$ , the equilibrium choices  $(x_i^e, y_i^e)$  are*

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<sup>1</sup>Due to symmetry, all other cases are isomorphic to this case.

characterized by: ( $I\{\cdot\}$  is the indicator function)

$$\begin{cases} x_i^e = -X + a_i \cdot I\{a_i > 0\} & \text{if } a_i + a_{-i} < 0 \\ x_i^e = X + a_i \cdot I\{a_i < 0\} & \text{if } a_i + a_{-i} > 0 \end{cases}$$

and

$$\begin{cases} y_i^e = -Y + b_i \cdot I\{b_i > 0\} & \text{if } b_i + b_{-i} < 0 \\ y_i^e = Y + b_i \cdot I\{b_i < 0\} & \text{if } b_i + b_{-i} > 0 \end{cases}$$

*Proof.* Consider the case that  $a_1 + a_2 < 0$ . We first argue that in equilibrium it cannot be the case that both choose an interior location so no player hits a bound. To see that, suppose there is an equilibrium  $(x_1^e, x_2^e)$  where both choose an interior location. Then it must be that both players are best responding by choosing her target location  $x_1^e = x_2^e + a_1$  and  $x_2^e = x_1^e + a_2$ . This is because if for any player  $i$   $x_i^e = x_{-i}^e + a_i$  does not hold, then either  $x_i^e > x_{-i}^e + a_i$  or  $x_i^e < x_{-i}^e + a_i$ . But then to get closer to her target location, player  $i$  could increase her profit by moving leftward when  $x_i^e > x_{-i}^e + a_i$  and by moving rightward when  $x_i^e < x_{-i}^e + a_i$ . Both are possible because  $x_i^e$  is an interior location. This implies there is a profitable deviation, contradicting  $(x_1^e, x_2^e)$  as an equilibrium. However, if  $x_1^e = x_2^e + a_1$  and  $x_2^e = x_1^e + a_2$ , then summing both gives  $a_1 + a_2 = 0$ , a contradiction to  $a_1 + a_2 < 0$ . Thus we conclude at least one player hits a bound in equilibrium.

Without loss of generality, assume  $a_1 < 0$ . There are two possible cases,  $a_2 > 0$  or  $a_2 \leq 0$ .

When  $a_2 > 0$ , since at least one player hits a bound, we consider first player 2 hits a bound. If player 2 hits the lower bound or  $x_2^e = -X$ , then since  $a_1 < 0$ , to best respond to player 2, player 1 hits the lower bound as well or  $x_1^e = -X$ . But then to best respond to player 1, 2 will want to move rightward because  $x_1^e + a_2 = -X + a_2 > -X$ . This implies a profitable deviation of player 2, a contradiction. Similarly, if 2 hits the upper bound or  $x_2^e = X$ , then to best respond to player 2, player 1 will choose her target location  $x_1^e = X + a_1$ . This target location is feasible because  $|a_1| \leq 2X$  or  $a_1 \geq -2X$ , and hence  $x_1^e = X + a_1 \geq -X$ . But then to best respond to player 1, player 2 would like to move leftward since  $x_1^e + a_2 = X + a_1 + a_2 < X$ . This again implies a profitable deviation of player 2, which is impossible. Hence it could not be player 2 hitting a bound. We are left with the possibility that player 1 hits a bound. If she hits the upper bound or  $x_1^e = X$ , then since  $a_2 > 0$ , to best respond to player 1, player 2 hits the upper bound as well or  $x_2^e = X$ . But then to best respond to player 2, 1 will want to move leftward because  $x_2^e + a_1 = X + a_1 < X$ . This implies a profitable deviation of player 1, a contradiction. Lastly, if player 1 hits a lower bound or  $x_1^e = -X$ , then since  $a_2 > 0$ , to best respond to player 1, player 2 chooses her target location or  $x_2^e = -X + a_2$ . Again, this target location is feasible because  $|a_2| \leq 2X$

or  $a_2 \leq 2X$ , and hence  $x_2^e = -X + a_2 \leq X$ . Now for player 1 to best respond to player 2, her target location is  $x_2^e + a_1 = -X + a_2 + a_1 < -X$ . So at best she could choose the lower bound  $-X$ . This shows players 1 and 2 are both best responding to each other and we have an equilibrium. To sum up, when  $a_2 > 0$ , player 1 hits the lower bound and player 2 chooses her target location  $-X + a_2$  is the only equilibrium.

When  $a_2 \leq 0$ , we first rule out any player hitting the upper bound. If player 1 hits the upper bound or  $x_1^e = X$ , then to best respond, player 2 will choose her target location  $x_2^e = x_1^e + a_2 = X + a_2$ . This target location is feasible because  $|a_2| \leq 2X$  or  $a_2 \geq -2X$ , and hence  $X + a_2 \geq -X$ . But then to best respond to player 2, player 1 would like to move leftward because  $x_2^e + a_1 = X + a_2 + a_1 < X$ . This implies a profitable deviation of player 1, which is impossible. On the other hand, if player 2 hits the upper bound or  $x_2^e = X$ , then to best respond to player 2, player 1 will choose her target location  $x_1^e = X + a_1$ . This target location is feasible because  $|a_1| \leq 2X$  or  $a_1 \geq -2X$ , and hence  $x_1^e = X + a_1 \geq -X$ . But then to best respond to player 1, player 2 would like to move leftward because  $x_1^e + a_2 = X + a_1 + a_2 < X$ . This again implies a profitable deviation of player 2, which is impossible. We are left with the case where at least a player hits the lower bound. But no matter who hits the lower bound, since the other player would like to go even lower (since  $a_1 < 0$  and when  $a_2 < 0$ ) or exactly matches (when  $a_2 = 0$ ), the other player hits the lower bound too. This shows both best respond to the other hitting the lower bound by hitting the lower bound herself. Hence when  $a_2 \leq 0$ , both players hit the lower bound or  $x_1^e = x_2^e = -X$  is the only equilibrium.  $\square$

## A2 The Level- $k$ Model for Spatial Beauty Contest Games

In addition to the equilibrium prediction, one may also specify various level- $k$  predictions. First, we need to determine the anchoring  $L0$  player who is non-strategic or naïve. Conceptually, the  $L0$  player could choose any location as her starting point, either randomly or deterministically, if no further presumption is made. Nonetheless, it is usually assumed in the literature that players choose randomly.<sup>2</sup> In a spatial setting, Reutskaja et al. (2011) find the center location focal, while Crawford & Iriberry (2007a) define  $L0$  players as being drawn toward focal points in the non-neutral display of choices. Therefore, a natural assumption here is that an  $L0$  player will either choose any location on the map randomly (according to the uniform distribution), which is on average the center  $(0, 0)$ , or will simply choose the center.

An  $L1$  player  $i$  with target  $(a_i, b_i)$  would best respond to an  $L0$  opponent who either

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<sup>2</sup>See Costa-Gomes et al. (2001), Camerer et al. (2004), Costa-Gomes & Crawford (2006) and Crawford & Iriberry (2007b).

chooses the center on average or exactly chooses the center. As a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility maximizer, she would choose the same location no matter which of the two ways her opponent behaves. This is true because our payoff structure is point symmetric by  $(0, 0)$  over the grid map. Hence, it makes no difference for an  $L1$  opponent whether we assume an  $L0$  player chooses randomly (on average the center) or exactly the center.<sup>3</sup>

If an  $L0$  player chooses (on average) the center, to best respond, an  $L1$  player would choose the location  $(a_i, b_i)$  unless  $X, Y$  is too small so that it is not feasible.<sup>4</sup> Similarly, for an  $L2$  opponent  $j$  with the target  $(a_j, b_j)$  to best respond to an  $L1$  player  $i$  who chooses  $(a_i, b_i)$ , he would choose  $(a_i + a_j, b_i + b_j)$  when  $X, Y$  is large enough. Repeating this procedure, one can determine the best responses of all higher level- $k$  ( $Lk$ ) types. Moreover, since the grid map is of a finite size, eventually when  $k$  for a level- $k$  type is large enough, the  $Lk$  prediction will coincide with the equilibrium. Figure I shows the various level- $k$  predictions of a  $7 \times 7$  spatial beauty contest game for two players with targets  $(4, -2)$  and  $(-2, 4)$ . To summarize, we have

**Proposition 2.** *Consider a spatial beauty contest game with targets  $(a_1, b_1)$  and  $(a_2, b_2)$  where two players choose locations  $(x_1, y_1), (x_2, y_2)$  satisfying  $(x_i, y_i) \in G \equiv \{-X, -X + 1, \dots, X\} \times \{-Y, -Y + 1, \dots, Y\}$ ,  $|a_1|, |a_2| \leq 2X$  and  $|b_1|, |b_2| \leq 2Y$ . Denote the choice of a level- $k$  player  $i$  by  $(x_i^k, y_i^k)$ , then for any given level-0 player's choice  $(x_1^0, y_1^0) = (x_2^0, y_2^0)$  (arbitrary point on the map), there exists a smallest positive integer  $\bar{k}$  such that for all  $k \geq \bar{k}$ ,  $(x_i^k, y_i^k) = (x_i^e, y_i^e)$ .*

*Proof.* Following the notations defined above, to find  $(x_i^k, y_i^k)$  that solves

$$\max_{x,y} u(\bar{s} - [|x_i - (x_{-i} + a_i)| + |y_i - (y_{-i} + b_i)|]),$$

we may solve  $x_i^k$  and  $y_i^k$  separately since there is no interaction between the choice of  $x_i^k$  and  $y_i^k$ . Hence, by symmetry we only need to show that  $x_i^k = \min \{X, \max\{-X, a_i + x_{-i}^{k-1}\}\}$ . Notice that

$$\min \{X, \max\{-X, a_i + x_{-i}^{k-1}\}\} = \begin{cases} -X, & x_{-i}^{k-1} + a_i < -X \\ x_{-i}^{k-1} + a_i, & x_{-i}^{k-1} + a_i \in \{-X, -X + 1, \dots, X\}. \\ X, & x_{-i}^{k-1} + a_i > X \end{cases}$$

In other words, when the unadjusted best response  $x_{-i}^{k-1} + a_i$  is lower than the lowest possible choice of  $x_i^k$  on the grid map, the adjusted best response is the lower bound  $-X$ . When it

<sup>3</sup>See Proposition 3 below. Also, in our estimation, we incorporate random  $L0$  as a special case (when the logit precision parameter is zero).

<sup>4</sup>In this case, an  $L1$  player would choose the closest feasible location.

is higher than the highest possible choice of  $x_i^k$  on the grid map, the adjusted best response is the upper bound  $X$ . When the unadjusted best response  $x_{-i}^{k-1} + a_i$  is within the possible range of  $x_i^k$  on the grid map, the adjusted best response coincides with the unadjusted best response. Notice that:

1. If  $x_{-i}^{k-1} + a_i \in \{-X, \dots, X\}$ ,  $\min_{x \in \{-X, \dots, X\}} |x - (x_{-i}^{k-1} + a_i)| = 0$  at  $x = x_{-i}^{k-1} + a_i$ .
2. If  $x_{-i}^{k-1} + a_i > X$ ,  $\min_{x \in \{-X, \dots, X\}} |x - (x_{-i}^{k-1} + a_i)| = -X + (x_{-i}^{k-1} + a_i)$  at  $x = X$ .
3. If  $x_{-i}^{k-1} + a_i < -X$ ,  $\min_{x \in \{-X, \dots, X\}} |x - (x_{-i}^{k-1} + a_i)| = -X - (x_{-i}^{k-1} + a_i)$  at  $x = -X$ .

Thus,  $x_i^k = \min \{X, \max\{-X, x_{-i}^{k-1} + a_i\}\}$  indeed maximizes player  $i$ 's utility (which is decreasing in the distance between the target  $x_{-i}^{k-1} + a_i$  and the choice).

For the second half, it suffices to show that there exists a smallest positive integer  $\bar{k}$  such that  $(x_i^k, y_i^k) = (x_i^e, y_i^e)$  for all  $k \geq \bar{k}$  when  $a_1 + a_2 < 0$ . All other possibilities can be argued analogously. There are 2 cases to consider:  $a_i < 0 \leq a_{-i}$  and  $a_1, a_2 < 0$ .

**Case 1:**  $a_i < 0 \leq a_{-i}$ : We show that when  $x_i^k > -X$ ,  $x_i^{k+2}$  is strictly less than  $x_i^k$ , and when  $x_i^k = -X$ ,  $x_i^{k+2} = -X$ . Then all subsequences taking the form of  $\{x_i^k, x_i^{k+2}, x_i^{k+4}, \dots\}$  will eventually converge to  $x_i^e = -X$ , implying  $\{x_i^0, x_i^1, x_i^2, \dots\}$  also converges to  $x_i^e = -X$ .

For any nonnegative integer  $k$ ,  $x_i^{k+2} - x_i^k = \min \{X, \max\{-X, x_{-i}^{k+1} + a_i\}\} - x_i^k$  where  $x_{-i}^{k+1} = \min \{X, \max\{-X, \underbrace{x_i^k}_{\geq -X} + \underbrace{a_{-i}}_{\geq 0}\}\} = \min \{X, x_i^k + a_{-i}\}$ .

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{If } x_i^k > -X, x_i^{k+2} - x_i^k &= \min \{X, \max\{-X, x_{-i}^{k+1} + a_i\}\} - x_i^k \\
&= \min \left\{ X, \max \left\{ -X, \min \{X, x_i^k + a_{-i}\} + a_i \right\} \right\} - x_i^k \\
&= \min \left\{ X, \max \left\{ -X, \min \underbrace{\{X + a_i, x_i^k + a_{-i} + a_i\}}_{< X} \right\} \right\} - x_i^k \\
&\quad \underbrace{\hspace{10em}}_{< X} \\
&= \max \left\{ -X, \min \{X + a_i, x_i^k + a_{-i} + a_i\} \right\} - x_i^k \\
&= \max \left\{ \underbrace{-X - x_i^k}_{< 0}, \min \underbrace{\{X + a_i, x_i^k + a_{-i} + a_i\}}_{< x_i^k} - x_i^k \right\} < 0. \\
&\quad \underbrace{\hspace{10em}}_{< x_i^k}
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{If } x_i^k = -X, x_i^{k+2} - x_i^k &= \min \left\{ X, \max \left\{ -X, \underbrace{x_{-i}^{k+1} + a_i}_{=\min\{X, x_{-i}^k + a_{-i}\}} \right\} \right\} - x_i^k \\
&= \min \left\{ X, \max \left\{ -X, \min \{ X, -X + a_{-i} \} + a_i \right\} \right\} - (-X) \\
&= \min \left\{ X, \max \left\{ -X, \min \{ X + a_i, -X + \underbrace{a_{-i} + a_i}_{<0} \} \right\} \right\} - (-X) \\
&\quad \underbrace{\hspace{10em}}_{<-X} \\
&= \min \{ X, -X \} - (-X) = -X - (-X) = 0.
\end{aligned}$$

For player  $-i$ , we know from Case 1 that there exists a positive integer  $\bar{k}_i$  where the opponent chooses  $x_{-i}^k = x_{-i}^e = -X$  for all  $k \geq \bar{k}_i$ . This implies  $x_{-i}^{k+1} = x_{-i}^e = -X + a_{-i}$  for all  $k \geq \bar{k}_i$  since  $x_{-i}^{k+1} = \min \{ X, \max \{ -X, x_{-i}^k + a_{-i} \} \}$ .

**Case 2:**  $a_1, a_2 < 0$ : As in Case 1, again we show that when  $x_i^k < -X$ ,  $x_i^{k+2}$  is strictly less than  $x_i^k$ , and when  $x_i^k = -X$ ,  $x_i^{k+2} = -X$ . Then all subsequences taking the form of  $\{x_i^k, x_i^{k+2}, x_i^{k+4}, \dots\}$  will eventually converge to  $x_i^e = -X$ , implying the sequence  $\{x_i^0, x_i^1, x_i^2, \dots\}$  also converges to  $x_i^e = -X$ . Since  $x_{-i}^{k+1} = \min \left\{ X, \max \left\{ -X, \underbrace{x_i^k}_{\leq m} + \underbrace{a_{-i}}_{<0} \right\} \right\} = \max \{ -X, x_i^k + a_{-i} \}$ , we have

$$\begin{aligned}
x_i^{k+2} - x_i^k &= \min \left\{ X, \max \{ -X, x_{-i}^{k+1} + a_i \} \right\} - x_i^k \\
&= \min \left\{ X, \max \left\{ -X, \max \{ -X, x_i^k + a_{-i} \} + a_i \right\} \right\} - x_i^k \\
&= \min \left\{ X, \max \left\{ -X, \max \left\{ \underbrace{-X + a_i}_{<-X}, x_i^k + a_{-i} + a_i \right\} \right\} \right\} - x_i^k \\
&= \min \left\{ X, \max \{ -X, x_i^k + a_{-i} + a_i \} \right\} - x_i^k.
\end{aligned}$$

$$\text{If } x_i^k > -X, x_i^{k+2} - x_i^k = \min \left\{ X - x_i^k, \max \left\{ \underbrace{-X - x_i^k}_{<0}, \underbrace{a_{-i} + a_i}_{<0} \right\} \right\} < 0.$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{If } x_i^k = -X, x_i^{k+2} - x_i^k &= \min \left\{ X, \max \left\{ -X, \underbrace{-X + a_{-i} + a_i}_{<-X} \right\} \right\} - (-X) \\
&= \min \{ X, -X \} - (-X) = -X - (-X) = 0.
\end{aligned}$$

Then, we can argue as in Case 1 that player  $i$  will eventually choose  $x_{-i}^k = x_{-i}^e = X$ .  $\square$

For random  $L0$  case, we have

**Proposition 3.** For choice  $(x_i, y_i)$  and target  $(a_i, b_i)$ , player  $i$ 's monetary payoff is

$$\pi_i(x_i, y_i; x_{-i}, y_{-i}; a_i, b_i) = \bar{s} - (|x_i - (x_{-i} + a_i)| + |y_i - (y_{-i} + b_i)|)$$

where  $\bar{s}$  is a constant. Suppose player  $i$  is level-1 with a continuous Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function  $u(\cdot)$  that values only monetary payoffs. Then, choosing location  $(a_i, b_i)$  is the best response to a level-0 opponent  $-i$  who chooses randomly over the entire map,  $G \equiv \{-X, -X + 1, \dots, X\} \times \{-Y, -Y + 1, \dots, Y\}$ .

*Proof.* To best respond to the choice of player  $-i$ , player  $i$  should find  $(x_i, y_i)$  that solves the maximization

$$(x_i, y_i) = \arg \max_{x, y} \sum_{y_{-i}=-Y}^Y \sum_{x_{-i}=-X}^X \frac{1}{(2X+1)(2Y+1)} u(\bar{s} - [|x_i - (x_{-i} + a_i)| + |y_i - (y_{-i} + b_i)|]).$$

To show that  $(x_i, y_i) = (a_i, b_i)$  indeed achieves the maximum, it suffices to show that  $(x', y') = (0, 0)$  solves the maximization

$$(x', y') = \arg \max_{x', y'} \sum_{y_{-i}=-Y}^Y \sum_{x_{-i}=-X}^X \frac{1}{(2X+1)(2Y+1)} u(\bar{s} - [|x' - x_{-i}| + |y' - y_{-i}|]). \quad (1)$$

For any given  $y_{-i}$  and  $y'$ , let  $Y_{-i} = y' - y_{-i}$ . Then, the summation over  $x$  is

$$\sum_{x_{-i}=-X}^X u(\bar{s} - Y_{-i} - |x' - x_{-i}|) \quad (2)$$

which is symmetric over  $x' = 0$ .

Without loss of generality, consider  $x' = t$ ,  $X \geq x' > 0$  and  $x' = 0$ . Player  $i$ 's utility when choosing  $x' = t$  differs from that when choosing  $x' = 0$  by

$$\begin{aligned} & \sum_{x_{-i}=-X}^X u(\bar{s} - Y_{-i} - |t - x_{-i}|) - \sum_{x_{-i}=-X}^X u(\bar{s} - Y_{-i} - |0 - x_{-i}|) \\ &= \sum_{k=-t}^{2X-t} u(\bar{s} - Y_{-i} - |X - k|) - \sum_{k=0}^{2X} u(\bar{s} - Y_{-i} - |X - k|) \\ &= \sum_{k=-t}^{-1} u(\bar{s} - Y_{-i} - |X - k|) - \sum_{k=2X-t+1}^{2X} u(\bar{s} - Y_{-i} - |X - k|) \\ &= \sum_{k=X+1-t}^X u(\bar{s} - Y_{-i} - |t + k|) - u(\bar{s} - Y_{-i} - |k|) < 0 \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

where the last equality holds since  $|t + k| > |k|$  for all  $X + 1 - t \leq k \leq X$  (notice that  $X \geq t$  implies that  $X + 1 - t \geq 1$ ), and  $u(\cdot)$  is increasing. Hence, choosing  $x' = t$  is worse than choosing  $x' = 0$ . Since the summation over  $x$  is symmetric over  $x' = 0$ , the same



argument applies to show that choosing  $x' = -t$  is worse than choosing  $x' = 0$ . Thus  $x' = 0$  maximizes the over  $x$  for any given  $y_{-i}$  and  $y'$ . Similarly,  $y' = 0$  maximizes

$$\sum_{y_{-i}=-Y}^Y \sum_{x_{-i}=-X}^X u(\bar{s} - (|0 - x_{-i}| + |y' - y_{-i}|)).$$

Thus, if the (level-0) opponent chooses uniformly on the map,  $(x_i, y_i) = (a_i, b_i)$  is indeed optimal. □

## A3 The Markov-Switching Level- $k$ Model for Lookups

### A3.1 THE STATE SPACE

According to Hypothesis 2b, a level- $k$  type subject  $i$  goes through a particular best response hierarchy associated with her level- $k$  type during the reasoning process, and carries out transitions from  $(x_{-i,n}^{K-1}, y_{-i,n}^{K-1})$  to  $(x_{i,n}^K, y_{i,n}^K)$ , for  $K = k, k-2, \dots$ , and transitions from  $(x_{i,n}^{K-1}, y_{i,n}^{K-1})$  to  $(x_{-i,n}^K, y_{-i,n}^K)$  for  $K = k-1, k-3, \dots$ . Taking level-2 as an example, the two key transition steps are from  $(x_{i,n}^0, y_{i,n}^0)$  to  $(x_{-i,n}^1, y_{-i,n}^1)$ , thinking as a level-1 opponent, best-responding to her as a level-0 player and from  $(x_{-i,n}^1, y_{-i,n}^1)$  to  $(x_{i,n}^2, y_{i,n}^2)$ , thinking as a level-2 player, best-responding to a level-1 opponent. Hence, the reasoning process of a level-2 subject  $i$  consists of three stages. First, she would fixate at  $(x_{i,n}^0, y_{i,n}^0)$  since she believes her opponent is level-1, who believes she is level-0. Then, she would fixate at  $(x_{-i,n}^1, y_{-i,n}^1)$ , thinking through her opponent's choice as a level-1 best responding to a level-0. Finally, she would best respond to the belief that her opponent is a level-1 by making her choice fixating at  $(x_{i,n}^2, y_{i,n}^2)$ . These reasoning processes are gone through in the mind of a subject and may be reflected in her lookups.

For a level- $k$  subject, we define  $s = k$  as the highest state indicating that she is contemplating a choice by fixating at the location  $(x_{i,n}^k, y_{i,n}^k)$ , best responding to an opponent of level- $(k-1)$ . Imagining what an opponent of level- $(k-1)$  would do, state  $s = -(k-1)$  is defined as the second highest state when her fixation is at the location  $(x_{-i,n}^{k-1}, y_{-i,n}^{k-1})$  contemplating her opponent's choice by best responding to herself as a level- $(k-2)$ .<sup>5</sup> Lower states  $s = k-2, s = -(k-3), \dots$ , etc. are defined similarly. Then, steps of reasoning of a subject's best response hierarchy of Hypothesis 2b (associated with a particular " $k$ ") can be expressed as " $0, \dots, k-2, -(k-1), k$ ." We regard these  $(k+1)$  steps of reasoning as the

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<sup>5</sup>We use the minus sign ( $-$ ) to refer to players contemplating about their opponent. Note that the lowest state 0 can be about one's own or the opponent. Thus the state 0 and  $-0$  should be distinguished. For the ease of exposition, we do not make this distinction and call the lowest state 0 later on.

$(k + 1)$  states of the mind for a level- $k$  player  $i$ . Hence, for a level- $k$  subject, state space  $\Omega_k$  consists of all thinking steps in the best response hierarchy of this particular level- $k$  type. Thus,  $\Omega_k = \{0, \dots, -(k - 3), k - 2, -(k - 1), k\}$ .

### A3.2 THE CONSTRAINED MARKOV TRANSITION PROCESS

Suppose the subject is a particular level- $k$ . Let  $s_t$  be the realization of the random variable representing subject's state at time  $t$ , drawn from  $\Omega_k = \{0, \dots, -(k - 3), k - 2, -(k - 1), k\}$ , denoted as the state space. Denote the state history up to time  $t$  by  $\mathcal{S}^t \equiv \{s_1, \dots, s_{t-1}, s_t\}$ .<sup>6</sup> Since lookups may be serially correlated, we model this by estimating a constrained Markov stationary transition matrix of states. Let the transition probability from state  $s_{t-1}$  to  $s_t$  be  $\Pr(s_t | s_{t-1}) = \pi_{s_{t-1} \rightarrow s_t}$ . Thus, the state transition matrices  $\theta_k$  for  $k \in \{0, 1, 2, 3, 4\}$  are

$$\theta_0 = (\pi_{0 \rightarrow 0}) = (1), \theta_1 = \begin{pmatrix} \pi_{0 \rightarrow 0} & \pi_{0 \rightarrow 1} \\ \pi_{1 \rightarrow 0} & \pi_{1 \rightarrow 1} \end{pmatrix}, \theta_2 = \begin{pmatrix} \pi_{0 \rightarrow 0} & \pi_{0 \rightarrow -1} & 0 \\ \pi_{-1 \rightarrow 0} & \pi_{-1 \rightarrow -1} & \pi_{-1 \rightarrow 2} \\ \pi_{2 \rightarrow 0} & \pi_{2 \rightarrow -1} & \pi_{2 \rightarrow 2} \end{pmatrix},$$

$$\theta_3 = \begin{pmatrix} \pi_{0 \rightarrow 0} & \pi_{0 \rightarrow 1} & 0 & 0 \\ \pi_{1 \rightarrow 0} & \pi_{1 \rightarrow 1} & \pi_{1 \rightarrow -2} & 0 \\ \pi_{-2 \rightarrow 0} & \pi_{-2 \rightarrow 1} & \pi_{-2 \rightarrow -2} & \pi_{-2 \rightarrow 3} \\ \pi_{3 \rightarrow 0} & \pi_{3 \rightarrow 1} & \pi_{3 \rightarrow -2} & \pi_{3 \rightarrow 3} \end{pmatrix}, \theta_4 = \begin{pmatrix} \pi_{0 \rightarrow 0} & \pi_{0 \rightarrow -1} & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ \pi_{-1 \rightarrow 0} & \pi_{-1 \rightarrow -1} & \pi_{-1 \rightarrow 2} & 0 & 0 \\ \pi_{2 \rightarrow 0} & \pi_{2 \rightarrow -1} & \pi_{2 \rightarrow 2} & \pi_{2 \rightarrow -3} & 0 \\ \pi_{-3 \rightarrow 0} & \pi_{-3 \rightarrow -1} & \pi_{-3 \rightarrow 2} & \pi_{-3 \rightarrow -3} & \pi_{-3 \rightarrow 4} \\ \pi_{4 \rightarrow 0} & \pi_{4 \rightarrow -1} & \pi_{4 \rightarrow 2} & \pi_{4 \rightarrow -3} & \pi_{4 \rightarrow 4} \end{pmatrix}.$$

Note that elements in the upper triangle where the column number is greater than one plus the row number is restricted to zero since we do not allow for jumps.

### A3.3 FROM STATES TO LOOKUPS

For each game  $n$ ,  $G_n = \{(x, y) | x, y \in \mathcal{Z}, |x| \leq X_n, |y| \leq Y_n\}$  is the map on which she can fixate at. Define the state-to-lookup mapping  $l_n^k : \Omega_k \rightarrow G_n$  which assigns each state  $s$  a corresponding lookup location on the map  $G_n$  according to the level- $k$  model.

The lookup sequence in trial  $n$  is a time series over  $t = 1, \dots, T_n$  where  $T_n$  is the number of her lookups in this game  $n$ . Because of the logit error, a level- $k$  subject may not look at a location with certainty. Therefore, at the  $t$ -th lookup, let the random variable  $\mathbf{R}_n^t$  be the probabilistic lookup location in  $G_n$  and its realization be  $r_n^t$ . Denote the lookup history up to time  $t$  by  $\mathcal{R}_n^t \equiv \{r_n^1, \dots, r_n^{t-1}, r_n^t\}$ .

<sup>6</sup>In the experiment, subjects could look at the entire computer screen. Here, we only consider lookups that fall on the grid map and drop the rest.

Conditional on  $s_t$ , the probability distribution of a level- $k$  subject's probabilistic lookup  $\mathbf{R}_n^t$  is assumed to follow a logit error quantal response model (centered at  $l_n^k(s_t)$ ), independent of lookup history  $\mathcal{R}_n^{t-1}$ . In other words,

$$\Pr(\mathbf{R}_n^t = r_n^t | s_t, \mathcal{R}_n^{t-1}) = \frac{\exp(-\lambda_k \|r_n^t - l_n^k(s_t)\|)}{\sum_{g \in G_n} \exp(-\lambda_k \|g - l_n^k(s_t)\|)}. \quad (4)$$

where  $\lambda_k \in [0, \infty)$  is the precision parameter. If  $\lambda_k = 0$ , the subject randomly looks at locations in  $G_n$  with equal probability. As  $\lambda_k \rightarrow \infty$ , her lookups concentrate on the lookup location  $l_n^k(s_t)$  predicted by the state  $s_t$  of a level- $k$ .

Combining the state transition matrix and the logit error, we can calculate the probability of observing lookup  $r_n^t$  conditional on past lookup history  $\mathcal{R}_n^{t-1}$ :

$$\Pr(\mathbf{R}_n^t = r_n^t | \mathcal{R}_n^{t-1}) = \sum_{s_t \in \Omega_k} \Pr(s_t | \mathcal{R}_n^{t-1}) \cdot \Pr(\mathbf{R}_n^t = r_n^t | s_t, \mathcal{R}_n^{t-1}) \quad (5)$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr(s_t | \mathcal{R}_n^{t-1}) &= \sum_{s_{t-1} \in \Omega_k} \Pr(s_{t-1} | \mathcal{R}_n^{t-1}) \cdot \Pr(s_t | S_{t-1} = s_{t-1}, \mathcal{R}_n^{t-1}) = \sum_{s_{t-1} \in \Omega_k} \Pr(s_{t-1} | \mathcal{R}_n^{t-1}) \cdot \pi_{s_{t-1} \rightarrow s_t} \\ &= \sum_{s_{t-1} \in \Omega_k} \frac{\Pr(s_{t-1} | \mathcal{R}_n^{t-2}) \Pr(\mathbf{R}_n^{t-1} = r_n^{t-1} | s_{t-1}, \mathcal{R}_n^{t-2})}{\Pr(\mathbf{R}_n^{t-1} = r_n^{t-1} | \mathcal{R}_n^{t-2})} \cdot \pi_{s_{t-1} \rightarrow s_t}. \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$

The second equality in equation (6) follows since according to the Markov property,  $s_{t-1}$  is sufficient to predict  $s_t$ . Note that equation (6) depends on the Markov transition matrix. Meanwhile, the second term on the right hand side of equation (5) ( $\Pr(\mathbf{R}_n^t = r_n^t | s_t, \mathcal{R}_n^{t-1})$ ) depends on the logit error. Notice that all the terms on the last line of equation (6) are now expressed with the time index moving backwards by one period. Hence, for a given game  $n$ , coupled with the initial distribution of states, the joint density of a level- $k$  subject's empirical lookups, denoted by

$$\begin{aligned} f_n^k(r_n^1, \dots, r_n^{T_n-1}, r_n^{T_n}) &\equiv \Pr(r_n^1, \dots, r_n^{T_n-1}, r_n^{T_n}) \\ &= \Pr(r_n^1) \Pr(r_n^2 | r_n^1) \Pr(r_n^3 | r_n^1, r_n^2) \dots \Pr(r_n^{T_n} | r_n^1, r_n^2, \dots, r_n^{T_n-1}), \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

can be derived.<sup>7</sup> The log likelihood over all 24 trials is thus

$$L(\lambda_k, \theta_k) = \ln \left[ \prod_{n=1}^{24} f_n^k(r_n^1, \dots, r_n^{T_n-1}, r_n^{T_n}) \right]. \quad (8)$$

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<sup>7</sup>See Appendix A3.4 for a formal derivation.

Since level- $k$  reasoning starts from the lowest state (here state 0), we assume this initial distribution of states degenerates to a mass point at the lowest state corresponding to level-0 (of herself if  $k$  is even and of her opponent if  $k$  is odd). With this assumption, we estimate the precision parameter  $\lambda_k$  and the constrained Markov transition matrix  $\theta_k$  using maximum likelihood estimation for each  $k$ , and classify subjects into the particular level- $k$  type which has the largest likelihood.

### A3.4 INITIAL DISTRIBUTION OF STATES

We start with the assumption that  $\Pr(s_0) = 1$  when the initial state  $s_0$  is 0 and zero otherwise. Then we derive the following step by step. First, for  $\Pr(s_0)$  given by the initial distribution of states and  $\Pr(s_1|s_0)$  given by the Markov transition matrix,  $\Pr(s_1) = \sum_{s_0 \in \Omega_k} [\Pr(s_0) \Pr(s_1|s_0)]$ . Second,  $\Pr(r_n^1) = \sum_{s_1 \in \Omega_k} [\Pr(s_1) \Pr(r_n^1|s_1)]$  for  $\Pr(s_1)$  given by the first step and  $\Pr(r_n^1|s_1)$  given by the logit error.

Third, we update the state by the current lookup or  $\Pr(s_1|r_n^1) = \frac{\Pr(s_1) \Pr(r_n^1|s_1)}{\Pr(r_n^1)}$  where terms in the numerator and denominator are derived in the second step.

Fourth, for  $\Pr(s_1|r_n^1)$  derived in the third step and  $\Pr(s_2|s_1)$  given by the Markov transition matrix, we derive the next state from the current lookup, or

$$\Pr(s_2|r_n^1) = \sum_{s_1 \in \Omega_k} [\Pr(s_1|r_n^1) \Pr(s_2|s_1)] = \sum_{s_1 \in \Omega_k} [\Pr(s_1|r_n^1) \Pr(s_2|s_1)]$$

where the second equality follows because by Markov, the transition to the next step only depends on the current state. Fifth, for  $\Pr(s_2|r_n^1)$  given by the fourth step and  $\Pr(r_n^2|r_n^1, s_2) = \Pr(r_n^2|s_2)$  given by the logit error, we derive the next lookup from the current lookup or  $\Pr(r_n^2|r_n^1) = \sum_{s_2 \in \Omega_k} [\Pr(s_2|r_n^1) \Pr(r_n^2|s_2)]$ . Sixth, as in the third step, we

update the state by the lookups up to now or  $\Pr(s_2|r_n^1, r_n^2) = \frac{\Pr(s_2|r_n^1) \Pr(r_n^2|s_2)}{\Pr(r_n^2|r_n^1)}$  where terms in the numerator and the denominator are both derived in the fifth step. Seventh, as in the fourth step, for  $\Pr(s_2|r_n^1, r_n^2)$  derived in the sixth step and  $\Pr(s_3|s_2)$  given by the Markov transition matrix, we derive the next state from the lookups up to now, or

$$\Pr(s_3|r_n^1, r_n^2) = \sum_{s_2 \in \Omega_k} [\Pr(s_2|r_n^1, r_n^2) \Pr(s_3|s_2)] = \sum_{s_2 \in \Omega_k} [\Pr(s_2|r_n^1, r_n^2) \Pr(s_3|s_2)].$$

Eighth, as in the fifth step, for  $\Pr(s_3|r_n^1, r_n^2)$  given by the seventh step and  $\Pr(r_n^3|r_n^1, r_n^2, s_3) = \Pr(r_n^3|s_3)$  given by the logit error, we derive the next lookup from the lookups up to now or  $\Pr(r_n^3|r_n^1, r_n^2) = \sum_{s_3 \in \Omega_k} [\Pr(s_3|r_n^1, r_n^2) \Pr(r_n^3|s_3)]$ .

Continuing in this fashion and multiplying altogether the second step, the fifth step, the eighth step, and so on, we derive  $\Pr(r_n^1) \Pr(r_n^2|r_n^1) \Pr(r_n^3|r_n^1, r_n^2) \dots \Pr(r_n^{T_n}|r_n^1, r_n^2, \dots, r_n^{T_n-1})$  or (7). Regarding the assumption on the initial state, alternatively, we could follow the tradition in the Markov literature and assume uniform priors, or  $\Pr(s_0) = \frac{1}{k+1}$  for all  $s_0 \in \Omega_k$ . But it is not clear how subjects could figure out locations of higher states without even actually going through the best response hierarchy. This is the reason why we employ the current assumption that  $\Pr(s_0) = 1$  when the initial state  $s_0$  is 0 and zero otherwise.

#### A4 Vuong's Test for Non-Nested But Overlapping Models

Let  $Lk^*$  be the type which has the largest likelihood with corresponding parameters  $(\lambda_{k^*}, \theta_{k^*})$ . Let  $Lk^a$  be an alternative type with corresponding parameters  $(\lambda_{k^a}, \theta_{k^a})$ . We choose a critical value from the standardized normal distribution to test if these two competing types,  $Lk^*$  and  $Lk^a$ , are equally good at explaining the true data, or one of them is a better model. If the absolute value of the test statistic is no larger than the critical value, we conclude that  $Lk^*$  and  $Lk^a$  are equally good at explaining the true data. If the test statistic is higher than the critical value, we conclude that  $Lk^*$  is a better model than  $Lk^a$ . Lastly, if the test statistic is less than the negative of the critical value, then we conclude that  $Lk^a$  is a better model than  $Lk^*$ . Equation (8) can be rearranged as  $L(\lambda_k, \theta_k) = \sum_{n=1}^{24} lr_n(\lambda_k, \theta_k)$  where  $lr_n(\lambda_k, \theta_k) = \ln f_n^k(r_n^1, \dots, r_n^{T_n-1}, r_n^{T_n})$ . This indicates that we assume subject's lookups are independent across trials and follow the same Markov switching process, although each trial's lookups sequence may be serially-correlated.

To perform Vuong's test, we construct the log-likelihood ratio trial-by-trial:

$$m_n = lr_n(\lambda_{k^*}, \theta_{k^*}) - lr_n(\lambda_{k^a}, \theta_{k^a}) \text{ for trial } n = 1, \dots, 24.$$

Let  $\bar{m} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=1}^N m_n$  (where in our experiment  $N = 24$ ). Vuong (1989) proposes a sequential procedure (p.321) for overlapping models. Its general result describes the behavior of

$$V = \frac{\sqrt{N} \left[ \frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=1}^N m_n \right]}{\sqrt{\frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=1}^N (m_n - \bar{m})^2}},$$

when the sample variance  $\omega_N^2 = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=1}^N (m_n - \bar{m})^2$  is significantly different from zero (the variance test). If the variance test is passed (which is the case for all of our subjects),  $V$  has the property that (under standard assumptions):

(V1) If  $Lk^*$  and  $Lk^a$  are equivalently good at fitting the data,  $V \xrightarrow{D} N(0, 1)$ .

(V2) If  $Lk^*$  is better than  $Lk^a$  at fitting the data,  $V \xrightarrow{A.S.} \infty$ .

(V3) If  $Lk^a$  is better than  $Lk^*$  at fitting the data,  $V \xrightarrow{A.S.} -\infty$ .

Hence, Vuong’s test is performed by first conducting the variance test, then calculating  $V$  and applying the above three cases depending on whether  $V < -c$ ,  $|V| < c$ , or  $V > c$ . ( $c = 1.96$  for  $p$ -value = 0.05.) Notice that this is the generalized version of the well-known “nested” Vuong’s test, which does not require the variance test prior to calculating  $V$ .

Note that in our case  $Lk^*$  is the type with the largest likelihood based on lookups, and the alternative type  $Lk^a$  is the type having the next largest likelihood among all lower level types. Hence, either (V2) applies so that  $Lk^*$  is a better model than  $Lk^a$ , or (V1) applies so that  $Lk^*$  and  $Lk^a$  are equally good (and we conservatively classify the subject as the second largest lower type  $Lk^a$ ). (V3) does not apply since  $V > 0$  by construct.

Two points are worth noting regarding Vuong’s test in our setting. First, one might worry about non-identification issues caused by nuisance parameters when the two competing types are strictly nested and if the subject were truly  $Lk^a$ . Hence, as an alternative, we perform Hansen’s test (Hansen (1992)). Columns 7 and 8 of Supplementary Table 2 report the nearly identical results (to those based on Vuong’s test). Secondly, we only perform Vuong’s test once, and if we find  $Lk^*$  and  $Lk^a$  explain the data equally well, we classify subjects as  $Lk^a$ , the lower level type that has the next largest likelihood. It is possible that the lower level type with the next-largest likelihood is still not different from the even lower level type with the even-next-largest likelihood (and so on). Hence, one might wonder whether we should stop here. Thus, we employ an iterative Vuong’s test and classify subjects as the type that is, for the first time, significantly different from a lower level type of which the likelihood is immediate lower. We re-classify only two  $L2$  subjects as  $L1$ , one  $L2$  subject as  $L0$  and two  $L1$  subjects as  $L0$ , making the average number of thinking steps drop to 1.65. This provides a lower bound to the possible type distribution. The iterative Vuong’s test result is reported in the sixth column of Supplementary Table 2.

## A5 Level-k Classification Based on Final Choices

We classify subjects into various behavioral types based on their final choices using maximum likelihood estimation. In addition, a bootstrap procedure is employed to evaluate the robustness of the classification. In particular, similar to Costa-Gomes & Crawford (2006), we perform a maximum likelihood estimation to classify each individual subject into a particular level- $k$  type. In particular, we model subjects following a particular level- $k$  type but

playing quantal response using the following logit error structure.<sup>8</sup> Let all possible level- $k$  types be  $k = 1, \dots, K$  and each subject goes through trial  $n = 1, \dots, 24$ . For a given trial  $n$ , according to Hypothesis 1, a level- $k$  subject  $i$ 's final choice is denoted as  $c_n^k = (x_{i,n}^k, y_{i,n}^k) \in G_n$  where  $G_n = \{(x, y) | x \in \{-X_n, -X_n + 1, \dots, X_n\}, y \in \{-Y_n, -Y_n + 1, \dots, Y_n\}\}$  is the finite choice set for trial  $n$ .  $|G_n| = (2X + 1)(2Y + 1)$  is the number of elements in  $G_n$ , which depends on the map size  $(X, Y)$  of the game in that particular trial.<sup>9</sup> For any two elements of  $G_n$ ,  $g_1 = (x_1, y_1)$  and  $g_2 = (x_2, y_2)$ , their distance is defined as  $\|g_1 - g_2\| = |x_1 - x_2| + |y_1 - y_2|$ , i.e. the ‘‘steps’’ on the map (the sum of vertical and horizontal distance) between  $g_1$  and  $g_2$ . Then, if a subject chooses a location  $g_n = (x_{i,n}, y_{i,n})$  in trial  $n$ , the distance between her choice  $g_n$  and the choice of a level- $k$  subject  $c_n^k$  is  $\|g_n - c_n^k\| = |x_{i,n} - x_{i,n}^k| + |y_{i,n} - y_{i,n}^k|$ . In a logit error model with precision  $\lambda_k$ , the probability of observing  $g_n$  is

$$d^k(g_n) = \frac{\exp(-\lambda_k \times \|g_n - c_n^k\|)}{\sum_{g \in G_n} \exp(-\lambda_k \times \|g - c_n^k\|)}$$

When  $\lambda_k \rightarrow 0$ ,  $d^k(g_n) = \frac{1}{|G_n|}$  and the subject randomly chooses from the choice set  $G_n$ . As  $\lambda_k \rightarrow \infty$ ,  $d^k(g_n) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } g_n = c_n^k \\ 0, & \text{if } g_n \neq c_n^k \end{cases}$  and the choice of the subject approaches to the level- $k$  choice  $c_n^k$ . The log likelihood over all trials with choices  $(g_1, g_2, \dots, g_{24})$  trial-by-trial can then be expressed as  $\ln \prod_{n=1}^{24} d^k(g_n)$ .

For each  $k$ , we estimate the precision parameter  $\lambda_k$  by fitting the data with the logit error model to maximize empirical likelihood. Then we choose the  $k$  which maximizes the empirical likelihood and classify the subject into this particular level- $k$  type. We consider all the level- $k$  types separable in our games:  $L0$ ,  $L1$ ,  $L2$ ,  $L3$ , and  $EQ$ . Results are reported in column (B) of Table III. Among the 17 subjects, there are two  $L0$ , four  $L1$ , four  $L2$ , four  $L3$ , and three  $EQ$ . The average number of thinking steps is 2.12, similar to the lookup-based classifications.<sup>10</sup>

One possible concern is whether some subjects do not follow any of the pre-specified level- $k$  types, so the model is misspecified. To incorporate all empirically possible behavioral types, we follow Costa-Gomes & Crawford (2006) and perform the pseudotype test by including 17 pseudotypes, each constructed from one of our subject's choices in 24 trials. This is to see whether there are clusters of subjects whose choices resemble each other's

<sup>8</sup>Since we do not have a large choice set as in Costa-Gomes & Crawford (2006), we employ a ‘‘logit’’ specification instead of a ‘‘spike-logit’’ specification to describe the error structure of subjects' choices.

<sup>9</sup>For instance, as shown in Figure I, the grid map of Game 16 (as listed in Table I) has a choice set of  $G_n = \{(x, y) | x \in \{-3, -2, \dots, 3\}, y \in \{-3, -2, \dots, 3\}\}$  consisting of the  $7 \times 7 = 49$  locations.

<sup>10</sup>We treat the  $EQ$  type as having 4 thinking steps in calculating the average number of thinking steps.

and thus predict other’s choices in the cluster better than the pre-specified level- $k$  types. We report results of the pseudotype test in Supplementary Table 1(a) where pseudo- $i$  is the pseudotype constructed from subject  $i$ .<sup>11</sup> We find that two subjects (subject 3 and subject 17) have likelihoods for each other’s pseudotype higher than all other types. So, based on the same criteria of Costa-Gomes & Crawford (2006), these two subjects could be classified as a cluster (pseudo-17). In other words, there may be a cluster of pseudo-17 type subjects (subjects 3 and 17) whose behaviors are not explained well by the predefined level- $k$  types. Despite of this, there are still 15 subjects out of 17 who can be classified into level- $k$  types, comparable to Costa-Gomes & Crawford (2006), who find 12.5% (11/88) of their subjects fail the pseudotype test and could be classified as 5 different clusters. Table III lists the classification with and without pseudotypes in columns (C) and (B) respectively. The distribution of level- $k$  types in column (C) of Table III does not change much even if we include pseudotypes, having two  $L0$ , three  $L1$ , four  $L2$ , three  $L3$ , and three  $EQ$ . The average of thinking steps is 2.13, nearly identical to that without pseudotypes.<sup>12</sup> This suggests that in our games, the level- $k$  classification is quite robust to empirically omitted types that explain more than one subject. In other words, Hypothesis 1 is confirmed in the sense that most subjects indeed follow the prediction of a particular level- $k$  type for choices, and few alternative models can explain the behavior of more than one subject.<sup>13</sup>

In addition to the original presentation using a two-dimensional grid map (Figure II), subjects also played the same game as two one-dimensional choices chosen separately (Supplementary Figure 25). Half of the subjects are shown the original presentation first in trials 1-24 and the alternative presentation later in trials 25-48, while the rest are shown the alternative first (trials 1-24) and original later (trials 25-48). A comparison of the final choices under these two presentations is shown in Supplementary Table 4. None of the subjects two sets of final choices differ significantly.

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<sup>11</sup>Alternatively, one could increase the number of pre-specified types. For example, one referee speculated that subjects could be acting as level- $k_1$  type on the horizontal axis, while being level- $k_2$  type along the vertical axis where  $k_2 \neq k_1$ . We estimated these flexible  $Lx-Ly$  types, and results in Supplementary Table 1(b) show little evidence of such types.

<sup>12</sup>In calculating the average number of thinking steps, we ignore the two pseudo-17 subjects. For these two pseudo-17 subjects, one is re-classified as  $L1$ , and the other  $L3$  when pseudotypes are not included.

<sup>13</sup>Given that we have only seventeen subjects, it is true that we cannot rule out the possibility that our small pool of subjects did not capture all possible behavioral types. However, Costa-Gomes & Crawford (2006) also find few omitted types in their pool of 88 subjects.



## A6 Raw Lookup Data

The eyetracker’s analysis software (Data Viewer, SR-Research) is capable of reading in the raw lookup data and provides animated videos of entire lookup sequences trial-by-trial. Though it is difficult to quantify these videos, we draw insights from these videos, and base subsequent lookup analyses on these insights to gain intuition about possible alternative reasoning processes.

We attempt to understand what viewing the animated videos of lookups and subsequent analysis reveal beyond final choices. To do so, we focus primarily on the seven subjects whose lookup-based types differ from their choice-based types. We discuss briefly for those whose lookup-based types and choice-based types are the same at the end. Though the analysis is preliminary and highly conjectural, we use lookups to identify reasoning of pseudotypes (subject 3) and various ways subjects might have used to simplify the reasoning process. The simplifications include breaking the spatial beauty contest games on two-dimensional grid maps into two one-dimensional choices to reason one dimension by one dimension (subject 8), adopting heuristics such as choosing-the-corner (subject 14), and utilizing a short-cut by summing up the targets of self and opponent to combine two levels of reasoning into one step (subjects 11 and 15). Finally, some subjects seem to be jumping between related levels (subjects 6) or skipping reasoning in some trials (subject 9).

To begin with, subject 3 is grouped with subject 17 to form a distinct pseudotype in the pseudotype test. From the lookup videos of subject 3, we suspect this subject used the top-left corner (instead of the center) as the starting point and perform level- $k$  reasoning. To verify this, we calculate her *LookupScore* for the union of *Hit* areas for various level- $k$  types using the top-left corner as the starting point. In Supplementary Table 5, the *LookupScore* for this new class of level- $k$  types is much higher than that of the level- $k$  types using the center as the starting point (0.31 compared to  $-0.01$ ). In fact, all original level- $k$  types have *LookupScores* close to zero (ranging from  $-0.05$  to  $0.03$ ), implying they are not that different from uniformly random scanning.<sup>14</sup>

To see how this lookup result translates into final choices, we estimate subjects 3’s level- $k$  type using final choices by including level- $k$  types starting from the top-left corner in addition to level- $k$  types starting from the center. We report in Supplementary Table 6 that level-1 starting from the top-left corner yields the largest likelihood ( $\log L = -69.67$ ).

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<sup>14</sup>The other pseudotype subject 17 yields similar results: When we calculate her *LookupScore* for the union of *Hit* areas for various level- $k$  types using the top-left corner as the starting point, we obtain a *LookupScore* of 0.26, which is a large difference between *Hit* time and *Hit* area. In fact, this is much higher than the *LookupScore* calculated for individual *Hit* areas for various level- $k$  types who start reasoning from the center, as well as the union of these *Hit* areas, which are all close to zero (ranging from  $-0.11$  to  $0.03$  in column 2 to 7 of Supplementary Table 5).

In fact, the other pseudotype (subject 17) is also classified as level-1 starting from the top-left corner with the largest likelihood ( $\log L = -65.84$ ) when these alternative level- $k$  types are included.<sup>15</sup>

The level- $k$  model will have the most power when level-0 behavior is correctly specified. Even though the center may arguably be the most natural candidate for a level-0 belief in our design, by directly observing where a subject focuses her attention on at the beginning of the reasoning process, we could examine whether this is indeed the case. Alternatively one may allow many anchoring level-0 types and see which fits the data the best. However, doing so will sacrifice parsimony of the model and may result in overfitting of data. Observing where a subject focuses on at the beginning of a trial may be an useful alternative to help identify her level-0 belief.

Secondly, choice-based model classifies subject 8 robustly as an equilibrium type with zero misclassification in the bootstrap, even though lookup-based classification suggests level-3. How does she figure out the equilibrium choices so well? Lookup videos suggests that instead of conducting reasoning for both dimensions at the same time, she simplified the task by first reasoning regarding the horizontal dimension on the top row of the grid map, and then reasoned about the vertical dimension on the column corresponding to her horizontal final choice. Indeed, in Supplementary Table 5 her *LookupScore* for the union of the top row and the corresponding horizontal choice column is very high (0.58), much higher than that of any other level- $k$  type (ranging from  $-0.06$  to  $0.13$ ). She seemed able to calculate the equilibrium as if following the textbook instruction, but she did this by looking at the two dimensions separately. By utilizing lookups, one could potentially identify alternative reasoning processes that lead to the same equilibrium behavior.

Thirdly, subject 14 is classified as an equilibrium type based on final choices, even though lookup-based classification suggests only level-1. In lookup videos, she had very few lookups and quickly chose a corner location. This leads us to suspect she is performing some kind of corner heuristic, which the hard games were designed to separate (from truly equilibrium behavior) because equilibrium predictions in hard games do not coincide with the corner. Her average number of lookups on the map per trial is only 3.92 (3.69), much smaller than the average of 23.61 (20.09) for all subjects (*s.d.* in parenthesis). In fact, her maximal number of lookups in a trial is only 15. Looking into her choices trial-by-trial, we find

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<sup>15</sup>Interestingly, subject 3 had several exact hits for level-3 starting from the top-left corner, all in the hard games. In fact, level-3 starting from the top-left corner yields the largest likelihood ( $\log L = -19.02$ ) if we consider only hard games. If one considers only easy games, level-1 starting from the top-left corner yields the largest likelihood ( $\log L = -26.64$ ). This explains why other level- $k$  types starting from the top-left corner might also explain choice data well (for instance  $\log L = -72.48$  for level-2 and  $\log L = -74.84$  for level-3).

that except for the last two trials, subject 14’s final choices always coincide with either the corner of equilibrium (when the game is easy) or the corner closest to her own target (when the game is hard). She might have intuitively felt that choosing the corner is a good idea. But like most intuitive reasoning, it serves the purpose well in simple situations but fails in more complicated ones. In fact, choosing the corner does not help her achieve equilibrium in hard games.<sup>16</sup> The small number of lookups directly indicates some form of heuristic reasoning without pre-specifying this possibility. The same heuristic could potentially be generalized to other games as well.<sup>17</sup>

Fourth, subject 11 and subject 15 are classified as level-2 and level-3, respectively, using final choices. From their lookup videos, we suspect they might simplify reasoning in two ways. First, like subject 8, they seemed to first perform reasoning regarding the horizontal dimension, and then reasoned about the vertical dimension.<sup>18</sup> Second, in each dimension, they took a shortcut in hard games. They did so by reasoning for self and opponent jointly instead of reasoning for self in one step and for opponent in another step as level- $k$  model assumes. In particular, we speculate subject 11 added up targets of self and opponent for each dimension, and jumped directly to the short-cut level-2 location, instead of going from level-0 location to opponent’s level-1 location and then to own level-2 location. On the other hand, after performing the first level of reasoning to reach level-1, subject 15 seemed to add up targets of self and opponent for each dimension and jumped directly to the short-cut level-3 location, instead of going from own level-1 to opponent’s level-2 and back to own level-3. A key feature of their lookups is they are more concentrated than what a full-fledged level- $k$  reasoning would imply. For instance, if on the horizontal dimension own target is one step to the left and opponent’s target is four steps to the right, a full-fledged level-2 subject will first go rightward by four steps and then go leftward by one step. Taking a short-cut instead implies summing up one step to the left and four steps to the right to get three steps to the right. Thus a subject could jump to three steps to the right without first

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<sup>16</sup>Taking Game 16 illustrated in Figure I as an example, player 1’s target is  $(4, -2)$ , or “right 4, below 2.” The bottom-right corner is closest to her own target, while the top-right corner is closest to equilibrium ( $\mathbf{E}_1$  and  $\mathbf{E}_2$ ). When we calculate subject 14’s *LookupScore* for the heuristic of jumping to the corner closest to her own target, we find that in hard games, it is very high (0.60), and much higher than the *LookupScore* for the heuristic of jumping to the corner closest to equilibrium ( $-0.02$ ). Thus the heuristic does not help her find equilibrium. In easy games, the heuristic serves her well. Her *LookupScore* for the heuristic of jumping to the corner of equilibrium is very high (0.76).

<sup>17</sup>For instance, in the two-person guessing game of Costa-Gomes & Crawford (2006), the corner heuristic corresponds to “choosing either the upper or lower bound depending solely on  $\alpha \cdot \beta > 1$  or  $< 1$ .”

<sup>18</sup>This can be seen from Supplementary Table 5. Looking through all possible combinations of any single row and any single column, the maximal *LookupScore* on a single row and a single column is 0.60 for subject 11 and 0.63 for subject 15, much higher from the *LookupScore* for various level- $k$  types.

going rightward and then leftward.<sup>19</sup> Indeed, when subject 11 is playing the 12 hard games, the average lookup time spent on the short-cut path (*Hit* time normalized by *Hit* area size) is 5.9 times of random lookup, but only 4.3 times on the standard level-2 path. See game-by-game results of subject 11 shown in Supplementary Figure 26. Similarly, when subject 15 is playing the 12 hard games, the average lookup time spent on the short-cut path is 5.4 times of random lookup, but only 4.8 times on the standard level-3 path. This is illustrated in Supplementary Figure 27. Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test indicates significant difference between the short-cut path and the corresponding level- $k$  path for both subjects ( $p < 0.01$ ) when comparing average lookup time game-by-game.<sup>20</sup> Short-cutting may be one way to achieve high levels of reasoning without going through the sophistication these levels may have required, which results in final choices very similar to standard level- $k$  types. Thus it is hard to identify shortcutting by final choices alone.

Fifth, subject 6 is classified as a level-2 based on final choices, even though lookup-based classification suggests equilibrium. From her videos, we suspect she is going back and forth between being level-2 and level-4 (which coincides with equilibrium most of the time). Indeed, calculating the *LookupScore* trial-by-trial, we find her having the highest *LookupScore* at level-1 at the beginning, but eventually switching and alternating between level-2 and level-4, yielding *LookupScore* of 0.52 and 0.64 in the last 16 trials for the two levels, respectively. Supplementary Figure 28 plots the 3-trial moving average of *LookupScore* for various level- $k$  types, which shows the same trend.

Finally, subject 9 is classified as level-0 based on final choices, even though lookup classification suggests level-2. In the lookup videos, she seemed to have “given up” reasoning and chose the center location several times toward the end of the experiment. Indeed, subject 9 had 3 trials with only 3 lookups and 7 trials with 13 lookups or less. In most of

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<sup>19</sup>Taking this short-cut implies jumping only in hard games. In easy games there is always a player whose target is zero in that dimension, hence taking this short-cut does not imply jumping and cannot be distinguished from a full-fledged level- $k$  reasoning. For instance, if on the horizontal dimension own target is one step to the left and opponent’s target is zero, a full-fledged level-2 subject will first stay at the center and then go leftward by one step. Taking a short cut instead implies summing up one step to the left and zero step to get one step to the left as well.

<sup>20</sup>The reason we report hit time normalized by hit area size instead of *LookupScore* is because *LookupScore* is not informative here. Recall *LookupScore* of any area is positive as long as subjects scan over that area more than uniform scanning would imply. Hence even if lookups are more concentrated and fall on a subset  $S$  of what a full-fledged level- $k$  reasoning would imply (call this full-fledged area  $F$ ), as long as subjects scan over the complement ( $F \setminus S$ ) more than uniform scanning would imply, *LookupScore* of the complement ( $F \setminus S$ ) will be positive, driving a higher *LookupScore* for the area of a full-fledged level- $k$  reasoning ( $F$ ). This is based on the observation that *LookupScore* of any area  $F$  equals that of a subset  $S$  and the complement  $F \setminus S$  since *LookupScore* is simply hit time minus hit area size and thus additive.

these trials she chose the center. Excluding the 3 trials with the least lookups (1/8 of total trials), we reclassify her as level-2 based on the remaining 21 final choices, consistent with the lookup classification ( $\log L = -80.89$ ).<sup>21</sup> If indeed a subject skips reasoning in some trials maybe due to exhaustion, without lookups, one could not have identified and exclude these “lazy” trials in which she skips reasoning.

For the remaining ten subjects whose lookup-based types and choice-based types are the same, though we also notice some similar features as above, however, they seem to exhibit these features in a more subtle way. However, we do notice two which we can quantify.

First, two subjects (subjects 1 and 10) can be called the textbook literal level- $k$  type. Their videos indicate that they follow the best-response hierarchy almost perfectly. In fact, column 4 of Table VI reports that their estimated logit precision parameter  $\lambda$  has a median of 8.58 and 9.00, which is extremely high, compared with the rest who at most has a median of 2.35.

Second, three subjects (subjects 4, 10, 12) have many trials in which they do not look at the opponent’s goal even once. Out of 24 trials, both subjects 4 and 10 have 16 such trials and subject 12 has 14. Since they seldom look at opponent’s goal, at most they can be level-1. Indeed, they are all classified as level-1. We further notice that subject 4 has 10 such trials in the second half (12 trials) of the game.

## A7 Trial-by-trial Level- $k$ Lookup Estimation

We want to classify subjects into various behavioral types based on their trial-by-trial lookups. Estimating the full-blown Markov-switching model trial-by-trial may not be possible since lookups in a single trial might be too short to identify the transition matrix. For instance, an  $L1$  Markov switching model, which consists of a two-state transition matrix, requires at least four observations: the transitions from  $L0$  to  $L0$ , from  $L0$  to  $L1$ , from  $L1$  to  $L0$ , and from  $L1$  to  $L1$ . Hence we need at least four lookups to estimate these transitions. In general, an  $Lk$  transition matrix, which consists of  $k + 1$  states, needs at least  $k + (k + 1)(k + 2)/2$  observations and therefore at least  $k + (k + 1)(k + 2)/2$  lookups to estimate the transitions. We propose a different way to use the lookups even when they are short (or consists of only one trial). Since an  $Lk$  player’s lookups should fall on some particular locations if the best response hierarchy is gone through, we aim at investigating how close the empirical lookups are to the mixture of these locations.

To illustrate our method, let’s first consider an  $L1$  player’s lookups. In a game where the target of an  $L1$  player is two steps to the right of her opponent’s choice, she would

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<sup>21</sup>Excluding the 7 trials with 13 lookups or less also classifies her as level-2 ( $\log L = -65.55$ ).

calculate her best response by counting two steps to the right from the center. Her lookups will fall on the center, the location one step to the right of it, and the location two steps to the right of it, which is her final choice. These three particular locations are defined as the heatmap for an  $L1$  player. We assume a subject looks uniformly over this particular heatmap, but conditional on each location her lookups follow the logit error distribution over the grid map. Since there are three locations in this heatmap, her lookup distribution will be the mixture of these three logit error distributions.

In general, if an  $Lk$  player's heatmap consists of  $m$  locations  $l_1^k, \dots, l_m^k$ , her lookup distribution will be the mixture of  $m$  logit error distributions. To be specific, her lookup  $R^k$  is distributed according to the following distribution: For any location  $r \in G$  on the grid map,

$$\Pr(R^k = r | \text{heatmap} = \{l_1^k, \dots, l_m^k\}) = \frac{1}{m} \sum_{j=1}^m \left( \frac{\exp(-\lambda_k \times \|r - l_j^k\|)}{\sum_{g \in G} \exp(-\lambda_k \times \|g - l_j^k\|)} \right)$$

where  $\lambda \in [0, \infty)$  is the precision parameter. In words, this is the probability of observing the location  $r$  with  $m$  equal likely logit error distributions where each logit error distribution is centered on one particular location in the heatmap.

We take a subject's lookup duration heatmap as our empirical distribution, and then classify her into the type in which the mixture of logit distribution is closest to the empirical one. How close these two distributions are is determined by minimizing the mean absolute difference between the mixture of the logit distribution of every level- $k$  type and the empirical duration heatmap over the precision parameter. Precisely, suppose a subject's lookup duration percentage on the location  $r \in G$  is  $d_r$ , we classify this subject into level  $k^*$  such that:

$$k^* \in \arg \min_k \left[ \min_{\lambda_k} \left( \sum_{r \in G} \left| d_r - \Pr(R^k = r | \text{heatmap} = \{l_1^k, \dots, l_m^k\}) \right| \right) \right]$$

In words, for each location  $r$ , we use the lookup duration percentage on  $r$  as the empirical probability of observing  $r$  and see whether this empirical probability is close to the predicted probability  $\Pr(R^k = r | \text{heatmap} = \{l_1^k, \dots, l_m^k\})$ .

We do this for each trial of each subject. Hence a subject could be classified into different  $Lk$  types in different trials.

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Supplementary Table 1: Subject's Maximized Likelihood for Various Types Based on Final Choices

(a) Level- $k$  Types vs. Pseudotypes

Subject	Lk type					Pseudotype																	
	L0	L1	L2	L3	EQ	pseudo-1	pseudo-2	pseudo-3	pseudo-4	pseudo-5	pseudo-6	pseudo-7	pseudo-8	pseudo-9	pseudo-10	pseudo-11	pseudo-12	pseudo-13	pseudo-14	pseudo-15	pseudo-16	pseudo-17	
1	-98.89	-88.92	-79.24	<u>-52.32</u>	-67.21	.	-98.27	-98.89	-97.34	-81.26	-85.83	-98.89	-84.57	-98.57	-92.07	-77.82	-91.05	-97.86	-97.81	-85.92	-86.76	-98.89	L3
2	-97.16	-93.70	<u>-81.14</u>	-85.76	-90.68	-96.12	.	-97.47	-94.69	-97.09	-91.68	-98.47	-95.52	-96.63	-98.55	-92.85	-97.14	-86.30	-93.32	-97.06	-89.75	-97.60	L2
3	-98.89	<u>-93.70</u>	-97.84	<u>-93.13</u>	-95.03	-98.89	-98.76	.	-98.89	-98.89	-98.89	-96.50	-98.89	-98.74	-98.89	-98.89	-98.89	-95.56	-95.28	-98.89	-98.87	<b>-61.67</b>	pseudo-17
4	-96.92	<u>-90.37</u>	-96.82	-95.96	-97.36	-95.15	-95.24	-98.89	.	-95.27	-96.40	-98.55	-96.69	-97.76	-91.42	-93.75	-93.73	-98.82	-98.89	-95.38	-96.31	-98.85	L1
5	-98.89	-97.28	-86.53	-82.12	<u>-70.69</u>	-83.19	-98.89	-98.89	-98.21	.	-87.17	-98.89	-90.70	-98.89	-98.04	-91.52	-97.98	-97.25	-95.28	-94.69	-93.74	-98.89	EQ
6	-98.89	-90.71	<u>-69.22</u>	-78.98	<u>-73.24</u>	-84.16	-93.91	-98.89	-97.49	-83.63	.	-98.89	-82.34	-98.32	-91.09	-79.83	-90.67	-94.70	-97.29	-89.75	-80.90	-98.89	L2
7	<u>-94.15</u>	-98.89	-98.69	-98.88	-98.87	-98.40	-98.17	<b>-93.04</b>	-98.00	-98.89	-98.89	.	-98.89	-96.99	-98.89	-98.64	-98.67	-97.75	-98.59	-98.69	-98.64	<b>-91.95</b>	L0
8	-98.89	-93.43	-89.58	<u>-81.62</u>	<u>-70.02</u>	-87.23	-98.71	-98.89	-98.86	-91.38	-86.73	-98.89	.	-98.89	-96.49	-91.17	-98.09	-98.25	-96.93	-94.93	-90.87	-98.89	EQ
9	<u>-92.52</u>	-97.28	<u>-93.37</u>	-95.39	-95.76	-96.80	-96.74	-97.47	-97.49	-97.35	-97.21	-97.55	-98.34	.	-98.66	-95.98	-98.38	-95.95	-97.51	-95.60	-94.78	-98.25	L0
10	-98.89	<u>-39.73</u>	-93.07	-86.98	-94.00	-90.22	-98.89	-98.89	-92.67	-96.01	-90.68	-98.89	-93.16	-98.89	.	-87.94	-75.40	-98.89	-98.89	-89.36	-93.45	-98.89	L1
11	-97.77	-85.59	<u>-68.30</u>	<u>-70.72</u>	-77.28	-74.45	-93.62	-98.89	-93.88	-86.59	-78.18	-98.88	-85.40	-96.43	-86.75	.	-82.33	-95.75	-98.54	-80.56	-74.79	-98.89	L2
12	-98.24	<u>-72.01</u>	-86.53	-84.90	-92.83	-86.82	-97.09	-98.89	-92.99	-94.22	-88.02	-98.82	-93.87	-98.32	-73.09	-81.09	.	-98.89	-98.89	-84.44	-89.75	-98.89	L1
13	-98.89	-85.59	-81.74	<u>-72.14</u>	-79.36	-97.74	-90.12	-95.65	-98.89	-96.01	-95.63	-98.89	-96.97	-98.01	-98.89	-97.55	-98.89	.	-75.94	-98.51	-92.86	-94.94	L3
14	-98.89	<u>-84.17</u>	-96.99	-76.67	<u>-74.45</u>	-98.89	-98.83	-98.60	-98.89	-97.81	-98.89	-98.89	-98.47	-98.89	-98.89	-98.89	-98.89	-83.53	.	-98.89	-98.89	-98.56	EQ
15	-98.89	-90.71	<u>-84.53</u>	<u>-82.12</u>	-86.72	-83.19	-97.94	-98.89	-96.09	-91.08	-88.82	-98.89	-90.70	-96.63	-88.87	<b>-81.09</b>	-86.22	-97.75	-98.81	.	-88.95	-98.89	L3
16	-98.89	-92.88	<u>-57.64</u>	-80.59	-80.35	-83.68	-90.91	-98.39	-96.67	-89.50	-79.42	-98.89	-85.40	-95.56	-92.69	-74.91	-91.05	-90.50	-95.78	-88.56	.	-98.85	L2
17	-98.89	<u>-92.88</u>	-98.17	-95.19	-97.36	-98.89	-98.59	<b>-60.42</b>	-98.89	-98.89	-98.89	-94.87	-98.89	-98.85	-98.89	-98.89	-98.89	-93.99	-94.35	-98.89	-98.89	.	pseudo-17

Note: Each row corresponds to a subject and contains the following information in order: subject number, the likelihood of various level- $k$  types, the likelihood of various pseudotypes (excluding the pseudotype corresponding to the subject herself), and the type with the largest likelihood of level- $k$  types (listed in the last column) unless a pseudotype cluster is identified. Note that the likelihoods are based on choice data and the type with the largest likelihood among the various level- $k$  types is underlined, which the largest likelihood among the pseudotypes are in **bold** when it is higher than that of all level- $k$  types. The likelihood of a subject's lookup type, when different from her choice type, is double underlined.



(b) Level- $k$  Types Allowing Each Dimension to Have Different Levels of Reasoning

Subject	$Lx-Ly$																				Type
	L0-L1	L0-L2	L0-L3	L0-EQ	L1-L0	L1-L2	L1-L3	L1-EQ	L2-L0	L2-L1	L2-L3	L2-EQ	L3-L0	L3-L1	L3-L2	L3-EQ	EQ-L0	EQ-L1	EQ-L2	EQ-L3	
1	-96.52	-94.66	-87.00	-91.07	-97.35	-85.22	-74.71	-80.78	-95.39	-84.51	-66.01	-74.39	-86.26	-70.85	-62.03	-56.85	-90.53	-78.08	-72.15	-58.24	L3
2	-94.86	-88.89	-91.62	-92.12	-95.97	-88.37	-90.63	-91.07	-91.82	-89.33	-85.11	-85.93	-91.78	-89.29	-81.98	-86.06	-95.44	-93.20	-88.33	-90.30	L2
3	-97.99	-98.79	-97.28	-97.67	-97.51	-95.71	-92.48	-93.33	-98.80	-96.49	-95.57	-96.12	-97.31	-93.54	-95.52	-93.17	-98.23	-95.40	-96.91	-94.44	L3
4	-95.63	-97.07	-95.94	-96.90	-91.40	-92.34	-90.96	-92.53	-96.78	-95.51	-95.77	-96.63	-96.42	-95.16	-96.46	-96.28	-97.68	-96.60	-97.58	-96.75	L1
5	-98.89	-98.69	-98.09	-97.38	-98.82	-93.79	-92.48	-91.07	-96.58	-93.30	-85.11	-83.14	-93.72	-89.98	-81.98	-78.51	-88.61	-84.47	-74.21	-73.05	EQ
6	-98.41	-93.72	-96.16	-93.96	-94.43	-79.12	-85.21	-81.30	-90.15	-85.95	-78.68	-73.70	-90.28	-86.18	-71.68	-75.02	-88.61	-84.47	-69.95	-77.77	L2
7	-97.72	-96.45	-96.57	-96.34	-98.87	-98.89	-98.89	-98.87	-98.40	-98.88	-98.64	-98.54	-98.74	-98.89	-98.85	-98.76	-98.88	-98.89	-98.89	-98.89	L0
8	-98.76	-98.26	-96.37	-93.08	-98.89	-91.02	-87.34	-81.81	-98.84	-92.42	-85.58	-79.40	-97.74	-88.93	-85.46	-74.40	-96.06	-85.73	-81.78	-77.22	EQ
9	-98.22	-95.99	-96.94	-96.72	-91.78	-94.81	-95.80	-95.58	<u>-89.24</u>	-96.49	-94.70	-94.47	-91.78	-97.09	-94.64	-95.38	-92.84	-97.30	-95.16	-95.97	L2L0
10	-84.73	-96.67	-93.90	-96.54	-81.12	-72.83	-67.22	-76.22	-97.16	-78.92	-89.67	-93.22	-95.08	-75.04	-90.29	-90.66	-97.42	-83.14	-94.05	-91.19	L1
11	-92.03	-87.39	-87.00	-87.85	-92.86	-79.74	-79.64	-80.78	-86.72	-77.64	-69.46	-71.54	-87.24	-78.73	-70.91	-73.12	-89.79	-82.20	-76.14	-76.09	L2
12	-87.36	-93.04	-90.88	-94.50	-89.33	-80.35	-77.89	-84.21	-93.94	-79.54	-84.15	-89.13	-93.72	-80.41	-86.80	-89.03	-96.62	-86.92	-91.66	-89.67	L1
13	-96.91	-96.23	-92.66	-94.24	-96.20	-83.18	-77.28	-80.78	-95.90	-84.51	-75.45	-79.40	-91.42	-77.55	-73.90	-71.79	-94.74	-84.04	-81.78	-76.09	L3
14	-98.89	-98.89	-98.48	-98.51	-98.89	-92.02	-80.20	-81.30	-98.89	-92.12	-89.30	-89.84	-98.48	-80.41	-89.21	-77.39	-97.55	-77.52	-86.77	<u>-73.05</u>	EQL3
15	-94.86	-94.95	-92.32	-94.50	-97.51	-90.67	-87.74	-90.43	-94.56	-85.00	<u>-81.01</u>	-85.04	-94.29	-85.31	-85.00	-85.24	-94.98	-86.92	-86.77	-83.65	L2L3
16	-97.26	-91.12	-94.99	-94.76	-96.20	-84.22	-89.61	-89.42	-83.18	-78.92	-72.59	-72.99	-89.88	-85.75	-72.44	-81.12	-89.01	-84.90	-72.15	-80.38	L2
17	-96.09	-98.26	-95.49	-97.23	-97.93	-95.91	<u>-92.19</u>	-94.54	-98.89	-96.31	-95.77	-97.23	-98.68	-95.16	-97.39	-96.28	-98.89	-96.60	-98.19	-96.14	L1L3

Note: Each row corresponds to a subject and contains the following information in order: subject number, the likelihood of various level- $k$  types allowing different levels for each dimension, and the type with the largest likelihood of level- $k$  types (listed in the last column). Note that the likelihoods are based on choice data and the type with the largest likelihood among the various level- $k$  types is underlined.

Supplementary Table 2: Distribution of Types Based on Hansen's Test and Iterative Vuong's Test

<i>subject</i>	$Lk^*$	$Lk^a$	Vuong's ( $V$ )	$Lk^d$	<i>Iterative Vuong</i>	Hansen's <i>p</i> -value	$Lk^{Hansen}$
1	L3	L2	4.425+	L3	-	-	-
2	L3	L2	0.689	L2	L1	-	-
3	L3	L1	1.577	L1	L0	0.084	L1
4	L3	L1	1.597	L1	-	0.095	L1
5	EQ	L2	2.977+	EQ	-	0.023*	EQ
6	EQ	L2	2.400+	EQ	-	0.053	<u>L2</u>
7	L2	L0	1.582	L0	-	0.769	L0
8	L3	L1	2.812+	L3	-	0.025*	L3
9	EQ	L2	1.001	L2	-	0.498	L2
10	L3	L1	1.226	L1	-	0.497	L1
11	L3	L2	2.087+	L3	-	-	-
12	L3	L1	0.853	L1	-	0.500	L1
13	L3	L1	3.939+	L3	-	0.015*	L3
14	L3	L1	1.692	L1	L0	0.096	L1
15	L3	L2	1.470	L2	L0	-	-
16	L3	L2	1.342	L2	L1	-	-
17	L3	L1	1.778	L1	-	0.082	L1

Note: + indicates the Vuong statistic  $V$  is significant or  $|V|>1.96$ .

\* indicates  $p$ -value less than 0.05.

Each row corresponds to a subject and contains the following information in order: (1) subject number, (2) based on her lookups, the type with the largest likelihood (denoted by  $Lk^*$ , also reported under the  $Lk^*$  column of Table II), (3) based on her lookups, the alternative lower level type which has the next largest likelihood (denoted by  $Lk^a$ , also reported under the  $Lk^a$  column of Table II), (4) Vuong's statistic in testing whether  $Lk^*$  and  $Lk^a$  are equally good models, (5) subject's type based on Vuong's test result, (6) types of those subjects who, based on the iterative Vuong's test, have different types from those based on Vuong's test, (7)  $p$ -value in Hansen's test if  $Lk^*$  and  $Lk^a$  are strictly nested, (8) types based on Hansen's test result when  $Lk^*$  and  $Lk^a$  are strictly nested. Note that among the twelve subjects whose  $Lk^*$  and  $Lk^a$  are strictly nested, Vuong's test results are almost identical to Hansen's test results. The only exception is that for subject 6 (her  $Lk^{Hansen}$  type L2), her Vuong's test statistic  $V$  is  $2.400 > 1.96$  while the  $p$ -value of the Hansen's test is 0.053, at the margin of significance.

Supplementary Table 3: Distribution of Types Based on Lookup Data (Unconstrained Markov)

Subject	Unconstrained $Lk^*$	Unconstrained $Lk^a$	Vuong's statistic $V$	Unconstrained $Lk^l$	Constrained $Lk^l$
1	L3	L2	3.818 +	L3	L3
2	L3	L2	0.704	L2	L2
3	EQ	L3	0.824	<u>L3</u>	<u>L1</u>
4	L3	L1	1.740	L1	L1
5	EQ	L2	4.482 +	EQ	EQ
6	EQ	L3	0.890	<u>L3</u>	<u>EQ</u>
7	L2	L0	1.385	L0	L0
8	EQ	L3	0.929	L3	L3
9	EQ	L2	1.381	L2	L2
10	L3	L1	1.600	L1	L1
11	L3	L2	2.290 +	L3	L3
12	L3	L1	1.480	L1	L1
13	L3	L1	4.224 +	L3	L3
14	L3	L1	2.301 +	<u>L3</u>	<u>L1</u>
15	L3	L2	2.149 +	<u>L3</u>	<u>L2</u>
16	L3	L2	0.881	L2	L2
17	L3	L1	2.191 +	<u>L3</u>	<u>L1</u>

Note: + indicates Vuong's statistic  $V$  is significant or  $|V| > 1.96$ .

Unconstrained  $Lk^*$  denotes the type with the largest likelihood.

Unconstrained  $Lk^a$  denotes the alternative lower level type which has the next-largest likelihood.

Unconstrained  $Lk^l$  denotes the classified type based on Vuong's test result for the unconstrained Markov-switching model.

Constrained  $Lk^l$  denotes the classified type based on the constrained Markov model.

Each row corresponds to a subject and contains the following information in order: (1) the subject number, (2) based on her lookups, the type with the largest likelihood using the unconstrained Markov-switching model, (3) based on her lookups, the alternative lower level type which has the next-largest likelihood, (4) Vuong's statistic in testing whether  $Lk^*$  and  $Lk^a$  are equally good models, (5) subject's lookup type based on Vuong's test result, (6) subject's lookup type based on the constrained Markov-switching model (as reported in the fifth column of Table II). Any difference between (5) and (6) are underlined. Notice that in (5) we classify a subject as her  $Lk^*$  type if according to Vuong's test,  $Lk^*$  is a better model than  $Lk^a$ . On the other hand, if  $Lk^*$  and  $Lk^a$  are equally good models, since  $Lk^a$  has fewer parameters, to avoid overfitting, we classify a subject as her  $Lk^a$  type.

Supplementary Table 4: Comparisons on Final Choices of Alternative Presentations

<i>Subject</i>	<i>Average Difference</i>				<i>Fitting original presentation (with logit)</i>	
	in X axis	(s.e.)	in Y axis	(s.e.)	lambda	(s.e.)
1	0.032	(0.209)	0.127	(0.315)	0.542*	(0.108)
2	0.032	(0.406)	0.196	(0.363)	0.085	(0.074)
3	-0.048	(0.112)	-0.024	(0.140)	1.287*	(0.195)
4	-0.066	(0.243)	-0.012	(0.271)	0.426*	(0.103)
5	0.141	(0.268)	0.152	(0.329)	0.272*	(0.091)
6	-0.033	(0.255)	-0.075	(0.154)	0.583*	(0.110)
7	-0.017	(0.293)	0.073	(0.260)	0.256*	(0.095)
8	0.029	(0.233)	0.056	(0.311)	0.374*	(0.096)
9	-0.109	(0.213)	-0.103	(0.420)	0.177*	(0.081)
10	0.044	(0.210)	0.023	(0.131)	0.857*	(0.149)
11	-0.071	(0.142)	0.000	(0.235)	0.680*	(0.126)
12	0.029	(0.186)	0.066	(0.140)	0.696*	(0.129)
13	0.122	(0.218)	0.077	(0.183)	0.449*	(0.109)
14	-0.006	(0.029)	-0.004	(0.113)	2.061*	(0.354)
15	0.014	(0.176)	-0.039	(0.242)	0.579*	(0.119)
16	0.064	(0.193)	0.351	(0.286)	0.150	(0.087)
17	-0.003	(0.175)	0.035	(0.145)	0.765*	(0.138)

Note: \* denotes significance at the 0.05 level.

Each row corresponds to a subject and contains the following information in order: (1) subject number, (2) the average difference of choices in the X axis in the two presentations (standard errors in parentheses), (3) the average difference of choices in the Y axis in the two presentations (standard errors in parentheses), (4) the precision parameter of the logit error if we treat each subject's choice in the alternative presentation as a pseudotype to fit her choice in the original presentation. Notice that if a subject's choices in the two presentations are similar, we should expect that her average difference of choices in either the X axis or the Y axis should not be significantly different from zero. Moreover, we should expect that her choices in the alternative presentation as a pseudotype can predict her choices in the original presentation well and hence the precision parameter in the error structure should be significantly different from zero. This is indeed the case. For none of the subjects, the average difference in either axis is significantly different from zero. For fifteen of the seventeen subjects, the precision parameters are significantly different from zero.

Supplementary Table 5: Inconsistent Subject’s *LookupScores* for level- $k$  Types and Alternative Rules

Subject	L0	L1	L2	L3	EQ	L0-EQ	Alternative Reasoning Rule
3	-0.01	0.00	-0.02	0.03	-0.05	-0.01	0.31 (L0-EQ starting from top left corner)
17	-0.01	0.03	-0.08	0.03	-0.11	-0.04	0.26 (L0-EQ starting from top left corner)
8	-0.01	-0.03	-0.06	0.01	0.13	-	0.58 (Top row and X-choice column)
14 (Easy)	-0.02	0.00	-0.11	0.06	0.45	-	0.76 (Corner heuristic-EQ)
14 (Hard)	-0.02	0.18	-0.21	0.15	-0.27	-	0.60 (Corner heuristic-own target)
11	0.01	0.04	0.13	0.31	0.21	-	0.60 (Single row plus single column*)
15	-0.01	0.04	0.03	0.22	0.13	-	0.63 (Single row plus single column*)
6	0.11	0.21	0.35	0.40	0.45	-	- (See Supplementary Figure 28)

Note: \* Row and column combination that yields highest *LookupScore*.

Each row corresponds to an “inconsistent” subject and contains the following information in order: subject number (and games used), the *LookupScores* of various level- $k$  types and the *LookupScore* for an alternative reasoning rule inspired by the lookup videos.


Supplementary Table 6: Pseudotypes’ Likelihood for Alternative Level- $k$  Types Based on Final Choices

Subject	L0	L1	L2	L3	L4	L0 via top-left	L1 via top-left	L2 via top-left	L3 via top-left	L4 via top-left
3 (Easy)	-49.45	-49.45	-49.45	-49.32	-49.45	-35.59	<u>-26.64</u>	-39.41	-45.27	-48.35
3 (Hard)	-49.37	-39.30	-44.77	-36.33	-38.85	-49.35	-40.98	-31.21	<u>-19.02</u>	-33.75
3 (All)	-98.89	-93.70	-97.84	-92.35	-94.89	-91.51	<u>-69.67</u>	-72.48	-74.84	-88.09
17 (All)	-98.89	-92.88	-98.17	-94.58	-97.29	-90.19	<u>-65.84</u>	-71.69	-81.42	-93.02


Note: Each row corresponds to a subject and contains the following information in order: subject number (and games used), the likelihood of various level- $k$  types and the likelihood of various level- $k$  types starting from the top-left corner. Note that the likelihoods are based on choice data and the type with the largest likelihood among all types is underlined.

Supplementary Table 7: Individual Response Time


Subject	Average (sec)	Min.	Max.
1	16.38	4.79	38.30
2	27.16	7.46	95.18
3	17.96	5.61	46.47
4	8.07	2.93	27.22
5	30.78	7.81	62.93
6	21.05	4.92	43.90
7	10.80	3.80	19.92
8	28.22	8.05	81.14
9	15.28	1.24	31.69
10	10.43	4.56	20.12
11	11.16	6.73	21.91
12	6.22	2.75	13.42
13	17.70	9.17	24.49
14	4.91	1.82	25.39
15	24.31	4.23	129.93
16	9.56	3.81	19.91
17	23.83	13.07	41.22
Overall	16.70	Std	13.62




Supplementary Figure 1: Aggregate Empirical Percentage of Time Spent on Each Location for Game 1 with 1-dimensional Targets  $(-2,0)$  (own) and  $(0,-4)$  (opponent) on a  $9 \times 9$  map. The radius of the circle is proportional to the average percentage of time spent on each location, so bigger circles indicate longer time spent.  $L_0, L_1, \dots, E$  are the predicted choices of various level- $k$  types. The red dots represent individual final choices.



Supplementary Figure 2: Aggregate Empirical Percentage of Time Spent on Each Location for Game 2 with 1-dimensional Targets  $(0,-4)$  (own) and  $(-2,0)$  (opponent) on a  $9 \times 9$  map. The radius of the circle is proportional to the average percentage of time spent on each location, so bigger circles indicate longer time spent.  $L_0, L_1, \dots, E$  are the predicted choices of various level- $k$  types. The red dots represent individual final choices.




Supplementary Figure 3: Aggregate Empirical Percentage of Time Spent on Each Location for Game 3 with 1-dimensional Targets (2, 0) (own) and (0,-2) (opponent) on a 7x7 map. The radius of the circle is proportional to the average percentage of time spent on each location, so bigger circles indicate longer time spent. L0, L1, ..., E are the predicted choices of various level- $k$  types. The red dots represent individual final choices.




Supplementary Figure 4: Aggregate Empirical Percentage of Time Spent on Each Location for Game 4 with 1-dimensional Targets (0,-2) (own) and (2, 0) (opponent) on a 7x7 map. The radius of the circle is proportional to the average percentage of time spent on each location, so bigger circles indicate longer time spent. L0, L1, ..., E are the predicted choices of various level- $k$  types. The red dots represent individual final choices.







Supplementary Figure 5: Aggregate Empirical Percentage of Time Spent on Each Location for Game 5 with 1-dimensional Targets  $(2, 0)$  (own) and  $(0, 2)$  (opponent) on an  $11 \times 5$  map. The radius of the circle is proportional to the average percentage of time spent on each location, so bigger circles indicate longer time spent. L0, L1, ..., E are the predicted choices of various level- $k$  types. The red dots represent individual final choices.




Supplementary Figure 6: Aggregate Empirical Percentage of Time Spent on Each Location for Game 6 with 1-dimensional Targets  $(0,2)$  (own) and  $(2, 0)$  (opponent) on an  $11 \times 5$  map. The radius of the circle is proportional to the average percentage of time spent on each location, so bigger circles indicate longer time spent. L0, L1, ..., E are the predicted choices of various level- $k$  types. The red dots represent individual final choices.




Supplementary Figure 7: Aggregate Empirical Percentage of Time Spent on Each Location for Game 7 with 1-dimensional Targets  $(-2, 0)$  (own) and  $(0, -2)$  (opponent) on a  $9 \times 7$  map. The radius of the circle is proportional to the average percentage of time spent on each location, so bigger circles indicate longer time spent. L0, L1, ..., E are the predicted choices of various level- $k$  types. The red dots represent individual final choices.




Supplementary Figure 8: Aggregate Empirical Percentage of Time Spent on Each Location for Game 8 with 1-dimensional Targets  $(0, -2)$  (own) and  $(-2, 0)$  (opponent) on a  $9 \times 7$  map. The radius of the circle is proportional to the average percentage of time spent on each location, so bigger circles indicate longer time spent. L0, L1, ..., E are the predicted choices of various level- $k$  types. The red dots represent individual final choices.




Supplementary Figure 9: Aggregate Empirical Percentage of Time Spent on Each Location for Game 9 with 1-dimensional Targets  $(-4, 0)$  (own) and  $(0, 2)$  (opponent) on a  $7 \times 9$  map. The radius of the circle is proportional to the average percentage of time spent on each location, so bigger circles indicate longer time spent. L0, L1, ..., E are the predicted choices of various level- $k$  types. The red dots represent individual final choices.




Supplementary Figure 10: Aggregate Empirical Percentage of Time Spent on Each Location for Game 10 with 1-dimensional Targets  $(0, 2)$  (own) and  $(-4, 0)$  (opponent) on a  $7 \times 9$  map. The radius of the circle is proportional to the average percentage of time spent on each location, so bigger circles indicate longer time spent. L0, L1, ..., E are the predicted choices of various level- $k$  types. The red dots represent individual final choices.




Supplementary Figure 11: Aggregate Empirical Percentage of Time Spent on Each Location for Game 11 with 1-dimensional Targets  $(2, 0)$  (own) and  $(0, 2)$  (opponent) on a  $7 \times 9$  map. The radius of the circle is proportional to the average percentage of time spent on each location, so bigger circles indicate longer time spent. L0, L1, ..., E are the predicted choices of various level- $k$  types. The red dots represent individual final choices.




Supplementary Figure 12: Aggregate Empirical Percentage of Time Spent on Each Location for Game 12 with 1-dimensional Targets  $(0, 2)$  (own) and  $(2, 0)$  (opponent) on a  $7 \times 9$  map. The radius of the circle is proportional to the average percentage of time spent on each location, so bigger circles indicate longer time spent. L0, L1, ..., E are the predicted choices of various level- $k$  types. The red dots represent individual final choices.




Supplementary Figure 13: Aggregate Empirical Percentage of Time Spent on Each Location for Game 13 with 2-dimensional Targets  $(-2, -6)$  (own) and  $(4, 4)$  (opponent) on a 9x9 map. The radius of the circle is proportional to the average percentage of time spent on each location, so bigger circles indicate longer time spent. L0, L1, ..., E are the predicted choices of various level- $k$  types. The red dots represent individual final choices.




Supplementary Figure 14: Aggregate Empirical Percentage of Time Spent on Each Location for Game 14 with 2-dimensional Targets  $(4, 4)$  (own) and  $(-2, -6)$  (opponent) on a 9x9 map. The radius of the circle is proportional to the average percentage of time spent on each location, so bigger circles indicate longer time spent. L0, L1, ..., E are the predicted choices of various level- $k$  types. The red dots represent individual final choices.




Supplementary Figure 15: Aggregate Empirical Percentage of Time Spent on Each Location for Game 15 with 2-dimensional Targets  $(-2, 4)$  (own) and  $(4, -2)$  (opponent) on a  $7 \times 7$  map. The radius of the circle is proportional to the average percentage of time spent on each location, so bigger circles indicate longer time spent. L0, L1, ..., E are the predicted choices of various level- $k$  types. The red dots represent individual final choices.




Supplementary Figure 16: Aggregate Empirical Percentage of Time Spent on Each Location for Game 16 with 2-dimensional Targets  $(4, -2)$  (own) and  $(-2, 4)$  (opponent) on a  $7 \times 7$  map. The radius of the circle is proportional to the average percentage of time spent on each location, so bigger circles indicate longer time spent. L0, L1, ..., E are the predicted choices of various level- $k$  types. The red dots represent individual final choices.




Supplementary Figure 17: Aggregate Empirical Percentage of Time Spent on Each Location for Game 17 with 2-dimensional Targets  $(6, 2)$  (own) and  $(-2, -4)$  (opponent) on an  $11 \times 5$  map. The radius of the circle is proportional to the average percentage of time spent on each location, so bigger circles indicate longer time spent. L0, L1, ..., E are the predicted choices of various level- $k$  types. The red dots represent individual final choices.



Supplementary Figure 18: Aggregate Empirical Percentage of Time Spent on Each Location for Game 18 with 2-dimensional Targets  $(6, 2)$  (own) and  $(-2, -4)$  (opponent) on a  $11 \times 5$  map. The radius of the circle is proportional to the average percentage of time spent on each location, so bigger circles indicate longer time spent. L0, L1, ..., E are the predicted choices of various level- $k$  types. The red dots represent individual final choices.




Supplementary Figure 19: Aggregate Empirical Percentage of Time Spent on Each Location for Game 19 with 2-dimensional Targets  $(-6, -2)$  (own) and  $(4, 4)$  (opponent) on a  $9 \times 7$  map. The radius of the circle is proportional to the average percentage of time spent on each location, so bigger circles indicate longer time spent. L0, L1, ..., E are the predicted choices of various level- $k$  types. The red dots represent individual final choices.




Supplementary Figure 20: Aggregate Empirical Percentage of Time Spent on Each Location for Game 20 with 2-dimensional Targets  $(4, 4)$  (own) and  $(-6, -2)$  (opponent) on a  $9 \times 7$  map. The radius of the circle is proportional to the average percentage of time spent on each location, so bigger circles indicate longer time spent. L0, L1, ..., E are the predicted choices of various level- $k$  types. The red dots represent individual final choices.







Supplementary Figure 21: Aggregate Empirical Percentage of Time Spent on Each Location for Game 21 with 2-dimensional Targets  $(-2, -4)$  (own) and  $(4, 2)$  (other) on a  $7 \times 9$  map. The radius of the circle is proportional to the average percentage of time spent on each location, so bigger circles indicate longer time spent. L0, L1, ..., E are the predicted choices of various level- $k$  types. The red dots represent individual final choices.




Supplementary Figure 22: Aggregate Empirical Percentage of Time Spent on Each Location for Game 22 with 2-dimensional Targets  $(4, 2)$  (own) and  $(-2, -4)$  (other) on a  $7 \times 9$  map. The radius of the circle is proportional to the average percentage of time spent on each location, so bigger circles indicate longer time spent. L0, L1, ..., E are the predicted choices of various level- $k$  types. The red dots represent individual final choices.




Supplementary Figure 23: Aggregate Empirical Percentage of Time Spent on Each Location for Game 23 with 2-dimensional Targets  $(-2, 6)$  (own) and  $(4, -4)$  (other) on a 7x9 map. The radius of the circle is proportional to the average percentage of time spent on each location, so bigger circles indicate longer time spent. L0, L1, ..., E are the predicted choices of various level- $k$  types. The red dots represent individual final choices.




Supplementary Figure 24: Aggregate Empirical Percentage of Time Spent on Each Location for Game 24 with 2-dimensional Targets  $(4, -4)$  (own) and  $(-2, 6)$  (other) on a 7x9 map. The radius of the circle is proportional to the average percentage of time spent on each location, so bigger circles indicate longer time spent. L0, L1, ..., E are the predicted choices of various level- $k$  types. The red dots represent individual final choices.




Supplementary Figure 25: Screen Shot of the SEPARATE Presentation




Supplementary Figure 26: Subject 11's *Hit* Time Normalized by *Hit* Area Size (Hard Games)




Supplementary Figure 27: Subject 15's *Hit* Time Normalized by *Hit* Area Size (Hard Games)




Supplementary Figure 28: Three-Trial Moving Average of Subject 6's *LookupScore* for Level- $k$  Types




(a) Subject 3




(b) Subject 17




(c) Subject 8



(d) Subject 11



(e) Subject 15



(f) Subject 14

Supplementary Figure 29: Individual Distribution of Initial Lookups (1% Time on Map)

## Sample Instructions:

### **EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS**

The experiment you are participating in consists of 48 rounds. At the end, you will be paid the amount you have earned from THREE randomly drawn rounds, plus a \$20 show-up fee. Everybody will be paid in private, and you are under no obligation to tell others how much you earned. During the experiment all the earnings are denominated in FRANCS. Your dollar earnings are determined by the FRANC/\$ exchange rate: 3 FRANCS = \$1.

You will wear an eye-tracking device which will track your eye movements. Please make sure you are not wearing contact lenses. You will be seated in front of the computer screen, showing the earnings tables, and make your choice by looking at the boxes on the screen. When looking at a box, it will light up, and will become your choice of action if you hit "space".

At the beginning of the session, the experimenter will adjust and calibrate the eye-tracker. To perform a calibration, look at the center of the screen (black dot) and hit space **once**. Then, the dot will disappear and move to a new location. Follow the black dot with your eyes and fixate at the new location until it disappears again. This procedure will be repeated until the dot returns to the center. (The same procedure will be repeated to validate the calibration.) At the start of each round, you will perform a self-correction by looking at the center of the screen (black dot) and hit the space bar.



### **Roles**

You and the other participant are paired to form a group, in which one participant will be member A, and the other member B. The roles of member A and B will be decided randomly by a die roll and you will maintain the same roles throughout the experiment.

### **The Decision**

There are 3 practice rounds and 48 real rounds. In each round, each of you simultaneously chooses a location (X, Y) on a given map, and your earnings are determined by your location and the other participant's location. In particular, each of you will have a "goal" which (together with the other participant's location) determines your "target location" for each round. Then, your earnings will be determined by how close you hit your target location.

For example, suppose the map consists of  $X=1\sim 5$  and  $Y=1\sim 7$ , and your goals are:

Member A	
LEFT 2	

Member B	
	BELOW 4

(This means that member A's target location is to choose **two blocks to the LEFT** of member B's location, while member B's target location is to choose **four blocks below** member A's location.)


Suppose member A's location is  $(X_a, Y_a)$ , and member B's location is  $(X_b, Y_b)$ . The target location for member A is  $(X_b - 2, Y_b)$ , and the target location of member B is  $(X_a, Y_a + 4)$ . The earnings for member A is (in FRANCS):

$$20 - |X_a - (X_b - 2)| - |Y_a - (Y_b + 0)|$$


While the earnings for member B is (in FRANCS):

$$20 - |X_b - (X_a + 0)| - |Y_b - (Y_a + 4)|$$


Note that the target location may be outside the map so you might not achieve 20. Also, note that the X's increase from left to right, and the Y's increase from top to bottom.



In each round, you will make a similar decision with **different** goals on a **different** map, which is shown to both sides. **However, no feedback will be provided after each round.** In each round, the goals of member A and B will be shown on the top-left and top-right corner. When you look at a location  $(X, Y)$ , it will light up with a red frame.



When looking at the box you want to choose, press "space" to make your choice. Then, the box will become red, and you will be asked "Are you sure?" Look at the bottom-left (YES) to confirm, or the bottom-right (NO) to start over again.





Member A
LEFT 2

Member B
BELOW 4

LEFT <=> RIGHT (x)

TOP <=> BOTTOM (y)

1,1	2,1	3,1	4,1	5,1
1,2	2,2	3,2	4,2	5,2
1,3	2,3	3,3	4,3	5,3
1,4	2,4	3,4	4,4	5,4
1,5	2,5	3,5	4,5	5,5
1,6	2,6	3,6	4,6	5,6
1,7	2,7	3,7	4,7	5,7

### QUIZ

In order to make sure you understand how your earnings are determined, we will now preform a quiz. Suppose you are member B, and the range of locations are X=1~5 and Y=1~7. Please write down your location choice. Then, the experimenter will tell you the (hypothetical) other's location choice, so you may calculate earnings for each member.

Member A
LEFT 2

Member B
BELOW 4

Member B's location choice: X= \_\_\_\_\_, Y= \_\_\_\_\_

Member A's location choice: X= \_\_\_\_\_, Y= \_\_\_\_\_

Member B's target location: X= \_\_\_\_\_, Y= \_\_\_\_\_

Member A's target location: X= \_\_\_\_\_, Y= \_\_\_\_\_

Member B's earning: 20 - \_\_\_\_\_ - \_\_\_\_\_ = \_\_\_\_\_

Member A's earning: 20 - \_\_\_\_\_ - \_\_\_\_\_ = \_\_\_\_\_

Please tell the experimenter if you have any concerns. **Your payments will be rounded up to the next dollar.** Thank you for your participation!